

Regional leaders in the global security arena: interests, strategies and capabilities ; 11th New Faces Conference 31 March–2 April 2008, Berlin, Germany

Bosold, David (Ed.); Brockmann, Kathrin (Ed.)

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version

Konferenzband / conference proceedings

Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:

SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Bosold, D., & Brockmann, K. (Eds.). (2009). *Regional leaders in the global security arena: interests, strategies and capabilities ; 11th New Faces Conference 31 March–2 April 2008, Berlin, Germany* (DGAP-Bericht, 14). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-129723>

Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use:

This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. This document is solely intended for your personal, non-commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain all copyright information and other information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the document in public.

By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated conditions of use.

DGAPbericht

Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Nº 14

April 2009

David Bosold, Kathrin Brockmann (eds.)

Regional Leaders in the Global Security Arena

Interests, Strategies and Capabilities

11th New Faces Conference
31 March–2 April 2008, Berlin, Germany
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Berlin 2009



DGAP

Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

David Bosold, Kathrin Brockmann (eds.)

Regional Leaders in the Global Security Arena

Interests, Strategies and Capabilities

11th New Faces Conference

31 March–2 April 2008, Berlin, Germany

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Berlin 2009

With the support of:

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**



Contents

Regional Leaders in the Global Security Arena

Introduction	5
------------------------	---

Kathrin Brockmann and David Bosold

Panel I: Regional Leaders and 21st Century Security Challenges – Missile Defence, Cyber Security and Peacekeeping

A Reassessment of the “Regional Turn” in Security Studies in Light of the Czech Missile Defense Experience	9
---	---

Nik Hynek and Vit Stritecky

Challenging Regional Power and Security: Conflicts in Space and Cyberspace	21
--	----

Mischa Hansel

Panel II: Powerhouse Asia – The Rise of India and China

India’s Look East Policy: Challenges and Opportunities	33
--	----

Monika Barthwal

Understanding China’s ‘Non-Intervention Policy’: Studying the Case of Myanmar.	43
--	----

LI Hak Yin

Panel III: Regional Leadership in the Middle East – Energy, WMDs and Terrorism

Regional Security Dynamics in the Middle East.	57
--	----

The Problematic Search for a Regional Leader

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi

Working out Gaza: Options for Regional Cooperation and the Role of Regional Leaders.	67
--	----

Ksenia Svetlova

Panel IV: Regional and Multilateral Approaches to Peace and Security in Africa

The African Peace and Security Architecture	75
---	----

Chrysantus Ayangafac

Peace and Security in West Africa: Supporting Regional Organizations	85
--	----

Till Blume and Matthias Mayr

Running with the Hare, Hunting with the Hounds	99
--	----

South Africa's Dual Role as Regional Power and Global Player

Miriam Prys

Panel V: Redefining the European Security Architecture – Strategic Partnerships and New Alliances

Primus inter Pares: Britain's Contribution to the Development of a European Union 'Grand Strategy'	109
---	-----

James Rogers

France's Renewed Atlanticism	121
--	-----

Luis Simón Navarro

Russia's Foreign Policy: A Review Of Putin's Rule	133
---	-----

Oleg Kozłowsky

Annex

Participants and Organizers	141
---------------------------------------	-----

The DGAP contributes to the assessment of international developments and the discussion of these issues by providing scholarly studies and publications. The opinions expressed in these publications are those of the authors.

Introduction

Regional Leaders in the Global Security Arena: Interests, Strategies and Capabilities

While theories of “new regionalism” consider regional security organizations as key actors to cope with complex security challenges, recent trends increasingly seem to suggest that individual countries take on the role of a “regional leader.” What are the characteristics of a “regional leader” and which countries currently deserve this label? Are only nation-states capable of assuming such a role? How do perceptions of regional leaders differ and in what way do these assessments result into different policies towards the respective countries or institutions? How does the rise of regional leaders affect the role and work of multilateral security organizations? How and where do different regional power patterns evolve and in how far does this affect the relationship between regional institutionalization (that is, formal organizational structures) and regional security? Theories of regionalization in the political and security sphere have long suggested that there is no simple causality between high institutionalization and a stable and secure region or vice versa. What happens if there are several potential leaders within the same region, but none of them enjoys clear dominance? In terms of organization and security this multi-leader situation can develop into quite different directions. In the case of Europe, potential leaders such as Germany and France have been able to overcome frictions by putting an end to previous and repeated military conflict, which has led to the most profound integration model we know today. On the other hand, several candidates for leadership in the Middle East have been facing an unparalleled period of rivalry and conflict detrimental to any form of regional cooperation and institutional build-up.

The fall of Iraq, the emergence of Iran as a—perceived or real—security threat in the region, the recent war in Gaza and the rise of oil prices, to name just a few factors, have led to a considerable shift in the Middle East’s constellation of power. Egypt seems to have lost some of its regional influence, while Saudi Arabia is establishing itself increasingly as the new regional leader, both politically—as a counterweight to Iran—and, together with the United Arab Emirates, economically, through strategic investments of its petro-dollar wealth on global financial markets. Turkey, which by some is being considered a bridge between Europe and the Middle East and thus a potential regional power broker, is being confronted with historically motivated prejudices throughout the Arab world. Syria, at least in theory, retains great potential for regional leadership, yet would need to overcome its isolation from the West due to its close alignment with Iran.

What are the regional agendas of the aforementioned actors and how will they shape the future of this most volatile and strategically important region in terms of security and stability?

Discussing regional leadership in Asia is less associated with military confrontation but with the region's economic potential and performance. Most notably, China and India come to mind in that respect. In the industrialized world the markets, production capacity and services industry of these countries are considered a great opportunity and also increasingly as a credible challenge. Their importance is growing not only in economic, but also in geo-political and security terms. India possesses impressive battle groups in the Indian Ocean, has extensive expertise in the field of strategic warfare and its traditional multilateralism is slowly being replaced by its striving for leadership. During a period of deepening economic and military cooperation between the US as well as East Asian states and India, Europe seems to be falling behind. China, traditionally a strong advocate of state sovereignty and noninterference, has gradually opened up towards regional security organizations, and has significantly increased its contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. What role will China and India assume in the global security arena and in regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)?

Yet, regional power dynamics are not exclusively limited to Asia, the Middle East and Europe. For instance, South Africa is by far the most powerful actor on the African continent both militarily and economically, and has long been claiming a role for regional leadership on the African continent. However, its capabilities to actually fulfill such a role remain limited. The African Union (AU) and its Common African Defense and Security Policy, on the other hand, have made considerable improvements, even though the African Standby Force will probably not become fully operational by 2010. Recent initiatives, not least by the EU and UN, have stressed the need for strengthening the AU, partnership and cooperation. Unfortunately, as recently became apparent in the cases of Sudan and Chad, capabilities remain scarce. What is the potential for South Africa, the African Union and the international community to contribute to regional stability in the long term?

The multi-leveled nature of the European Union, the constraints of intergovernmentalism and diverging national interests make the question of how emerging regional leaders should be dealt with a particularly challenging one within the EU. The dilemma between attempts to reach common positions and long-standing bilateral relationships makes it difficult for the EU to "speak with one voice."

Taking into consideration that countries such as Russia exert power in the EU's immediate neighborhood, i. e. with regard to Kosovo or Transnistria, it is obvious how pressing the challenge for the EU has become. However, some EU member states have the potential to assume leadership within the Union and could give new impulses to establishing the EU as a credible and effective regional actor in foreign and security policy. Despite the absence of a consistent group of leading member states, changing coalitions of member states considerably advanced ESDP, since its inception. Is an avant-garde group of leaders desirable for and conducive to integration dynamics in EU Foreign and Security Policy? Could the three largest member states France, Great Britain and Germany assume a similar role in ESDP as the Franco-German motor has done in the field of economic and political integration, and what will be the pre-conditions for such a development?

Regional Leaders are on the rise. The present volume presents the outcome of DGAP's 11th New Faces Conference, which, through various case studies, has thoroughly examined established and emerging "regional leaders", their geo-political agendas and security interests, their strategic partnerships with other countries, their role in regional security organizations and the international community, and their capabilities to provide stability and security in their region and beyond. As the following contributions show, we can find a multitude of understandings and conceptualizations of what constitutes 'power' and a 'region.' While there are certainly predominant understandings of the region as a synonym for a geographical unit we normally refer to as 'continent,' the reader will be confronted by rather unconventional conceptualizations of the regional category. The same holds true for most accounts of 'power' which is commonly conceived of as representing a quantifiable dimension of material assets such as military power, economic output and the like. Yet, as we can learn from the writings of Joseph Nye and his concept of 'soft power'—or Hillary Clinton's more or less identical idea of 'smart power'—power and influence also depend heavily on the attractiveness of ideas and concepts. We therefore hope that the following chapters will provide the reader with some fresh ideas on the different forms of regional power.

Kathrin Brockmann and David Bosold

A Reassessment of the “Regional Turn” in Security Studies in Light of the Czech Missile Defense Experience

Nik Hynek and Vit Stritecky

Introduction

This paper critically appraises the recent literature on security-oriented regionalism and on individual state leadership in regionally-anchored security matters, though with global implications. Two bodies of literature are identified and examined. Since this article also espouses an issue-oriented research strategy, the key question of practical utility of the two existing bodies in explaining the Czech missile defense experience is then put forward namely the question, whether the Czech Republic can be considered a regional security leader in general, or at least in particular as far as the missile defense case is concerned.

The authors argue that in order to make theoretical sense of the issue in question, two methodological and conceptual moves need to be made. Apart from the necessity to go beyond the material-ideational divide, exemplified in this paper by the investigation of material effects of the discourse on missile defense and the Czech Republic’s role in the system, it is mainly what we call the analysis of “supply-driven leadership.” The process of supply-driven—or conferred—leadership is studied through a shift from original bilateral responsabilization of the Czech Republic by the U.S. to subsequent Czech attempts to diffuse its newly acquired responsibility through standard multilateral channels, that is, NATO. In conclusion, implications of this dynamics for theories and approaches to regional leadership in security area are outlined.

Regional Security in Existing Theories of International Relations (IR)

Neo-utilitarian Approaches: (Neo-)Realism, Liberal Interdependence, and the Security-Complex Theory

Most of the recent realist scholarship, and neorealist thinking in particular, has built its explanatory framework around the crucial position of the distribution of power and the patterns and dynamics of power competition within the international system.¹ Despite its global (systemic) focus, some neo-realists have approached the regional level through the observation of alliance formation. Most notably, Walt has mitigated neorealist foreign policy determination and increased states’ operational options.² Traditional balancing has been complemented by a



Nik Hynek

1 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York, NY, 1979.

2 Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, NY, 1987.

possibility of band wagoning, that is, the support of the regional hegemon by other states. Moreover, Walt has also opened the black box of primary influence of material capabilities by bringing in the categories of proximity and intentions into threat consideration. The threat is therefore not solely based on the weaponry but also on the two latter factors when states formulate their security policy.

Slightly different, a "neo-classical" understanding of regional security is offered by the offensive realism advocated by Mearsheimer. According to this author, only strength ensures safety, hence the ultimate goal is to gain the safest position, which is that of a hegemon. There are no great powers seeking to maintain the status quo, since they all have a constant incentive to change the distribution of power.³ Secondly, he claims that liberals have brought only little empirical evidence of cooperation, which would not have appeared in the absence of institutions. "What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior."⁴

A major challenge to neo-realist patterns of description has come from the group of theories that could be subsumed under the label of interdependency liberalism. Although these theories also rely on structural effects to explain actors' behavior, the interdependency approaches are by no way restricted to the systemic level, that is, the global level, and hence provide an analytical platform for lower levels. The most prominent theoretical approach that aims at explaining international cooperation is based on the idea of interdependency as it is put forward in neo-liberal institutionalism. Also, neo-functionalist reflections on the regional interdependence became influential due to their focus on functional responses by states and, perhaps even more importantly, by the fundamental role attributed to the development of procedures cementing subsequent regional cooperation.⁵

Other important insights have been provided by the regional security complex theory.⁶ Regional security complex is defined as a "set of units, whose major processes securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another."⁷ Put differently, the crucial characteristics of a regional security complex are the patterns of amity and enmity, which reflect the patterns of security interdependence.

3 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, NY, 2001, pp. 362–363.

4 John J. Mearsheimer, *The false Promise of International Institutions*, in: *International Security*, No. 3/1994, p. 47.

5 Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford, CA, 1958.

6 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge 2003.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Reflectivist Approaches: The Pluralist-Security-Community Approach and the States-based Constructivist Approaches

Before we continue with the analysis of constructivist approaches, a few theoretical remarks deserve to be mentioned here. First, both theoretical and practical earthquakes that took place between the late 1980s and the early 1990s have brought about the shift from neo-utilitarianism to constructivism. As for the theoretical challenges, the so-called third debate resulted in a stronger focus on social practices and explanations for change in which constructivism emerged as the most viable alternative to neo-utilitarian approaches.⁸ Second, the demise of the Soviet Union and the former Communist states revealed the poverty of existing approaches to explain or even foresee this fundamental shift in the real world.

Two strands of reflectivist scholarship dealing with security and its regional anchor exist and will be examined in turn. The first type that is concerned here can be labeled the pluralistic security community approach. The centerpiece of Deutsch et al.’s⁹ transactionist approach was formed around the idea that communication is the cement of the group cohesion. In other words, more communication brings about more cohesion. Unlike realists and neo-realists, the pluralistic security community approach argues that states and even entire regions are embedded in different environmental contexts. Hence, state interactions cannot be situated within one and universally applicable model of the international system. The direct relevance for more recent constructivist scholars dealing with security represents the argument concerning the impact of transnational forces on states’ behavior and deeper embedded collective identities. Adler and Barnett, in resurrecting Deutsch’s intellectual legacy, hold that the security-community approach is informed by the logic of community. They delimit the pluralistic community as a “transnational region comprising sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”¹⁰ and propose a three-tier approach to their studying. The first tier consists of precipitating factors that encourage states to coordinate their policies; the second tier features structural elements of power and ideas as well as international organizations and processes of social learning;

8 Nikola Hynek, Conditions of emergence and their (bio)political effects: political rationalities, governmental programmes and technologies of power in the landmine case, in: *Journal of International Relations and Development*, No. 2/2008, pp. 93–120; Hynek, Andrea Teti, Saving Identity from Postmodernism? Disciplining Constructivism and Governing the ‘International’, in: *Contemporary Political Theory* (2009, forthcoming); Hynek, Sociální konstruktivismus, in: Pavel Pšejka (ed.), *Přehled teorií mezinárodních vztahů*, Brno 2005, pp. 129–144; Hynek, Anglická škola a teorie mezinárodních vztahů. Obsahový vesmír, akademický svět a kritiky přístupu, in: *Mezinárodní vztahy*, No. 2/2005, pp. 76–89; Mark Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate, in: *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, No. 3/1987, pp. 231–249; Mark Hoffman, Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory, in: *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, No. 2/1991, pp. 169–185.

9 Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community: North-Atlantic Area*, New York, NY, 1957.

10 Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998, p. 30.

and, finally, the third tier is centered at the development of trust and (transnational) collective identity.¹¹

The pluralistic security community approach has been complemented by state-based approaches. These usually deal with the question of how states can enhance their international power and credibility, rendering them particularly important for the study of middle powers¹² and small states.¹³ Role conceptions theory—adapted from social psychology and sociology—plays the central role in these approaches. Introduced to political science by Holsti,¹⁴ role theory can be conceived of as an analytical framework stressing out the importance of cognitive and cultural factors. As Holsti maintains,

“A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems.”¹⁵

Furthermore, according to Aggestam,¹⁶ role conception is a normative self-perception of expected foreign policy held by policymakers. Role conception thus indicates the intentionality of an actor, and the main focus is directed to the ways in which actors themselves interpret different roles in the realms of foreign and security policy. To mention but a few, a bridge/mediator, a partner, or a leader can be mentioned as role examples. The crucial notion in role theory is its recognition by other states, aptly described by Andrew Cooper as “the kudos received from outsiders.”¹⁷

In order to illustrate the explanatory power of the theories presented above, we will now turn to the case of the Missile Defense system to be installed in the Czech Republic.

11 Ibid.

12 Hynek, Robert C. Thomsen, *Keeping the Peace and National Unity: Canada’s National and International Identity Nexus*, in: *International Journal*, No. 4/2006, pp. 845–858; Hynek, *Canada as a Middle Power: Conceptual Limits and Promises*, in: *Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, No. 2/2006, pp. 132–155; Adam Chapnick, *The Middle Power Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations*, Vancouver 2005.

13 Christine Ingebritsen (ed.), *Small States in International Relations*, Seattle, WA, 2006; Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.), *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior*, Boulder, CO, 2003.

14 Kal Holsti, *National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, in: Stephen Walker (ed.), *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis*, Durham, NC, 1987, pp. 5–43.

15 Ibid., p. 12.

16 Lisbeth Aggestam, *A Common Foreign and Security Policy: Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in the EU*, in: Aggestam, Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Security and Identity in Europe: Exploring the New Agenda*, Houndmills 2000, pp. 86–115.

17 Andrew F. Cooper, ‘Coalitions of Willing’: The Search for Alternative Partners in Canadian Diplomacy, Paper presented at the Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies, Grainau, Germany 2000, p. 12.

Regional Expansion of the Missile Defense and the Role of the Czech Republic¹⁸

The idea to build the European pillar of the US missile defense system has been a feature of the country's policy since the 1980s. The first preliminary consultations concerning the issue of the recent anti-missiles shield took place during the summer of 2002. By then, the Czech Republic expressed its endeavor to harbor both components of the system: the X-band radar as well as the interceptors. Poland, which was simultaneously consulted by the US, had a similar attitude. After these negotiations the exchange of various technical data relevant for the placement and proper functioning of the system followed. The development accelerated during the summer 2006, when the US experts examined the territories offered by the Czech Republic. At that point it became clear that the facilities of the system were to be split between Poland and the Czech Republic. Whereas Poland was selected for harboring the battery of interceptors, the Czech Republic was asked to provide a suitable place for the X-band radar aimed at detecting, tracing and following possible attacking missiles from the Middle East, most probably Iran. The official request by the US government reached Prague in January 2007 and the official negotiations started in May of the same year.

The issue of the missile defense could be investigated from various perspectives. However, the following lines underline some aspects of the negotiations solely from the Czech Republic vantage point. First of all, it should be emphasized that the negotiations with the US government have been held on a strictly bilateral basis. Although the bilateral structure was an inevitable outcome of the US preferences, the asymmetry of negotiation positions of the two countries is striking (i. e. the Czech government being purely reactive for quite a long time). Moreover, at least since the visit of the American Minister of Defense, Robert Gates, in October 2007, it became publicly apparent that the US was conducting parallel negotiations with the greatest opponent of the US missile defense, Russia, about Russian conditions for the presence of the US system in Central Europe.¹⁹ In light of critical mass media reactions and the majority of the population opposing the US X-band radar being placed in the country, the Czech governmental representatives defended the country's involvement by stressing gains in economic and military areas (it is still very unclear if there will be any major gains of this type for the country).

¹⁸ The following part is based on the research conducted by the team of authors from the Institute of International Relations within the project of analytical survey of the Czech Foreign Policy in 2007 and on several additional interviews with the representatives of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Office of Government.

¹⁹ Gates embarrassingly mentioned a possibility of a Russian presence on the base on the press conference, which had thus far been a non-issue in the Czech discourse.

The only attempts to multilateralize the issue have been connected to Czech diplomatic efforts to deal with the issue in NATO. However, the debate there has rather been reserved as there is open opposition to the plans by some members as well as indifference by others. This demureness has mostly been reflected in the non-existence of a binding agreement concerning political obligations of NATO. This is in a contrast to the continuation of a technical/military process in NATO which has been called for in a so-called “Feasibility study”, setting major moves in the direction of the NATO-developed and led anti-ballistic missile system (ALTBMD).

Some changes were expected from NATO’s Bucharest summit, held in April 2008. The crucial issue for the Czech government has been the decision to link the US system to the NATO one. Yet, it seems to be clear that the strategic debate within NATO is far from allowing for binding decisions. Nevertheless, the crucial importance for the Czech political theatre lies in the fact that the Green Party, which has been a member of the current Czech government coalition, made its consent with the X-band radar placement conditional on further (and still quite undefined) NATO involvement. As the opposition in Parliament will most probably vote against the radar, the support of the Greens is crucial. Due to the absence of a domestic strategic debate, the Czech national discussion has so far been dominated by either staunch opponents or keen proponents. Most interestingly, many fundamental topics have been avoided.

In Lieu of Conclusion: The Paucity of Suitable Theories in Light of a “Supply-Driven” Leadership

What can we learn from and say about the Czech Republic’s position in the US missile defense project in light of the theories outlined in the first part of this chapter? Can the Czech Republic be considered a regional leader as far as the issue of missile defense is concerned? What characteristics determine regional leadership as far as the position of the Czechs in the issue is concerned?

As for the neo-utilitarian regional approaches to security, the main challenge to theoretically viable explanations represents the size and (relatively modest) military capabilities of the Czech Republic, a small country. A neo-realist perspective, as put forward by Kenneth Waltz, would have problems to explain the Czech decision and the governmental approval for the placement of the X-band radar since the theory would be unable to observe any major reconstitution of the balance of power in terms of power-distribution. In terms of military—read nuclear—capabilities the international system remains similar to the past. As we

have seen in the theoretical section, the Cold War (with its simple and constraining macrostructure) has never ceased to exist due to the fact that no other country has emerged as a great power since 1990.

More interesting—however flawed—insights would be gained by bringing in a regionally-sensitive neo-realism as put forward by Stephen Walt. A country such as the Czech Republic would be expected to strategically bandwagon, that is, foster ties with the current hegemon, in situations where its own national security would be considered as deteriorating (e.g. in light of imminent, or even prospective, threat). For Walt, this process would eventually lead to overcoming mutual distrust and the beginning of an alliance formation. Since the Czech Republic has been a NATO member for some time and since this organization, unlike the EU, possesses some significant military capabilities, it would only seem logical that the Czech Republic would embrace missile defense through such a multilateral platform. Empirically, nevertheless, none of this actually took place. First, it was not the Czech Republic that felt acutely threatened (either by an explicit Iranian or an implicit Russian/Chinese threat), but it was rather the US. Second, since the US perception of this threat was translated into the country’s pressure on the Czech Republic to harbor the radar, the band wagoning thesis does not hold water. It is also questionable, whether the Czech approval has meant an increase in operational options for the country or the opposite. More concretely, a reduction in the country’s options given that it has become tightly dependent on US decisions



Till Blume, Mischa Hansel, Tim Strabbing and Nik Hynek

regarding the radar and having faced hostile opposition from a number of other NATO and / or EU members.

As for offensive realism, two points suffice to illustrate the inability to explain the dynamic of missile defense in the light of its theoretical premises. First, the US has never had greater military and technological superiority than in recent years. Hence, one would expect it to strike against Iranian nuclear capabilities in the first place. Missile defense is thus simply not an appealing solution for such a proponent of offensive strategies. As a result, no cooperation on this issue would be expected from a small state. Second, even in the improbable event of the US asking the Czech Republic for consent in terms of the radar installation, one would not only expect the US to dictate all the conditions. In addition, one would rule out the possibility of the Czech side in eventually succeeding (at least partially) to transfer the issue onto a NATO platform against the will of the Bush administration. This is due to the theory's belief in the non-existence of an independent power of international institutions vis-à-vis the hegemonic interests of their members (i.e. the US setting the agenda within NATO as the most powerful member). Finally, the more logical option for the theory's proponents would be the US decision to stop negotiations with the Czech Republic and transfer the radar to Poland which has been skeptical of the multilateral NATO dimension and would support the agreement on a bilateral basis regardless of NATO and EU opposition.

Liberal strands of neo-utilitarian theories get to an explanatory impasse, too. These theories are ill-suited to explain military issues as they start with the premise of the economic effects of cooperation on states' behavior. They would thus argue that it is difficult to see why an increase in economic help to Iran and other possible remedies should not be given priority over the missile defense system. Expectations of a spill-over effect and complex social learning as an outcome of interaction are inherently present in these approaches. Moreover, these approaches would put into doubt that negotiations between the US and the Czech Republic would be conducted on a bilateral basis since multilateralism has been the staple of these approaches. Even in light of a partial transfer of the issue to NATO, one would still face difficulties to explain why the US agreed to the NATO dimension in the first place. The fact that this decision has been tactical only and the US has not practiced substantive, but rather nominal multilateralism²⁰ within NATO does not make it significantly easier for these theories to explain the practical dynamics. Other liberal approaches, most notably globalist liberal-

20 John G. Ruggie, *Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution*, in: John G. Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York, NY, 1993, pp. 3–47.

ism resting on the idea of societal interdependency,²¹ would get into even greater difficulties since the role of territoriality is reduced to a minimum, arguing that world politics is actually becoming more de-territorialized than anytime before. These approaches are particularly blind to the geopolitical dimension of the third pillar as their understanding of a region: both in its Euclidean-geographical and socially-cognitive senses.

Compared with the above approaches, Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complex theory looks promising in terms of the ability to integrate the regional level of security into a neo-realist analysis while adding some touches of constructivism. It is precisely constructivism that adds the qualitatively most important added value to the traditional neorealist analysis. The theory’s insights are nowhere more visible than in the innovative idea of so-called securitization. According to its proponents, constructivism is needed to distinguish between securitization and politicization and, who can securitize an issue and under which conditions.²² Securitization in that respect means the ability of an actor, e.g. a government, to receive popular and parliamentary support for a security related decision and action.

What can one say about the empirical case from a securitization perspective? First, the way the US has securitized the Iranian threat suggests the authors are right in claiming that one needs significant material resources to successfully securitize a threat, that is, to receive support for the claim that Iran is a serious security threat. This claim is circulated in the international system and subsequently planted into other states’ national security discourses. Buzan and Wæver, however, show strong elements of linear thinking in that they move back and forth along the line (with thresholds) on which segments of a non-issue, a politicized issue and, finally, a securitized issue can be discerned. A successfully securitized issue, according to them, cannot be made a non-issue, or, simultaneously, a politicized issue given that the process of securitization elevates the issue to a level of such grave seriousness that no questions about the reality of the threat are allowed. As far as the empirical evidence suggests, the securitization process in the missile defense case has been rather uneven and certainly non-linear.

The problem with their definition can be termed here as the “problem of the multidirectional nature of (de)securitization”. Although the authors do acknowledge that securitization can take place at different levels (the so-called “mixed

²¹ Jan A. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, London 2000.

²² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO, 1998.

securitization’),²³ they are unable to explain how it has been possible for the US to concurrently securitize and desecuritize the issue not only at different levels but also at the same level. How could the authors account for the presence of the (successfully securitized) US necessity to introduce the third pillar of their missile defense system as far as the Czech and Polish audience is concerned while, simultaneously, down playing its possible impact on the strategic balance as far as audiences in Russia and China are concerned? This disparity can also be revealed at the technical level of the issue: While the prospective Czech-based US X-band radar and Polish-based US interceptors are portrayed as properly tested, sophisticated systems of high accuracy in light of the possibility of an Iranian missile being shot at the US/Europe, the systems capabilities are repeatedly being kept low as far as their possible effect on the Russian nuclear arsenal is concerned. The theory’s proponents can thus not explain how a leading securitizing actor—the US—has been, at the same time, a leading desecuritizing actor. This is due to their blindness in recognizing the multiple arenas with different deployed objectives/logics, which make the same actors to behave differently.

The constructivist turn has definitely brought the wind of change as far as the style of security theorization is concerned. As the last paragraphs demonstrate, nevertheless, it has suffered, too—despite its heuristic value—, from deficiencies when confronted with reality check. In concrete terms, Deutsch’s transactionalist approach to pluralistic security communities cannot explain why the Czech Republic and Poland have decided to work out the issue of missile defense bilaterally with the US rather than through the two existing pluralistic security communities of which they are members, namely NATO and the EU. This is rather a surprising development since, according to Deutsch, an increase in security communication is also an indicator of where and how issues are being solved. The density of other security-related talks in which Czechs and Poles have taken part has definitely been much greater in NATO and the EU compared with the history of direct bilateral negotiation of the two countries with the US. The same can be said in regard to Adler and Barnett²⁴ who argue that the existence of external threat is one of three precipitating conditions for the emergence of a security community. The two countries did not press (apart from the Greens in the Czech Republic) for a security-community approach though the security communities have been existing and have had, at least in case of NATO, their own missile defense strategy.

23 Ibid., p. 18.

24 Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998.

What does the above development then tell us about the collective identities of actors? First, the idea of mutual non-exclusion of collective identities is not so clear-cut when examined against the background of missile defense. Why, then, has there be so much open governmental opposition in the Czech Republic and Poland against the attempt to simultaneously work out the issue through more than one channel? This would make sense from a military-strategic perspective as the US national missile defense has been concerned with territorial missile defense (planned to take place largely outside the atmosphere through the use of ground-based exo-atmospheric interceptors), whereas NATO has been working on a theatre missile defense system ensuring security through the use of PAC-3 (“Patriots”) and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems. The only explanation—and, thus, challenge to both Deutsch as well as Adler and Barnett—has been the possibility of being a member of a pluralistic security community and, at the same time, not having too positive opinions about its possible actions and capabilities. As for the EU’s role, both the Czech and Polish governments have not seen any point in addressing the issue on this platform. This is understandable since the EU has not implemented or discussed any strategy appertaining to missile defense. However, the ideological opposition of the recent Tusk and the past Kaczynski governments in Poland (and, to lesser extent, of the current Czech government) towards NATO with its existing and complementary missile-defense strategies is surprising. It directly challenges Deutsch as well as Adler and Barnett on grounds of their argument that, in order to have a functioning pluralistic security community, mutual trust among members must exist. Hardly can one believe that this has been the case in the missile-defense issue, i. e. the issue in which the distrust among NATO members has further been exacerbated by skeptical French (the deterrence theory argument), Norwegian (domestic political cycle) and German (Neo-Ostpolitik) governments. Simultaneously, the opposite—i. e. that NATO is a dysfunctional community—is not true either. The suggestion is that the argument concerning the relationship between a community collective identity and mutual trust of its members is much more complex. Also, the Czech experience challenges Adler and Barnett’s argument about social learning always preceding successful identity formation. Had it not been for the Czech Green Party, a junior coalition government member, the missile defense would not have been channeled through NATO.

The issue of collective identity brings the analysis to the latest form of state-based constructivist approaches focusing on the notion of role conception. Additionally, these approaches directly tackle the question of a security leadership, here delimited as regional security leadership. The question that has been proposed is to what extent the Czech Republic can be understood as a regional

security leader in terms of its role in missile defense? What can the scholarship that often investigates small states and their specific collective identities tell us about the above question? First, these approaches usually begin with a formulation of a role conception inside investigated states. The burden of activity is thus placed on the government which formulates and consequently exports country's roles outside, to the international system. This seems only logical when one speaks about states as leaders. Can the Czech Republic be considered a leader in the missile defense issue? It is argued that one's answer depends on ideological beliefs and preferences: While for Germany and France as the core of the Old Europe both the Czech Republic and (even more) Poland are usually labeled traitors and spoilers, for the US, however, the latter two countries are true leaders since they have understood the nature of the existing threat and the necessity to do something about it. Regardless of one's own political beliefs, it is maintained that a key challenge state-based oriented constructivism faces is that the Czech Republic has actually not created any distinct role conception connected to the missile defense issue for itself, but rather has this role been supplied to it by the US. In methodological terms, the above approaches are flawed inasmuch as they are propositionally based on the "demand-driven" leadership while the reality of the issue strongly suggests the Czech Republic has become the object of "supply-driven" leadership politics.²⁵ Extending the argument one step further, the Czech Republic cannot be understood as a leader in the discussed issue because it has not actively carved a diplomatic niche for itself in the missile defense problématique.

It is rather surprising that apart from Martha Finnemore, who introduced the concept of supply-driven norms into IR, no other scholar working in constructivist tradition has attempted to use this cardinal insight for security issues, including the issue of missile defense. To conclude, reflective approaches and also the securitization scholarship certainly have potential to move the theorization of regional security issues further, but they also need to rectify some of the flaws that have been accompanying them. As for the issue of missile defense and the role of the Czech Republic, the key research focus for future studies on this topic should be directed at answering a question how a country can actually become a leader against its own will.

25 For a concept of supply-driven norms, see Martha Finnemore, *International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy*, in: *International Organization*, No. 4/1993, pp. 565–597.

Challenging Regional Power and Security: Conflicts in Space and Cyberspace¹

Mischa Hansel

Introduction

The following analysis focuses on prerequisites rather than opportunities of regional security. It addresses the precarious relationship between regional security, regional power and the inherently global domains of space and cyberspace. Put simply, the very concept of regional security is based on the prerequisite that geographical position matters. For example, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the controversy on NATO enlargement went beyond the sheer numbers of weapons systems or allies respectively. They focussed just as much on the geographical positions of troops and new alliance members. Usually, distance increases security whereas proximity enhances the level of threat.² This is true as well for economic aspects of security. The economic well-being of societies depends on the protection of its resources and markets from those areas where brute force determines the distribution of goods.

The nature of power-projecting forces, among other factors, increases or decreases the prospects of regional security and regional power centers. Conventional land power, sea power, and air power are unevenly distributed and constrained by directions, locations and jurisdictions. Even the effectiveness of air power is, to a considerable extent, terrestrially determined. The efficiency of the US Air Force is, for example, critically dependent on land-based regional air bases.³ It cannot gauge the air defenses of potential enemies without violating the sovereignty of their airspace. Assets in space or cyberspace are different: they tend to be ubiquitous and decisively encourage global interactions. Moreover, they are exposed to environments in which sovereignty is absent or problematic respectively. For all of these reasons, it is quite difficult to selectively exclude actors (irrespective of distance) from defensive or offensive postures in those domains. Conflict in space and cyberspace could therefore seriously challenge regional security and regional powers. On the other hand, regional powers cannot leave space and cyberspace untapped for both military as well as economic reasons. They are more



Mischa Hansel

1 I thank Esra Pakin, Alexandra Patin, Gloria Reyes, Thomas Jäger, John Akude and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions.

2 Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, in: *International Security*, No. 4/1984, pp. 9–11.

3 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power, Space Power and Geography, in: Colin S. Gray (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, London 1999, pp. 76–79.

and more drawn into a global strategic game, which is crucial to understand in order to manage its destabilizing influences.

The ensuing analysis is intended to adumbrate a few more specific thoughts on these issues. It is divided into three steps: First, I briefly illuminate the divergent perspectives of key actors on space and cyberspace. Second, I show why and how both domains are becoming increasingly contested. Finally, I take into account the consequences of this strategic constellation in terms of regional security and international stability in general.

Perspectives on Space and Cyberspace

In order to keep costs and casualties low, the United States is at the forefront of incorporating globalizing technologies into its war fighting capabilities. For instance, the percentage of guided munitions (via lasers or GPS signals) rose from eight per cent in the 1991 Gulf War to 34 per cent in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. By the time Operation Iraqi Freedom took place, that figure had risen to 68 per cent.⁴ In 1991, the majority of intra-theatre and inter-theatre communications (85 per cent) were already transmitted by satellites.⁵ However, 500 000 US soldiers in 1991 had seven-time less bandwidth at their disposal than 50 000 in Afghanistan had in 2001.⁶ Finally, the Pentagon uses more than 5 million computers on 100 000 networks at 1500 sites.⁷ Encompassing all these networks is the Global Information Grid (GIG).

By exploiting those space and cyberspace assets, conventional military power could be used more decisively, selectively, and efficiently than ever before. Attrition strategies are superseded by precision warfare. At least, these are the ideas of the proponents of what is called a revolution in military affairs (RMA).⁸ Most notably, the risks of American soldiers in combat are minimized. In the 1991 Gulf War, coalition forces lost no more than 327 soldiers while fighting against a huge Iraqi army. The Kosovo air campaign in 1999 was conducted without a single casualty among pilots. Only one western soldier died in conventional battles fought in Afghanistan in 2001 and only 172 in Iraq in 2003.⁹ The underlying technologi-

4 Martin Sieff, U.S. Space Assets Vital but Vulnerable, <<http://spacewar.com/news/milspace-05x.html>> (03/04/2008).

5 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power, Space Power and Geography, in: Colin S. Gray (ed.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*, London 1999, p. 74.

6 William B. Scott, Milspace Comes of Age in Fighting Terror, in: *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, No. 14/2002, pp. 77–78.

7 Peter Brooks, Countering the Art of Information Warfare, <<http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed101607a.cfm>> (05/03/2008).

8 A critical assessment is provided by Stephen Biddle, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the American Military Transformation, in: John Baylis et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford 2007, pp. 274–294.

9 Martin Shaw, *The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer War and its Crisis in Iraq*, Cambridge 2005, p. 10.

cal dynamic of the RMA is spurred by the civilian information technology (IT) industry. Thus, there is a favorable synergy between economic prosperity and military advantages.¹⁰

Regional powers aligned with the United States are forced to adapt. Otherwise they risk political marginalization even when crises break out in their vicinity. This was the case when European NATO members lacked sufficient satellite images during the Kosovo crisis.¹¹ Since European populations do not tolerate higher casualties or higher costs than American voters do and staying competitive in the global knowledge economy requires a vital IT and space industry, there are economic, military, and political incentives for European states to formulate and implement vigorous space and cyberspace policies.¹² Hence, even if their ambitions were limited to the regional level, they nevertheless would have their stake in space and cyberspace.

Non-aligned regional powers, especially authoritarian ones, are pressed to selectively embrace and partially deny the use of global information infrastructure. Economic development requires participation. But the inclusion in global information flows threatens to undermine political control. Countermeasures are taken to solve this dilemma. 30 000 employees in Chinese security institutions are occupied with monitoring internet activity. In response to ever increasing internet usage, the tasks of surveillance and interception are gradually being automated by software tools.¹³ Furthermore, foreign services providers are compelled to enable or take over part of the censorship themselves.¹⁴ However, internet censorship is far from being confined to China alone.¹⁵ Recently, Pakistani efforts to block ac-

10 In the past, technologies developed for military usage like rockets or the precursor of the internet gradually enabled civil applications as well. In case of the RMA, the transfer tends to proceed the other way around—from the civil IT sector to the military (see Eliot Cohen, *Technology and Warfare*, in: John Baylis et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford 2007, pp. 141–159.) For an alternative view emphasizing a single body of knowledge behind military and civil innovations see Barry Buzan, Eric Herring, *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, Boulder, CO, 1998, pp. 20–23.

11 Mischa Hansel, '(Although) it's not Rocket Science': A Theoretical Concept for Assessing National Space Policies in Europe, Köln 2007, pp. 10–11, 21–22.

12 For space policies and capabilities in Europe see Theresa Hitchens, Tomas Valasek, *European Military Space Capabilities*, Washington, DC, 2006; Thomas Jäger, Mischa Hansel, *Nationale Weltraumpolitiken im Vergleich: Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien und Großbritannien und die Kooperationsoptionen im Rahmen der Europäischen Union*, in: Heiko Borchert (ed.), *Europas Zukunft zwischen Himmel und Erde. Weltraumpolitik für Sicherheit, Stabilität und Prosperität*, Baden-Baden 2005, pp. 13–33.

13 James A. Lewis, *The Architecture of Control: Internet Surveillance in China*, <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/0706_cn_surveillance_and_information_technology.pdf> (03/05/2008).

14 Mure Dickie, Stephanie Kirchgaessner, *Evildoers? How the West's Net Vanguard Toils Behind the Great Firewall of China*, in: *Financial Times*, 02/15/2006.

15 Reporters without Borders, *The 15 Enemies of the Internet and other Countries to Watch*, <http://www.rsf.org/print.php?id_article=15613> (04/09/2008).

cess to YouTube videos unintentionally caused an almost global blackout of the popular website.¹⁶

Escaping the sensors of satellites passing above one's territory is another challenge to political control. Not only secret services, but occasionally also human rights initiatives pursue their aims with the aid of satellite photos.¹⁷ Sovereignty does not extend into space, for it is legally defined as a global common in analogy to the high seas. Thus, aside from attacking the satellite, states can only disrupt transmissions or conceal their secrets on the ground. For example, Iran and Libya are suspected to have jammed the transmission of foreign satellite channels.¹⁸ However, the primary problem with globalizing technologies from the perspective of non-western powers is the overwhelming power western militaries generate from their incorporation.

Contested Spaces

Confronted with the superiority of western capabilities of warfare, non-western powers are driven to unconventional responses. They develop and signal asymmetric warfare capabilities to deter interventions. Some states are looking to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Being options of last resort, they enable the protection of national territory but not of regional interests. Thus, there is a strong temptation to threaten the western 'Achilles heel' in space and cyberspace.

The Chinese test of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 seems to reveal such a strategy.¹⁹ On January 11, 2007 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) destroyed an old weather satellite with a ballistic missile. This demonstration of an advanced anti-satellite capability produced a massive cloud of space debris, indiscriminately and permanently threatening other spacecraft.²⁰ There are recommendations for other anti-satellite techniques and systems found in Chinese professional journals,²¹ although the influence of those ideas among the political leadership remains unclear. However, the testing and deployment of a debris-producing anti-satellite

16 BBC News, YouTube Outage Blamed on Pakistan, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/7262071.htm>> (02/25/2008).

17 For example see the 'Eyes on Darfur'-Project of Amnesty International, <<http://www.eyesondarfur.org/satellite.html>> (01/10/2008). Other cases are reported by Peter N. Spotts, Monitoring Human Rights? Get a Satellite, in: The Christian Science Monitor, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0622/p03s03-usfp.htm>> (04/09/2008).

18 Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2006, <<http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2006.pdf>> (01/09/2008).

19 Ashley J. Tellis, China's Military Space Strategy, in: Survival, No. 3/2007, pp. 41–72.

20 Frank Morring, China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever, in: Aviation Week & Space Technology, <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw021207p2.xml> (05/25/2007).

21 Michael C. Pillsbury, An Assessment of China's Anti-Satellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies and Doctrines, <http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2007/FINAL_REPORT_1-19-2007_REVISIED_BY_MPP.pdf> (03/10/2008).

weapon is a prime example of how regional policies cannot escape their global implications when pursued in space and cyberspace. Such an action is probably meant to deter a future western intervention in a regional conflict scenario—for example with respect to Taiwan. Nonetheless, the security of all space powers has been diminished in the aftermath of the test.

The temptation to explore ways of space warfare is made even stronger due to the fact that not only western militaries, but society as a whole is crucially dependent on space systems. Telecommunications, traffic systems, transportation and energy sectors, as well as emergency services and financial transactions are enabled, managed, and monitored via those systems. Unsurprisingly, the United States regards the security of space as a vital interest.²² Western militaries are amongst the actors utilizing various civil and commercial capacities. For example, commercial satellites transmitted 80 per cent of all satellite communications during Operation Iraqi Freedom.²³ Both military and civil space assets are basically unprotected. Until now, the relative inaccessibility of space is their most efficient form of protection. In contrast, further protective measures are quite expensive. Incorporating defensive devices or extra fuel reserves into satellites en-

22 The White House, U.S. National Space Policy, 8, <<http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/usa/SpacePolicy2006.pdf>> (03/10/2008).

23 United States Air Force, Space Operations, Maxwell Air Force Base, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afdd2_2.pdf> (03/10/2008).



Discussant Esra Pakin from Turkey

abling them to repel or evade attacks adds 10–20 per cent to system costs.²⁴ Being without efficient protection and following predictable paths, satellites have been described as “sitting ducks,”²⁵ downright inviting attacks. Making things worse, the combination of few and expensive satellites which characterizes most space system architectures provides only limited redundancy. Therefore, a lot of damage could be expected from but a few hits.

Experts vastly disagree on the vulnerability of cyberspace.²⁶ Grounded in the originally military purpose of a network structure there is an inherently high degree of redundancy working in favor of the defender.²⁷ But its very connectivity turns into a disadvantage as computer viruses and worms may unpredictably spread. The computer worm MyDoom, for example, which spread in January and February 2004, at its peak slowed down global internet performance by 10 per cent. The most damaging viruses and worms LoveLetter, Code Red, Blaster, and Sobig.F each inflicted an estimated economic damage between 2 and 15 billion US dollars.²⁸ However, far from attempting to destroy or degrade the whole network structure, real attackers might secretly scan or disrupt specific networks and data while leaving cyberspace functional as a whole. PLA cyber warfare units which have been established since 2003 are suspected to have spied on various Western governments’ and private sector networks.²⁹ Regional security in economic and military terms is threatened by such electronic attacks. Before the information age, sources of economic strength like heavy industries and natural resources could only be targeted by physical force. They had to be conquered or destroyed in order to shift the balance of economic power. Armies could effectively shield a region’s wealth. Nowadays, the economic well-being of some regions (North America, Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia) increasingly rests on the knowledge which underlies competitive services and high-tech-products.³⁰ Inasmuch as such knowledge is stored in a virtual environment, it can be attacked

24 Paul Nordin, *Hardness and Survivability Requirements*, in: Wiley J. Larson, James R. Wertz (eds.), *Space Mission Analysis and Design*, Torrance, CA, 1992, p. 226.

25 William Marshall et al., *Space Weapons: The Urgent Debate*, in: *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Nr. 1/2005, p. 28.

26 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, *Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States*, Hanover, NH, 2004, <<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf>> (03/10/2008), pp. 12–13.

27 James A. Lewis, *Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection*, Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0601_cscip_preliminary.pdf> (03/04/2008), pp. 6–7.

28 George Jones, *Viruses and Worms*, in: *Informationweek*, 07/10/2006. For a critical assessment of such damage estimates, particularly the inclusion of opportunity costs for individual firms, see James A. Lewis, *Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection*, Washington, DC, 2006, <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0601_cscip_preliminary.pdf>, (03/04/2008).

29 John J. Tkacik, Jr., *Trojan Dragon: China’s Cyber Threat*, Washington, DC, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf> (03/10/2008), pp. 3–7. See also Jürgen Dahlkamp et al., Prinzip Sandkorn, in: *Der Spiegel*, 08/27/2007.

30 Peter F. Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity, Guidelines to our Changing Society*, London 1969.

by non-physical forces via cyberspace. Now, copying instead of conquest is required for redistributing economic wealth by force. Therefore, physical protection alone can no longer safeguard regional resources and markets. On the other hand, cyber warfare units pose risks in terms of military security. They could be employed to secretly probe the vulnerabilities of military networks, providing the opportunity to use or distort critical data in times of conflict.

Even individual attackers are powerful in cyberspace, unlike in space: indeed, basic access is dead easy. Attackers can effectively conceal their identity by various means.³¹ Cyber-attacks are barely inhibited by physical borders, contrary to law enforcement. A really comprehensive and global cooperation would have to overcome the basic reluctance of authorities towards data exchange.³² Another advantage for attackers is the low degree of material resources and technological sophistication they need to construct their warfare instruments or detect software vulnerabilities. Vast networks of already contaminated computers, allowing remote control without their owner's permission and knowledge are rented or sold. Called bot nets, they cost just 200 to 300 US dollars per hour.³³ The massive attacks on the internet root servers in February 2007 might have been cyber criminals simply advertising their bot nets.³⁴ The latter could be used to carry out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, turning out web sites and costumer services by overwhelming them with requests. In May 2007, DDoS attacks were directed against the websites of Estonian ministries, banks, telecommunication companies, and news organizations. The attacks were admittedly related to a politically controversial move by the Estonian government to relocate a Soviet war memorial some days earlier.³⁵

However, to gather secret information or to harm physical infrastructures by electronic means requires more sophisticated tools.³⁶ Suitable hacking tools and

31 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, *Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States*, Hanover, NH, 2004, <<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf>> (03/10/2008), pp. 120–121. However, the characteristics of cyberspace favouring easy access and anonymity are entirely contingent on code, i.e. the software and hardware that cyberspace is made of. The features of cyberspace are therefore not conclusively given. Cyberspace is totally constructed: a future code of cyberspace might prevent anonymity rather than support it (see Lawrence Lessig, *Code*, Version 2.0, New York, NY, 2006).

32 The 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, adopted by the Council of Europe, stands out as a first step towards harmonisation of national laws and encouragement of joint actions. See <<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Htm/185.htm>> (04/08/2008).

33 Susan MacLean, Report Warns of Organized Cyber Crime, in: *itWorldCanada*, 08/26/2005, <<http://www.itworldcanada.com/a/IT-Focus/39c78aa4-df47-4231-a083-ddd1ab8985fb.html>> (03/10/2008).

34 Aaron Mannes, James Hendler, Net Attack, in: *Wall Street Journal Europe*, online edition, 05/06/2007, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118099627980924270.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia> (03/07/2008).

35 Peter Finn, Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic, in: *The Washington Post*, 05/19/2007.

36 Aaron Mannes, James Hendler, Net Attack, in: *Wall Street Journal Europe*, online edition, 05/06/2007, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118099627980924270.html?mod=opinion_main_europe_asia> (03/07/2008).

information on short-term security leaks are also sold on the internet.³⁷ Prices for information on current computer vulnerabilities range from 1000 to 5000 US dollars.³⁸ Knowledge of short-term vulnerabilities of new software is sold at online auctions.³⁹ Aside from virtual attacks on virtual targets, physical targets can be attacked by virtual means. The 2003 “Slammer” internet worm, for example, infected the control system at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio for several hours.⁴⁰ Such instances demonstrate the potential vulnerability of computer systems monitoring and controlling critical infrastructure while being connected to local networks or even the internet itself.

Based on these threats, American officials warned of a “Space Pearl Harbor”⁴¹ or “digital Pearl Harbor”⁴² in cyberspace while calling for defensive countermeasures. Expecting an irrevocable extension of conflict into these new domains, they also recommended offensive capabilities. Accordingly, the US National Space Policy from 2006 claimed both, taking necessary actions to protect US space assets and to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests”.⁴³ Whereas former space strategies did also reveal such an intention, even though in a more diplomatic tone, the 2006 policy goes further by explicitly rejecting any new restrictions by international law.⁴⁴ To be sure, there are no hints that American offensive capabilities would be accompanied by claims of a legitimate rule over near earth space. Space will remain a global common despite American space power, just like the high seas have despite British naval power in the 19th century. Nevertheless, moving from words to action would seriously transform the practice of the current space regime. As a matter of fact, the financial and technological capabilities of accessing the space will no longer

37 John Christensen, Bracing for Guerrilla Warfare in Cyberspace, in: CNN Interactive, 04/06/1999, <<http://www.cnn.com/TECH/specials/hackers/cyberterror/>> (03/10/2008); Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32114_20071115.pdf> (03/10/2008), pp. 9–10.

38 Bob Francis, Know Thy Hacker: The Dollars and Cents of Hacking, in: Infoworld, 01/28/2005, <http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/01/28/05OPsecadvise_1.html> (03/10/2008).

39 Tim Green, Web Site Auctions Software Vulnerabilities to Highest Bidder, in: Network World, 03/28/2007, <<http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/082307-wabisabi.html>> (03/10/2008).

40 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32114_20071115.pdf> (03/10/2008), pp. 21–22.

41 Space Commission, Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, Washington, DC, 2001, <http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/executive_summary.pdf> (03/10/2008), p. 21.

42 Richard Clarke (National Security Council) quoted from CNN.com, U.S. Cyberspace Chief Warns of ‘digital Pearl Harbor,’ 12/08/2000, <<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/12/08/security.summit.ap/>> (03/06/2008).

43 The White House, U.S. National Space Policy, 8, <<http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/usa/SpacePolicy2006.pdf>>, (03/10/2008).

44 After resigning from the ABM-Treaty in 2002 the USA is no longer restricted by any space related international treaty except the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. However, the OST outlaws just the orbital deployment of weapons of mass destruction. It does not forbid conventional weapons in space.

be sufficient to guarantee its utilization; rather US acquiescence may become necessary.

Offensive techniques which provide temporary and reversible effects are preferred. Few operational systems like the Counter-Communication-System (CCS) are known.⁴⁵ However, by recently hitting an inoperable spy satellite with a modified SM-3 the United States reminded that their missile defense system could serve anti-satellite functions as well.⁴⁶ Defensive measures aim to improve situational awareness through new space observation systems.⁴⁷ Additionally, the U.S. military is trying to enhance redundancy by distributing functions between numerous smaller and cheaper satellites. Less costly and more flexible launching options are being developed to reduce the time and costs of reconstitution after attacks.⁴⁸

A similar mixture of offensive and defensive approaches characterizes American cyberspace efforts. In order to strengthen the defensive side, the Cyber Security Tracking, Analysis and Response Center (CSTARC), the Cyber Warning and Information Network (CWIN), and the National Cyber Alert System (NCAS) were established.⁴⁹ U.S. military employed Computer Network Attacks (CNA) for the first time in Haiti in 1994.⁵⁰ The classified 2006 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations reportedly states that “offensive capabilities in cyberspace offer both the U.S. and our adversaries an opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative.”⁵¹ Moreover, General Kevin P. Chilton, head of the U.S. Strategic Command, declared in a congressional hearing that “capabilities are being developed ‘to operate, defend, exploit and attack in cyberspace’.”⁵² The 2003 Information Operations Roadmap signals offensive intentions even more bluntly: “Networks are increasingly the operational center of gravity, and the Department must be prepared to ‘fight the net’.”⁵³ Responsible military units include the Joint Func-

45 Taylor Dinerman, The Bush Administration and Space Weapons, in: *The Space Review*, 05/09/2005, <<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/755/1>> (11/27/2006).

46 Marc Kaufman, Josh White, Spy Satellite’s Downing Shows a New U.S. Weapon Capability, in: *The Washington Post*, 02/22/2008.

47 Amy Butler, Secret Steps: U.S. Government Mobilizes to Deal with Asat Problem, in: *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 20/2007, pp. 39–40.

48 Department of Defense, Plan for Operationally Responsive Space, Washington, DC, 2007, <http://www.responsivespace.com/ors/reference/ORS_Plan.pdf> (01/15/2008).

49 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32114_20071115.pdf> (03/10/2008), pp. 31–32.

50 Ralf Bendrath, Krieger in den Datennetzen, 06/17/2001, <<http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/7/7892/1.html>> (03/10/2008).

51 Walter Pincus, The New Art of War, in: *Washington Post*, 03/03/2008.

52 Ibid.

53 Department of Defense, Information Operations Roadmap, Washington, DC, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_01_06_psyops.pdf> (03/10/2008), p. 6.

tional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC).⁵⁴

Blurring Lines

After outlining increasing incentives and opportunities for preparing and waging space and cyber attacks the analysis turns to the consequences for regional and international stability. The more space and cyberspace become centers of gravity in strategic terms, the more the significance of position, direction, and distance is undermined. First of all, this refers to the deployment of offensive capabilities: Due to orbital motion one can hardly exclude specific assets from threats. As far as cyberspace is concerned, one cannot detect where and against whom a hacker is currently operating. In some cases, even the effect of weapons lacks discrimination: the diffusion of computer viruses seems unpredictable and escalatory, constituting an act of war simultaneously waged against all actors. In a similar vein, the development, testing, and demonstration of debris producing, i. e. ‘dirty’ anti-satellite capabilities automatically transforms near-earth space into a globally contested domain. Owing to higher risks and, hence, higher insurance rates commercial actors might abandon the space business quite rapidly. Perhaps the same logic applies to cyberspace. Thus, the extension of conflict into these new domains would coincide with the loss of viable economic opportunities therein. But conflict in these realms also undermines other demarcations: between public and private action and, most fundamentally, between the state of war and the state of peace. Because legal restrictions are unclear and responsibilities could be plausibly denied, these very ambiguities might provide additional incentives for attacking space and cyberspace assets.

Civil societies’ dependence on space and cyberspace has already been mentioned as well as the usage of civil capacities by the military. Private and public spheres in cyberspace, however, might become even more intermingled. Searching for profits, cyber criminals usually blackmail time-critical online business like e-commerce or online-casinos by threatening to undertake denial-of-service attacks or to disclose security leaks. But is it certain that no state will ever pay them for their services? Every real-world crisis in recent years has had its counterpart in cyberspace: Western and Serbian hackers, Palestinian and Israeli hackers, Indian and Pakistani hackers, Chinese and American hackers, and Russian and Chechen hackers attacked each others’ websites and defaced them with propaganda.⁵⁵ In the case of the attacks on Estonian websites, officials suspected Russian authorities of being involved in

⁵⁴ Walter Pincus, *The New Art of War*, in: Washington Post, 03/03/2008.

⁵⁵ Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, *Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States*, Hanover, NH, 2004, <<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf>> (03/10/2008), pp. 14.

the attacks.⁵⁶ One should at least acknowledge that the combination of numerous skilled computer experts alongside a limited job market has created a huge and probably hireable hacker community in Eastern Europe. Indeed, Russia's hacker community is as large as the ones in China or the USA even though Russia has far fewer Internet users.⁵⁷ There are reports that Russian intelligence services had already pressured convictable cyber criminals to work for them.⁵⁸ Other cases add to the picture: Chinese strategists have been thinking of embedding civilian hackers into cyber warfare for years,⁵⁹ outlining something like a "People's War with computers".⁶⁰ The PLA organizes competitions for computer hackers to identify and recruit talents.⁶¹ To some observers this looks like a new *levée en masse*, this time in cyberspace.⁶² An Indian computer security consultant accused Pakistani intelligence services of paying hackers in the USA and Great Britain 500 to 10 000 US dollars to deface Indian websites.⁶³ Obviously, there is an evolving grey zone between cyber crime, cyber protest, state-sponsored, and state-led cyber warfare and cyber-espionage, making it almost impossible to know whether one is being attacked by private actors or states and whether law enforcement or the military should respond.⁶⁴

In space and cyberspace it is difficult to determine what constitutes a weapon and the threshold of war initiation. Due to their dual-use nature, some space capabilities could implicitly serve counter-space functions, as well. Twenty eight states have orbital or sub-orbital launch capabilities. This is a prerequisite for kinetic energy anti-satellite weapons. At least 30 states have already employed micro-satellites, modifiable into covert anti-satellite devices.⁶⁵ In terms of cyberspace, CNA-software tools are neither identifiable nor quantifiable. Offensive tools are needed to test defensive ones and can be limitlessly duplicated.⁶⁶ Offensive and defensive capabilities are hard to distinguish, a situation which seriously aggravates the

56 Peter Finn, Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic, in: The Washington Post, 05/19/2007.

57 There are 28 million internet users in Russia compared with 150 million in China and 210 million in the USA. See Clifford J. Levy, Russians Let Hackers Loose on the West, in: International Herald Tribune, 10/22/2007.

58 Ruth Alvey, Russian Hackers for Hire: The Rise of the E-Mercenary, in: Jane's Intelligence Review, 07/01/2001.

59 Charles G. Billo, Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States, Hannover 2004, <<http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/projects/archives/cyberwarfare.pdf>> (03/10/2008), p. 29–38.

60 Ibid., p. 29.

61 Tim Reid, China's Cyber Army is Preparing to March on America, Says Pentagon, in: The Times Online, 09/08/2007, <http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article2409865.ece> (03/07/2008).

62 Audrey K. Cronin, Cyber-Mobilization. The New *Levée en Masse*, in: Parameters, No. 2/2006, pp. 77–87.

63 Suelette Dreyfus, Hacktivism Through the Eyes of an Infiltrator, in: The Age (Melbourne), 08/05/2003.

64 Clay Wilson, Botnets, Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress, Washington, DC, November 2007, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32114_20071115.pdf> (03/10/2008), p. 8.

65 Spacesecurity.org, Space Security 2007, Waterloo (Canada) 2007, <<http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2007.pdf>> (01/09/2008), pp. 58–59, 128–130.

66 Olivier Minkwitz, Ohne Hemmungen in den Krieg? Cyberwar und die Folgen, HSFK-Report, No. 10/2003, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, <<http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=59CB8004-71A9-5010-12A3-F9357E26CD35&lng=de>> (3/10/2008), p. 34.

security dilemma.⁶⁷ To be able to employ computer network attacks in war demands the probing and manipulation of foreign networks in times of peace.⁶⁸ Far from being merely cyber espionage (something even allies do to each other), these preparations resemble terrorists' sleeping cells in societies.⁶⁹ Therefore, it seems only logical to conclude that "peace really does not exist in the information age," as a former National Security Agency (NSA) director stated.⁷⁰ Moreover, international law hardly keeps pace with the information age. Does the term 'use of force' only relate to actions resulting in physical damage and human suffering on earth? How should one differentiate between military and civilian targets? Diverging interpretations on these issues may contribute to the escalation of international crises.⁷¹ There is also little agreement on what constitutes a proportional reaction to a CNA or anti-satellite attack.⁷² Are air strikes a legitimate response? As long as there is no international consensus on these matters, the grey zone between public and private action seems to be extended into a grey zone between peace and war.

Conclusion

In order to reduce their vulnerabilities, western powers should consider some costly remedies and trade-offs: first of all, they should abstain from offensive intentions and rather strengthen their defensive capacities. Instead of being a normative plea, this conclusion is based on the sheer self-interest of Western powers because they have the highest stakes in space and cyberspace and could therefore expect the most severe losses in the case of an arms race and ensuing warfare. Enhancing protection and redundancy may hamper economic efficiency and innovation.⁷³ If those measures could, however, keep incentives for space and cyberspace attacks below a certain threshold, they would certainly be worth undertaking. Primarily, they preserve regional security by enabling the separation from military and economic threats and are, moreover, necessary in safeguarding the economic viability of space and cyberspace in the long run.

67 Robert Jervis, *Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma*, in: Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis (eds.): *International Politics. Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, New York 2007, pp. 177–197.

68 Olivier Minkwitz, *Ohne Hemmungen in den Krieg? Cyberwar und die Folgen* (HSFK-Report, No. 10), Frankfurt a. M. 2003, <<http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/report1003.pdf>>, p. 22.

69 Johannes Ulrich, expert with the SANS Technology Institute, quoted from Robert Marquand, Ben Arnoldy, *China Emerges as Leader in Cyberwarfare*, in: *Christian Science Monitor*, 9/14/2007, p. 1.

70 Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minihan, quoted from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Cyber Operations and Cyber Terrorism*, Fort Leavenworth 2005, <<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup2.pdf>>, p. IV–1.

71 Duncan B. Hollis, *Rules of Cyberwar?*, in: *Los Angeles Times*, 10/8/2007.

72 James Adams, *Virtual Defense*, in: *Foreign Affairs*, No. 3/2001, p. 110.

73 This may require comprehensive protection of military and even commercial satellites. It may also be necessary to closely monitor industrial collaborations and limit dependence on foreign computer software to forestall the leakage of strategic knowledge and the penetration of critical networks. See John J. Tkacik, Jr., *Trojan Dragon: China's Cyber Threat*, Washington, DC, 2008, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/bg_2106.pdf> (3/10/2008), p. 7–12.

India's Look East Policy: Challenges and Opportunities

Monika Barthwal

Introduction

India's rise as an emerging power on the international stage has captured the world's attention in the 21st century. This rise has been signposted by its impressive economic growth, its nuclear deal with the US and its growing presence in regional and international forums. In a regional context, India has been working steadfastly to build a greater economic role for itself. Simultaneously, India is also seeking a significant strategic role within Asia, in terms of establishing itself as a key political and security actor. While it has rekindled earlier visions of India as a pan-Asian leader, this renewed phase of greater engagement within Asia is fuelled by a new-found pragmatism in Indian foreign policy.

This chapter argues that although India's 'Look East Policy' or LEP has allowed it to forge closer economic alliances with ASEAN countries, it has so far failed to achieve one of its key aim in recent times—to establish India as an integral part of the Asian security architecture. It begins with a brief analysis of the background within which the LEP was adopted, and outlines the key aims of the policy. The paper then examines to what extent India has pursued its LEP successfully with respect to its economic and strategic goals. While taking into account the progress India has made in achieving the former, it highlights the challenges India faces in pressing on with the strategic objectives embedded in the LEP, including Chinese resistance to India's closer strategic ties with countries in Asia. It concludes that unless India is able to outline a clear role for itself within the existing Asian security architecture, it will remain limited to being perceived as a South Asian power, rather than a Pan-Asian one.

Background

The early 1990s saw a distinct shift in India's strategic and economic vision. In 1991, the Indian economy awoke from a long phase of protectionism, import-substitution and heavy regulation to begin a period of steady deregulation, privatization and the opening up of markets, creating room for foreign direct investment and greater movement of market forces. Almost simultaneously, India's foreign policy adopted a primarily Asian focus as embodied within the 'Look East Policy' or LEP. The central aim of this policy was to re-establish traditional ties within Asia to build closer economic relationships with countries in Southeast Asia.



Monika Barthwal

India's LEP came in the context of a rapidly changing global order. Independent India under Nehru's leadership in the 1940s and 1950s championed the cause of decolonization in Southeast Asian colonies. Nehru saw a natural leadership role for India in Asia, and professed to a 'non-aligned' foreign policy. Through the latter, he asserted India's right to pursue its own interests without domination from either the US or the Soviet Union. Despite this assertion, there was a clear and evident preference for the latter, particularly as the US fostered closer relations with India's arch-rival Pakistan.

China's invasion of India in 1962 was a huge blow to Nehru's internationalist idealism, and eventually led to a shift in India's foreign policy to focus on its immediate neighborhood.¹ Bilateralism became the new mantra for the Indian state in South Asia. The war with Pakistan in 1965 and later skirmishes along the Indo-Pakistan border across the Rann of Kutch in the west further entrenched the importance of Pakistan in India's foreign policy. The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war has been widely viewed as the turning point India's perceptions of its role within the region.² India's win was decisive, and led to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh. Even as Nehruvian principles continued to be proclaimed as sacrosanct in Indian foreign policy-making, a distinct deviation became obvious in the following years.³ As Bradnock points out, with "[t]he break-up of Pakistan and the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship [in 1971] began new phases in India's relations both with its immediate neighbours and with the wider world" as it emerged as "the unchallenged power within the South Asian region and potentially a force to be reckoned with further afield."⁴ In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear tests, further entrenching its status as the dominant power in South Asia.

The Cold War and India's strategic and ideological alignment (despite its claims to formal nonalignment) with the Soviet Union resulted in a strong divide between India and countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The latter saw the communist Soviet Union as a distinct threat, following the Soviet-backed invasion of Laos by the North-Vietnamese forces in 1959. The formation of the Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN, was essentially a reaction to the communist threat perceived from the Soviet Union and China. The organization came into being in 1967, and preceded the tremendous economic transformation ASEAN

1 Devna Rastogi, Reena Sekhri, Indian Foreign Policy, Security and Economic Issues, <http://www.ipcs.org/India_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2315&country=1016&status=article&mod=a> (16/07/2008).

2 Richard Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971, London 1990; Barry Buzan et al., South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers, London 1986.

3 Sumit Ganguly, India's Foreign Policy Grows Up, in: World Policy Journal, No. 4/2003, pp. 41–47.

4 Richard Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971, London 1990, p. 2.

countries underwent in the 1970s and 1980s. By the early 1990s, these burgeoning economies had captured the world's attention.

The rise of China as an economic giant was another defining feature of this changing global order. Between the 1950s and late 1980s, China and India shared largely hostile relations, especially in light of friendly relations between China and Pakistan, the Indo-China war of 1962 and border disputes over common borders in Kashmir and Northeast India. When India forged closer military ties with the Soviet Union during the Cold War China strengthened its strategic relationship with Pakistan. Pre-occupied with aligning itself with the Soviet Union to counter China's military power, India missed the opportunity China grasped simultaneously—to build extensive economic relations with the states of Southeast Asia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union signaled an end of the era of Soviet dominance in India's security and economic policies. As the edifice upon which India had modeled its socio-economic policies crumbled, India found itself to be an economically stagnant and inward-looking state which had not only missed the boat as far as the economic boom in Asia was concerned, but also had little to show in terms of close relations with countries in the wider region. Its own immediate neighborhood of South Asia was an economically poor and politically chaotic mess, and the relationships with its neighbors had become stagnant. India's leaders realized that rather than championing the cause of the "Third World" and limiting its focus towards South Asia, India had to pursue its own self-interests to surge ahead and carve out a place for itself in the wider regional and international arenas.⁵ This pragmatic turn in India's foreign policy has since resulted in India seeking an expansion in its relations with all major powers including the US, Japan, China and Europe. High economic growth was identified as the key path to this goal, and, by searching for foreign direct investment the most pragmatic option was to "look East" towards Southeast and East Asia.

To ASEAN countries, India was the natural counterweight to Chinese influence and power in Asia. In fact, the organization had twice—in 1975 and in 1980—seriously considered India as a possible dialogue partner before India actively sought engagement with ASEAN. On both occasions, India opted to stay out. Notwithstanding the initial rejection, ASEAN countries welcomed India's move when it eventually announced its LEP and desire to forge closer bilateral and multilateral relations with ASEAN.

⁵ C. Raja Mohan, India's New Foreign Policy Strategy, Draft paper presented at a Seminar by China Reform Forum and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beijing, 26/05/2006, <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan.pdf>> (16/07/2008).

India's LEP 1992–2008

India's LEP has since been implemented in two parts or phases. The first phase “was ASEAN-centred and focused primarily on trade and investment linkages.”⁶ It began with the launch of the LEP and lasted throughout the 1990s which saw a rapid growth of India-ASEAN relations. The turn of the century marks the beginning of the second and current phase of the LEP, which is embedded within an extended vision of Asia, stretching from “Australia to East Asia, with ASEAN at its core.” It embodies India's desire for greater engagement within the region, moving on from trade and investment to “wider economic and security issues, including joint forces to protect the sea-lanes and coordinate counter-terrorism activities.” This includes establishing free trade arrangements (FTAs) with ASEAN as a whole and, additionally, bilateral agreements with member countries, as well as deepening relations with Australia, Japan and South Korea in the light of economic, strategic and political considerations.⁷

Integration within ASEAN's Institutional Regime and India-ASEAN Trade

India has made significant advancement in embedding itself within the institutional framework of ASEAN. It has progressed from being a sectoral level partner of ASEAN in 1992 to a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996.⁸ It reached summit-level interaction with the organization in 2002, the highest level within the ASEAN framework. Summit meetings have provided India with the opportunity and platform to outline its LEP priorities, policy goals and its own vision of the role India can play in the region.⁹ They have provided the space for India and ASEAN countries to continue discussions, formalize existing areas of cooperation as well as to introduce new potential areas to the agenda.

Trade between ASEAN states and India has increased from US\$2.4 billion in 1990 to around US\$31 billion in 2006/07. However, compared to the level of trade and integration China has achieved with ASEAN countries, this progress is still considerably slow and limited. China became ASEAN's fourth-largest partner in 2007, with total bilateral trade reaching \$202.5 billion¹⁰—almost seven times more than that between India and ASEAN. Institutionally, China, as an ASEAN

6 Yashwant Sinha, *Resurgent India in Asia*, speech at Harvard University, 29/09/2003, <<http://www.kashmirtelegraph.com/1003/five.htm>> (03/10/2008).

7 Sukh Deo Muni, C. Raja Mohan, *India's options in a changing Asia*, in: Ram Rattan Sharma (ed.), *India and Emerging Asia*, New Delhi 2005, p. 63.

8 The ARF includes ASEAN member countries and all its dialogue partners, i.e. China, South Korea, Japan and now India. It is the main instrument of ASEAN for discussing security and strategic issues in the region.

9 Vibhanshu Shekhar, *Asean Summit 2007: Setting India's Agenda* in: IPCS Policy Brief, No. 56, November 2007, <<http://ipcs.org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No56-VibhanshuShekhar.pdf>> (03/03/2008).

10 China, ASEAN become fourth-largest trade partners in 2007 in: *China Daily*, 29/02/2008, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-02/29/content_6497860.htm> (03/10/08).

dialogue partner, has also been far more active than India, despite the fact that India was the first of the two to achieve this status. As dialogue partner since December 1995, India has established 14 bilateral mechanisms with ASEAN. China, on the other hand, became full dialogue partner in June 1996 but has managed to establish 27 China-ASEAN institutional mechanisms. Moreover, the mechanisms it shares with ASEAN are the most active and productive of such mechanisms existing between ASEAN and other dialogue countries.¹¹

Strategic Ties with ASEAN

If the defining feature of the LEP has been the push for closer economic ties with Southeast Asian countries, its cornerstone is the desire to bring India out of its limited South Asian context and establish a strong strategic position in a wider regional and international one. The second and current phase of the LEP has concentrated on its foundational aims to follow the broader vision of integrating India within the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific. To this effect, India has successfully become a member of the ARF in 1996, which is the main instrument for discussions on security and strategic issues. The discussions take place in two forums within the ARF—the ARF Senior Officers' Meetings (ARF-SOM) and the Intersessional Support Group meetings on Confidence Building Measures

¹¹ Ranjit Gupta, India's 'Look East' Policy, in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi 2007, p. 357.



Monika Barthwal from India und Li Hak Yin from Hong Kong discussing the rise of China and India

(ISG on CBMs).¹² Since becoming a member, India has been participating in both groupings on issues such as drug-trafficking, terrorism and counter-terrorism as well as maritime piracy. At the second India-ASEAN summit in October 2003, for example, India and ASEAN signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism.¹³ India also signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), expressing its adherence to the ASEAN goal of regional peace and stability.¹⁴

On the bilateral front, India has been working hard to foster closer ties with single ASEAN countries. It has engaged in talks with Vietnam to work out a Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation and has signed an agreement with Singapore on a long-term arrangement for conducting joint training and exercises between the countries air forces. In January 2008, India and Malaysia announced a pact to intensify bilateral defense cooperation, which included a team from the Indian Air Force and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd going to Malaysia to undertake the training of Royal Malaysian Air Force pilots and technicians. Both sides also agreed to increase naval exercises between the two countries as well as discuss other security issues concerning the region. Bilateral defense cooperation between India and Japan has also increased over recent years including fields such as maritime security, research and development and exchange of information on technology aspects. Meanwhile, India and Indonesia had their first-ever Joint Defence Cooperation Committee (JDCC) meeting in Jakarta in June 2007. India has also consistently expressed willingness to undertake anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits, if such a wish is expressed by countries in the region.

Evaluating the Success of the LEP...

...in Economic Terms

On the economic front, India seems to have made considerable progress in linking its own economy to the vibrant economies of Southeast Asia. Trade has grown impressively, and India continues to work to forge trade agreements with all ASEAN countries. Her FTA with Thailand in 2003 and a Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore in 2005 are some of the key achievements for India in this realm. Despite these positive developments,

¹² The latter is supported by track II institutions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS).

¹³ The Joint Declaration stipulates cooperation in (a) exchange of information, (b) legal and enforcement matters, (c) institutional capacity augmentation and (d) training. During the meeting on Law Enforcement in Bali in August 2004, India proposed sharing of intelligence and coordinated actions among the law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism.

¹⁴ Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, <<http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>> (07/03/2008).

however, there are some hurdles which inhibit India's path to greater economic cooperation.

India has been negotiating an India-ASEAN FTA for the last three years. It has faced considerable difficulties in reaching a collective agreement with ASEAN countries, with disagreements over various issues as such tariff reductions and a list of certain goods. In India, domestic support for giving further concessions to ASEAN over several contentious issues is low, particularly over issues like India's highly sensitive list of goods and existing tariff barriers, and the issue of rules of origin. India has also defended its deadline of 2018 before eliminating tariff barriers, arguing that its own small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will otherwise get exposed to external competition from ASEAN SMEs too early. If India sticks to its 2018 deadline, it will face competition from Chinese, Japanese and South Korean SMEs as these will already be present in the Southeast Asian market by 2015.

In addition, India has announced many policy initiatives to facilitate integration with ASEAN countries over the past years which have failed to get past the planning stages. As part of their CECA, India and Singapore signed Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA) in goods and services, and agreed to mutually recognize degrees and technical qualifications of each other's institutions. The MRAs included liberalization of visa regimes on both sides on 127 categories of professionals. Almost three years later, however, little has been done to bring into effect these relaxations and recognitions to allow easier movement of professionals between the two countries.¹⁵

...and in Terms of Strategic Aspects

India's economic advances towards ASEAN countries have been made in the broader context of integrating itself within the region as a key strategic player and establishing itself as a part of the Asian security architecture. Its achievements in terms of becoming a member of the ARF and signing various joint agreements and treaties with ASIAN in the realms of terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy are indicative of a positive perception of India as a strategic player in Asia by countries in the region. They consider India to be a crucial balancing factor in the security dynamics of the region, most notably vis-à-vis China. India not only provides an alternative for ASEAN countries of not becoming overtly dependent on China as their key trade partner, but also balances to an extent the political and strategic power Beijing projects within the region.

¹⁵ Yogendra Singh, India-Singapore CECA Enters Second Phase in: IPCS, 31/01/2008, <<http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticle1.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2497&status=article&mod=b>> (10/03/2008).

Nonetheless, India still has some way to go before it can be viewed as a credible player in the region's security architecture. While bilateral agreements to share security information, expertise and conduct joint defense exercises are all important in integrating India further within the region, India still needs to convince Southeast and East Asian countries that it can be a significant security actor in Asia. This is not an easy task, and India faces several impediments on its path to establishing itself as a credible force in terms of strategic matters.

First, India still continues to struggle in positing herself within the traditional geographical paradigm of 'Asia' as it is understood in countries of Southeast and East Asia. In this understanding, Asia stretches from Japan to Myanmar, and includes the ASEAN countries. Countries like Malaysia have used this view to argue against the inclusion of India as a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Such a view has also served to delay India joining the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2006.

Historically, India has had little involvement in the region's security flashpoints such as Taiwan, the North Korea nuclear issue and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This means India is excluded from talks and negotiations on the most pivotal security issues marking the region and bearing on the security concerns of countries in the region. Indeed, India's single political involvement in the region was in the 1970s and 1980s when, under Cold War dynamics, India supported Vietnam and its puppet regime in Cambodia. By the late 1980s, India was involved in international efforts to bring a peaceful resolution to the situation in Cambodia, and played a small but important role in ensuring the political settlement which came about after the Paris Conference in October 1991.¹⁶

China's influence and power in the region plays a crucial role to the extent to which India can extend its own ambit of influence. While Sino-Indian relations have been on the up-swing, China continues to view India as a non-regional power in East Asia. In early 2005, before the first EAS meeting, China actively lobbied against India's inclusion (as well as that of Australia and New Zealand) in EAS. Once these efforts had failed, Beijing insisted on dividing the East Asian Community (EAC) into a core group (ASEAN+3 or APT) and the peripheral states (consisting of India, Australia and New Zealand). Ultimately, it was decided that, although the APT would be the main driving force behind the EAC, the EAS summits would be held in ASEAN countries and it would be ASEAN leading the APT, rather than China.

16 Ranjit Gupta, India's 'Look East' Policy in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, New Delhi 2007, p. 359.

The vision of a polycentric Asia as preferred by ASEAN and India is also not a very palatable thought for Beijing as it implies opposition to China's dominance in the region. This is despite the assessment made by strategic circles in China that India will continue to have little impact on the key regional security issues Taiwan, the South China Sea islands and North Korea. Thus, it will continue to be viewed within East Asia as predominantly an Indian Ocean power. Nonetheless, China cautiously observes India's growing ties with countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar, with the Chinese media arguing that India is trying to hem in China by building up closer military ties with the countries surrounding China. The joint military exercises held by India, Japan and the US off the Japanese coast in 2007 and the Malabar multilateral naval exercises between India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore in the Bay of Bengal in 2007 have added to Chinese anxiety in the region.

China also has reservations about the growing intimacy between the US and India on nuclear matters. Beijing has strongly criticized US-Indian nuclear cooperation and argued that it could potentially create a domino effect of proliferation and competition.¹⁷ However, while there are many in the US who make the same argument, it is generally seen in the US interest to have a strong and powerful democratic India in Asia as a counterweight to communist China's economic and political clout in the region. The US has supported an increased profile for India in the international community via the G20 and has encouraged it to take a leadership role in the establishment of a Community of Democracies with the support of the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Democracy Caucus.¹⁸

Competition for influence and power—economic and strategic—will remain a defining feature of Sino-Indian relations in the years to come. As the US continues to be cautious towards China, India needs to continue its pragmatic stance and capitalize on forging closer bilateral economic and strategic ties with the Asian giant. An economic and strategic relationship with China will serve India's interest in Southeast and East Asia and is more likely to invite Chinese support for India's regional goals. Stronger support within ASEAN countries for a greater Indian role in the region is also fundamental, if India is to assuage China's doubts about India's strategic intentions within the region. To this end, India should use its soft power to further her relations with ASEAN, i.e. through education, cul-

17 C. Raja Mohan, Parag Khanna, Getting India right: Mutual Interests and Democratic Affinity, in: Policy Review, February/March 2006, <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/2913806.html>> (26/02/2008).

18 For more, see US Department of State, The Community of Democracies, <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10790.htm>> (16/07/2008).

ture, tourism and diplomacy with ASEAN states.¹⁹ Moreover, unlike China, India shares no historic animosities with these countries. There is no history of bilateral disputes or territorial claims in the region.²⁰ This provides the leverage for India to offer assistance and expertise in many realms such as higher education, human resource development, information and technology, processes of democratization and nation-building.

India also needs to demonstrate that it can play a more stabilizing role in its own backyard to strengthen its image as a potential leader within Asia. The volatilities in countries such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal reflect poorly on India's ability to bring stability and security to Asia. To its credit, India has made efforts to improve its bilateral ties within the region over the last decade. Since 2004 it has been involved in talks with Pakistan to normalize relations between the two countries. It has set aside its reservations in involving extra-regional powers in the affairs of South Asian states, and is now "working closely with the great powers in resolving the political crises in Nepal and Sri Lanka. India's unilateralism in the region is increasingly being replaced by a multilateral approach."²¹

Finally, as India continues to strive for a broader engagement in Asia in the economic and security realms, it needs to develop a comprehensive strategic vision for itself within the region. This vision should be in accordance with her new-found pragmatic approach of reconciling foreign policy objectives with national interests. Once India marks out a concrete role for herself within the wider Asian security architecture, she will be able to lay claims to regional power status in the wider region on more credible grounds.

19 Baldas Ghoshal, Some New Thoughts on India's Look East Policy, IPCS Issue Brief, October 2007, <<http://ipcs.org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No54.pdf>> (11/03/2008).

20 Ranjit Gupta, India's 'Look East' Policy in: Atish Sinha, Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, New Delhi 2007, p. 367.

21 C. Raja Mohan, India's New Foreign Policy Strategy, Draft paper presented at a Seminar by China Reform Forum and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beijing, 26/05/2006, <<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan.pdf>> (16/07/08).


Understanding China's 'Non-Intervention Policy': Studying the Case of Myanmar

LI Hak Yin¹

Introduction

China's non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. When the international community attempted to launch humanitarian intervention in Sudan or raised the concern of human rights abuses in Myanmar, China held firmly to its non-intervention policy by preventing such a move in the United Nations. It invoked the respect of other countries' territorial integrity and sovereignty as the primary reason. Expected to be a responsible great power, China has aroused the concerns of many in the international community with the implications of its non-intervention policy.²

Discussions of China's non-intervention policy as well as Sino-Myanmar relations after the Cold War are, indeed, limited in current academic literature. Regarding China's stance on humanitarian and multilateral intervention, Allen Carlson may be the first to have studied China's changing attitude. Carlson finds that China opposed international intervention during the Cold War because both the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded as using intervention to expand their hegemonic influence in other regions. After the Tiananmen crisis in 1989, in order to break the international isolation and build up a more positive national image, China has become a "reluctant peacekeeper" by accepting the international intervention in Kosovo and East Timor.³ Recently, China also sent a 1000 peacekeepers to Lebanon. However, Carlson's work could not explain the inconsistency of China's stance on international interventions, especially its rejections regarding Darfur, North Korea and Myanmar. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small also notice the problem of China's non-intervention policy which they regard as "China's new dictatorship diplomacy." The authors argue that in facing the various interests in Darfur, North Korea and Myanmar and the demand to be a "responsible stakeholder," China has attempted to strike a balance by pressuring the authoritarian regimes to make some changes in order to satisfy international demand while protecting those regimes from international intervention. For example, China supported the United States in suspending an important



LI Hak Yin

1 The author would like to thank Prof. Zheng Yongnian and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this paper.

2 Robert Zoellick, United States urges China to be responsible world citizen, <<http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Sep/22-290478.html>> (22/09/2005).

3 Allen Carlson, Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China's Recent Stance on Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention, in: Pacific Affairs, No. 1/2004, pp. 10–25.

North Korean account in a bank in Macau; China persuaded Sudan to accept the joint peacekeeping forces of the United Nations and African Union; and China warned Myanmar that Beijing may withdraw its support if there is no progress on political reforms.⁴ The only critique to such a rationale being behind China's non-intervention policy or "new dictatorship diplomacy" (in their words) is that energy security and economic interests such as the imports of oil and natural resources cannot tell the whole story.

About Sino-Myanmar relations, scholars such as Jürgen Haacke⁵ and Ruukun Katanyuu, instead, focus their work on the bilateral relations between Myanmar and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).⁶ Magnus Petersson studies the relationship between ASEAN and the European Union (EU) in the context of Myanmar.⁷ Marie Lall⁸ and Ian Holliday⁹ examine Myanmar relations with India and Myanmar relations with the United States respectively. The remaining literature focuses on Myanmar domestic affairs such as the rule of the military junta, ethnic conflicts and the difficulties of democratization as one can see in the works of Peter Carey,¹⁰ Robert I. Rotberg,¹¹ Robert H. Taylor¹² and John Perry.¹³ Although Liang Chi-Shad presents a general summary on Sino-Myanmar relations starting from 1948¹⁴ and Sheng Lijun examines the Chinese anti-drug policy in Myanmar,¹⁵ both accounts do not satisfactorily address the motivations driving the Chinese non-intervention policy toward Myanmar.

This paper seeks to explain the Chinese non-intervention policy through a comprehensive study of Chinese interests at regional, geo-strategic and international levels by using the case of Myanmar. Moreover, this paper observes that the Chinese non-intervention policy does not necessarily preclude intervention, as China

- 4 Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Andrew Small, China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy—Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?, in: *Foreign Affairs*, No. 1/2008, pp. 40–52.
- 5 Jürgen Haacke, Enhanced Interaction with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with its Diplomatic and Security Culture, in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, No. 2/2005, pp. 188–216.
- 6 Ruukun Katanyuu, Beyond Non-Interference in ASEAN—The Association's Role of in Myanmar's National Reconciliation and Democratization", in: *Asian Survey*, No. 6/2006, pp. 825–845.
- 7 Magnus Petersson, Myanmar in EU-ASEAN Relations, in: *Asia-Europe Journal*, No. 4/2006, pp. 563–581.
- 8 Marie Lall, Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy, in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, No. 3/2006, pp. 424–446.
- 9 Ian Holliday, Rethinking the United States's Myanmar Policy, in: *Asian Survey*, No. 4/2005, pp. 603–621.
- 10 Peter Carey (ed.), *Burma—The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society*, London 1997.
- 11 Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *Burma—Prospects for a Democratic Future*, Washington, DC, 1998.
- 12 Robert H. Taylor (ed.), *Burma—Political Economy Under Military Rule*, London 2001.
- 13 John Perry, *Myanmar (Burma) since 1962: The Failure of Development*, Aldershot 2007.
- 14 Liang Chi-Shad, *Burma's Relations with the People's Republic of China: From Delicate Friendship to Genuine Cooperation*, in: Peter Carey (ed.), *Burma—The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society*, London 1997, pp. 71–90.
- 15 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: *Asian Perspective*, No. 2/2006, pp. 97–126.

has indeed intervened in Myanmar politics. Therefore, this paper further argues, that the Chinese non-intervention policy is simply a natural response to China's interests and concerns in Myanmar.

Chinese Multi-level Interests in Myanmar

Regional Interests—Stop the Spread of HIV/AIDS

Low education level, drug use and long time military conflict all contribute to the high infectious rate of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar; a prime concern for Chinese Health policy. As early as 1992, there were over 100 000 HIV infected people, and the number quadrupled to around 400 000 in 1996.¹⁶ According to Myanmar official figures, 350 000 people aged between 15 and 49 were infected in 2005, but many believe there have been likely more infected.¹⁷ To make the situation worse, the Myanmar military government rejected even non-governmental assistance in combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. Dr. Hervé Isambert, the program manager of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), points out that the Myanmar military government has imposed many constraints on their work in Mon and Karen states, from which the French sector of MSF was forced to withdraw in 2006. Fearing potential intervention and disclosure of the internal chaos of Myanmar to the outside world, the Myanmar military government remains suspicious of such foreign organizations.¹⁸ Yet with increasing economic interactions between China and Myanmar and the spread of HIV/AIDS along the Chinese-Myanmar borders the issue becomes more difficult to conceal. Responding to this rising threat, China passed the Yunnan AIDS Prevention and Control Law in 2004 by providing condoms in many public places where migrants are highly concentrated.¹⁹ However, according to the 2006 China Health Yearbook, Yunnan still has the third highest AIDS' incidence and mortality rate in China,²⁰ indicating that Myanmar remains a serious challenge for China, particularly in Yunnan Province.

Regional Interests—Crack Down on Cross-Border Gambling

Cross-border gambling is another factor in enabling the diffusion of AIDS, drug trafficking and money laundering across the China-Myanmar border. Since gambling is illegal in China, many Chinese routinely travel to Macau, one of China's

16 Martin Smith, *Burma's Ethnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral Problem in the Regional Context*, in: Peter Carey (ed.), *Burma—The Challenge of Change in a Divided Society*, London 1997, p. 114.

17 David Fullbrook, Myanmar's HIV/AIDS security threat, in: Asia Times Online, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HL02Ae02.html> (02/12/2006).

18 Hervé Isambert, Why the French section of MSF has ended its activities in Myanmar, MSF article, <http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=4613E1EB-0D4F-C582-2770E8597606F085&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html> (30/03/2006).

19 See the website of China AIDS, <<http://www.china-aids.org/english/News/News327.htm>> (05/02/2004).

20 Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, 2006 China Health Year Book, <<http://www.moh.gov.cn/open/statistics/year2006/p238.htm>> (29/12/2006), p. 238.

special administrative regions, seeking fun. However, not only Macau, but also the border regions of Myanmar such as Mong La and Maijuyang have developed into gambling paradises for many Chinese. In 2005, the Chinese government claimed that, in response, 80 of these casinos near China-Myanmar borders were forced to cease operation, satellite channels for online gambling were blocked and visas for Chinese to Myanmar became highly restricted.²¹ However, despite these restrictions, Wang, a former casino employee in Maijuyang, claims “whatever you need we can take care of, gambling, drugs, girls—all of which can be arranged.” Indeed, this elucidates the difficulty of controlling the border areas for the Myanmar military government and the Chinese government, which, at the time, is more concerned with fighting local insurgences such as the Kachin army.²² Despite these difficulties, China continues to launch further counter-measures against border gambling operations by cutting off electricity, water and telecommunication to the casinos on the China-Myanmar borders, where, compared to 2005, only 28 out of 149 remain in business.²³ Because of the likelihood that some of the casinos will go underground, it can be expected that China will continue to keep a close eye on the China-Myanmar border areas.

Regional Interests—Dealing with Drug Trafficking

Part of Myanmar is known as the Golden Triangle producing great amounts of opium, heroin and amphetamines for the world drug market, for which the Chinese-Myanmar borders have been one of the major drug trafficking routes. Many local insurgencies, such as the Kokant Alliance Army (Shan State, Region I), United Wa State Army (Shan State, Region II), National Democratic Alliance Army (Shan State, Region IV), Mongu National Protection Army (Shan State, Mongu), New Democratic Army (Kachin State, Region I) and Kachin Protection Army (Shan and Kachin State), are involved in the planting, production and transportation of drugs.²⁴ These local insurgencies are all located in Shan and Kachin States, which share the border with China and Thailand and China and India, respectively. Although the total hectares of opium and poppy cultivation in Myanmar have sharply decreased from 165 800 in 1993 to 27 700 in 2007 and some local insurgencies such as the United Wa State Army have expressed their determination to cease drug cultivation,²⁵ the figures increased once again in 2007

21 Casino bordering SW China closed due to crackdown on gambling in China, in: People's Daily Online, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200507/05/eng20050705_194237.html> (05/07/2005).

22 Chinese players try their luck at Myanmar casinos, in: Taipei Times, <<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/10/05/2003381785>> (05/10/2007).

23 China wins big in crackdown on border casinos, <<http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKPEK33029420070417?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>> (17/04/2007).

24 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN cooperation against illicit drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: Asian Perspective, No. 2/2006, pp. 102–103.

25 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Myanmar's Wa: Likely losers in the opium war, in: Asia Times Online, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FA24Ac06.html> (24/01/2004).

contrary to the continuous fall in the previous seven years.²⁶ Shan State is given particular attention because it accounts for 92 per cent of total opium and poppy cultivation in Myanmar in 2007,²⁷ arousing the concern of Myanmar's neighbors. Worse still, is the evolution of China from a drug transit country to a consumer market. The drug-addicted population in China was only 148 000 in 1991, but the number had risen to 900 000 by 2001.²⁸ Indeed, cracking down on drug trafficking is not only in the interest of China, but also of Thailand and other ASEAN members.

Given the aforementioned regional concerns, China has attempted to safeguard the stability in Myanmar. Fearing the collapse of Myanmar into a failed state in which the spread of AIDS, cross-border gambling and drug trafficking are intensified, China has rejected any international intervention which, as demonstrated in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, have the propensity to produce the opposite results of what the intervening country had intended to achieve.

Strategic Interests—a Free Route

China regards Myanmar as an important geo-strategic country mainly because of concerns of a potential Myanmar blockade in the Malacca Strait. According to Tang Wenlin, China pays close attention to the development of its relations with Southeast Asian countries because, in case the Malacca Strait were blocked in a potential conflict in Taiwan, the Indochina Peninsula would become the only free route between China and the Bay of Bengal.²⁹ Adding to this the fact that over 85 per cent of oil coming to China currently passes through the Malacca Strait,³⁰ it becomes apparent that China would find it necessary to diversify its importing route. Upon consideration of its geographical proximity, Myanmar naturally becomes the most suitable country through which to transfer oil and natural gas from Africa and the Middle East to China. Indeed, construction of an oil pipeline between Myanmar's Sittwe, a city next to the Bay of Bengal, and China's Kunming has started in 2007 with a forthcoming natural gas pipeline being constructed sometime thereafter.³¹ In addition, China reached an agreement with

26 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Opium Poppy Cultivation in Southeast Asia: Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand*, <<http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/2007-opium-SEAsia.pdf>> (10/10/2007), p. 51.

27 Ibid.

28 Chin Ko-lin, Sheldon X. Zhang, *The Chinese Connection: Cross-border Drug Trafficking between Myanmar and China*, Final Report for the US Department of Justice, <<http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/218254.pdf>> (04/07/2007).

29 See the comment of Tang Wenlin, in: *Ming Pao Daily*, 18/11/2007. Tang is the director of Southeast Asia Research Center, Guangxi University.

30 The risk of Malacca Strait and China's strategy on energy, in: *The Sun* (Hong Kong), 12/05/2006.

31 Construction of China-Myanmar oil pipeline expected to start this year, in: *Xinhua News*, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-04/21/content_6008196.htm> (21/04/2007). The gas pipeline will carry 170 billion cubic meters from Middle East to China in the next 30 years.

ASEAN to build the Trans-Asian Railway, one line of which will travel from China's Kunming to Myanmar on its journey to the final destination of Singapore.³² Although the Trans-Asian Railway will be completed as late as 2015, through its conception, China shows its interests to develop a new transport line from Myanmar that will allow China to import not only oil and natural gas, but also other materials on a safer route and forego the passage through the potentially risky Malacca Strait. Therefore, China has to keep Myanmar free from international intervention in order to prevent the infiltration of foreign influence in the region, which could block the remaining free and shorter transport routes between China and Africa as well as the route between China and the Middle East.

Strategic Interests—Stability

Considered as indispensable strategic positions in maintaining territorial integrity, the Chinese border areas have aroused great concern, especially with the recent American attention towards Myanmar. M. Taylor Fravel finds that China treats its frontier areas as “buffer zones” or “protective screens” in which ethnic unrest is “a source of direct conflict with neighbors or pretext for external intervention,” potentially triggering unrest in other areas, including the inland areas.³³ These ethnic conflicts have long been a serious problem for Myanmar which is composed of 135 ethnic groups, seven states for non-Burmese groups and seven divisions within core Burmese groups.³⁴ Missionary scholars even suggest that one of the ethnic groups, Karen, “were a lost tribe of Israel.”³⁵ Some of these Burmese ethnic minorities share the same Tibeto-Burmese language system with one of the China's ethnic groups, the Yi living in the Yunnan Province. Thus, China must make two strategic considerations in dealing with the ethnic conflict in Myanmar as to the question whether (i) intensified ethnic conflicts, such as local Myanmar insurgencies declaring independence, will pose a trigger-effect near the China-Myanmar borders, particularly in the Yunnan Province, and, whether (ii) the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar will lead to foreign intervention and an international presence afterwards? It would appear that China has no choice but to tolerate the Myanmar military government, even though it has brought China many troubles and been a significant source of pressure, because of its ability to keep various local insurgencies in peace through the cease-fire treaty, through which China can prolong the stability in its border areas.

32 Trans-Asian Railway, in: *Ming Pao Daily*, 09/04/2007.

33 M. Taylor Fravel, *Securing borders: China's doctrine and force structure for frontier defense*, in: *Journal of Strategic Studies*, August–October 2007, p. 711.

34 Ian Holliday, *National unity struggles in Myanmar: A degenerate case of governance for harmony in Asia*, in: *Asian Survey*, No. 3/2007, p. 383.

35 Ashley South, *Karen Nationalist Communities: The Problem of Diversity*, in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, No. 1/2007, p. 58.

International Interests—Assurance to Neighboring Countries

The Chinese non-intervention policy not only serves to keep Chinese borders free of foreign influence, but also helps to convince neighboring countries of China's peaceful development. By holding firm to the non-intervention policy—meaning that China will not manipulate the affairs of other countries—China shows its commitment to not causing any harm or promoting any conflict in the region. Indeed, the Chinese non-intervention policy seems to be a prompt response to the idea of a “Chinese threat” held by many Southeast Asian countries. By signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN and recognizing the non-intervention clause, China has demonstrated its sincerity and commitment to peaceful and harmonious inter-Asian relations and became the first non-ASEAN country to sign the treaty. Through this policy, China assures its neighbors that, although China's national strength is growing, China has no intention to alter the current regional order and status quo. The case of Myanmar will serve as the testing ground for the consistency of Chinese action with its non-intervention policy. If China is forced to intervene in the affairs of Myanmar due to mounting international pressure, many of its neighboring countries will, indeed, question whether Chinese action was a forced response to external pressures and internal turmoil in the region or rather the start of a Chinese initiative to dominate regional affairs as it grows more powerful. The pressure from the west for intervention and China's reluctance highlights the conflicting interests between the west and China in the handling of Myanmar. The West regards intervention towards Myanmar as a humanitarian issue; however, China considers the intervention as an issue of China's image, position and commitment to its neighboring countries.

International Interests—Counteracting the American Unilateral Move

For China, recent American trends towards unilateralism and unilateral intervention pose a particularly credible threat that America will possibly intervene in Taiwan, North Korea, and Myanmar because of the countries' potential influence in shaping regional order. Indeed, the worst scenario for Chinese leaders would be the expansion of American containment policy from Japan, Taiwan and Australia to North Korea and Myanmar.

However, China is not alone in facing the threat of a unilaterally acting America. Indeed, the expansion of NATO, the series of Color Revolutions near its border, the American unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the implementation of an American Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Eastern Europe all pose serious threats to Russia. Furthermore, the American support of Pakistan threatens the national security of India. American regard of Pakistan

as a major non-NATO ally because of its support in combating terrorism has enabled the country to purchase American F-16 fighter jets, further threatening the fragile regional security balance between India and Pakistan. This American move is naturally regarded as an intervention in the Indo-Pakistani conflict; a move strongly opposed by Indian leaders out of concern for a maintained balance of power in South Asia.³⁶

However, although Russian and Indian responses to American regional influence and intervention have been widely neglected, China's non-intervention policy towards Myanmar has caught the world spotlight. Not only the Chinese, but also the Russian and Indian responses to Myanmar reflect their dissatisfaction with American unilateralism and interference. The Chinese and Russian joint veto to the American-sponsored resolution in the UN Security Council criticizing human rights conditions in Myanmar on 12 January 2007, is particularly significant as it marked not only the fifth time that China had cast a veto in the Security Council, but, perhaps more significantly, the first time in 35 years that China and Russia had cast a double veto. Since the 1990s, the Chinese and Russian statements on a multipolar world and non-intervention policy had been regarded merely as rhetorical since neither country carried out any substantive policy to limit or counteract the American influence;³⁷ however, beginning with the dual veto China and Russia have shown their resolve to put their non-intervention policy into real practice. On a visit to Myanmar during 19–21 January 2007, Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, commented on the Sino-Russian joint veto, "that [it] is their internal matter ... we don't believe in exporting our ideology. We are a democracy and we want democracies to flourish, but it is for them to decide," thus giving implicit support to the veto against America's resolution.³⁸ The Indian response should be a surprise to the United States not only because India is the biggest democratic country in the world, but also because the United States has developed intimate relations with India through military exercise, armament sales and the controversial nuclear cooperation over the last years.³⁹ Indeed, China and India have regional interests in Myanmar; however, the consistent Chinese, Russian and Indian reactions to Myanmar can also be seen as protests towards the growth of American unilateralism.

36 Peter Baker, Bush: U.S. to sell F-16s to Pakistan, in: *The Washington Post*, 26/03/2005.

37 Richard Weitz, Why Russia and China have not formed an anti-American alliance, in: *Naval War College Review*, No. 4/2003, p. 49.

38 C. S. Kuppuswamy, India-Myanmar relations: visit of the External Affairs Minister, South Asia Analysis Group—Paper no. 2112, < <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers22/paper2112.html> > (26/01/2007).

39 India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty yet, but the United States still offers nuclear cooperation to India, including the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear materials.

China's "Non-intervention Policy"

China's non-intervention policy has become a controversial topic not only because the debate between China and the West regarding the Chinese underlying rationale, but also because ambiguities in the definition of non-intervention. Karin Fierke studies diplomatic interventions in more than military terms and such also addresses the moral, legal, economic, cultural and therapeutic aspects which cover just war theory, humanitarian intervention, armament sales and cultural propaganda.⁴⁰ Clearly, Chinese leaders have a different approach toward the understanding of intervention. Generally, Chinese leaders regard non-intervention policy as non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; however, Chinese leaders have never clarified the means of intervention: whether they be political, economic or military. It is unlikely that China would accept any form of military intervention because of "its past humiliation under western imperialism" and its belief that the country "will not impose its will on others and will not allow others to impose theirs on China."⁴¹ Yet the question remains; should political or economic influence be regarded as means of intervention under the Chinese non-intervention policy? Jason Qian and Anne Wu differentiate between Chinese and Western approaches on Darfur by the fact that "China's strategy is one of humanitarian and development aid plus influence without interference, in

40 Karin M. Fierke, *Diplomatic Interventions: Conflict and Change in a Globalizing World*, Basingstoke 2005.

41 Gerald Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework of Analysis*, London 1999, p. 108.



Discussant Nikolas Win Myint from the United Nations

contrast to the West's coercive approach of sanctions plus military intervention."⁴² Given these differences in intervention approaches—or even: ideologies—it is necessary to distinguish between 'soft' interventions like humanitarian and development aid and 'hard' interventions like economic sanctions and military interference, the former of which being more a matter of political and economic influence than intervention. Given this definition and upon examination of China's policy measures along its border, it becomes clear that China's relationship with Myanmar is one of soft interventions. Thus, China's non-intervention policy does not entirely preclude intervention of any form.

Soft Intervention—Cross Border Missions

China's soft intervention in Myanmar is, in many ways, a natural response to drug trafficking along China-Myanmar borders. To a certain extent, China is forced to intervene in Myanmar because the Burmese military government is only able to control some 392 out of the total 1997 kilometers long border with China while the other borders remain under the control of various local insurgencies.⁴³ For China, this means that the Burmese military government cannot enforce sufficient border control measures to crack down on drug trafficking near China's border. With many local insurgency groups striving for autonomy, China will not be able to rely on the Myanmar military government to manage the affairs of local insurgencies. Therefore, besides cutting off electricity and telecommunications to local insurgents such as in the case of Mong La, China has developed programs with the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention of the Greater Mekong Sub-Region to offer police training to Myanmar and Laos. With the cooperation of Myanmar and Laos, it has even operated cross-border police missions to suppress drug trafficking and Chinese police in Yunnan even provides training to the police in Myanmar.⁴⁴ In the case of Myanmar, hard intervention, like economic sanctions or military intervention would not help to improve the situation since the source of the drugs comes from various local insurgents rather than the military government of Myanmar. Due to its inability to exert control over local pockets of resistance and insurgency, China is forced to conduct some soft interventions along the Chinese-Myanmar borders. If China does not take any action, drug trafficking might become a disastrous regional problem.

Soft Intervention—Shaping Foreign Policy

Apart from its involvement in the country's internal affairs, China has also played a great role in shaping the foreign policy of the Myanmar military government.

42 Jason Qian, Anne Wu, China's Delicate Role on Darfur, in: The Boston Globe, 23/07/2007.

43 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN cooperation against illicit drugs from the Golden Triangle, in: Asian Perspective, No. 2/2006, pp. 115–116.

44 Ibid, pp. 108–111.

China is believed to be largely responsible for the rapprochement between Myanmar and North Korea on 26 April 2007. After terminating its relations with North Korea in 1983 when the South Korean president was nearly assassinated by a North Korean plot in Rangoon, diplomatic relations were finally restored in April last year. Indeed, it was the Chinese ambassador to the Union of Myanmar, Guan Mu, which accompanied the North Korea delegation after the meeting with Myanmar, two hours after the restoration deal had been announced.⁴⁵ Since North Korea is eager to import rice from Myanmar and Myanmar is eager to break its international isolation, the rapprochement reveals the mutual interest of both countries in a symbiotic relationship. However, China must not be overlooked as a beneficiary as well. The development of a stable and gradually open Myanmar which can foster a peaceful regional order is certainly in China's best interest. In examining China's effort to break the isolation and encouraging Myanmar's trade with other countries, Feng Zhongping explains that China could not accept measures of hard-intervention such as regime change by military means because, "China thinks the most important thing is not to organize elections, but to help develop the economy."⁴⁶

Soft Intervention—Pressuring the Myanmar Military Government

However, Chinese soft-intervention is not limited to the realm of economics and international trade, but also can be seen in the critical role the Chinese government played in convincing the Myanmar military government not to suppress the mass demonstrations in Rangoon in September 2007. Before the outbreak of mass demonstrations, China's State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met with the Burmese Foreign Minister, and special envoy of Than Shwe, U Nyan Win, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Noticing the growing social discontent over economic hardships in Myanmar, Tang addressed the issue saying that "Myanmar could resume domestic stability in the earliest time possible."⁴⁷ Furthermore, one Southeast Asian diplomat commented on China's action privately saying that the Myanmar military government was under immense pressure from the Chinese government and this was the main reason that the Myanmar military government remained extremely reserved in its reaction to the mass demonstrations.⁴⁸ Underlying China's action in the mass demonstrations was the knowledge that any radical response of the Myanmar military government will not only affect Myanmar, but also the Chinese government. Chinese

45 Xinhuanet, <http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-04/27/content_6034458.htm>, (27/04/2007).

46 Quentin Peel, China's path through the dense jungle of diplomacy, in: Financial Times, 27/09/2007.

47 State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan Meets with Special Envoy of SPDC Chairman of Myanmar in the website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, <<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2747/2749/t363133.htm>> (13/09/2007).

48 Ming Pao Daily, 25/09/2007.

leaders perceive the situation in Darfur to be similar, which caused some Western diplomats to propose a boycott for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Although believing that the social chaos and political instability in Myanmar should be the internal affairs of the Myanmar military government, China is aware of the effect of this instability on its own domestic politics and thus, the issues of Myanmar have become part of Chinese affairs as well.

Although China ultimately failed to stop the Myanmar military government's bloody suppression of the mass demonstrations, China still attempted to introduce remedies to ease the anxious political atmosphere in Southeast Asia. First, China encouraged the Myanmar military government to accept the visit of the UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari. Regarded as one of the most closed and isolated countries in the world, Myanmar certainly did not easily grant permission for the visit of a UN special envoy. When discussing the Myanmar issues with the Chinese government, the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, commented that China placed enormous pressure on the Myanmar military government to accept the visit of the UN special envoy. This can clearly be seen in the fact that the Chinese ambassador to the Union of Myanmar, Guan Mu, picked up the UN special envoy at the airport in Rangoon.⁴⁹ Under Chinese pressure, the Myanmar military government even appointed Labor Minister Aung Kyi to hold a dialogue with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.⁵⁰ Chinese soft-interventions above are, in fact, necessary in order to safeguard its strategic and international interests in Myanmar. China could not allow the situation in Myanmar to deteriorate further simply because of the fear of international intervention, particularly from the America. Because of its rejection of hard interventions, China has to use other means to stabilize the social order in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Clearly the motives behind China's non-intervention policy are not simply economic since there exists a plethora of reasons for China to ensure stability in Myanmar. However, China certainly does not believe that hard intervention could solve the problems in Myanmar. Still, a failed Myanmar will pose even more challenges to the region. It is thus understood that China is willing to defend Myanmar from international intervention because of its own strategic interests in the region such as the maintenance of both, a free transport corridor into the Indochina Peninsula and a buffer to China's borders. However, China's non-intervention policy is not a regional policy. It is, indeed, part of the new world order of

49 BBC Chinese.com, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_7020000/newsid_7020300/7020333.stm> (29/09/2007).

50 Ming Pao Daily, 31/10/2007.

China, in partnership with India and Russia, constraining the growing American unilateralism.

By considering the above-mentioned interests of China in Myanmar, we can understand the inconsistency of China's stance on international intervention. China can accept international intervention in Kosovo, East Timor and Lebanon under the aegis of the UN since China does not have regional and strategic interests there. Besides, as long as those international interventions are carried out by the UN, China feels more comfortable as those interventions are not dominated by particular great powers for expanding their spheres of influence. In contrast, any political change and instability in Darfur will definitely upset China's energy security, while those in North Korea and Myanmar will even threaten China's strategic planning and national security which is why China blocked the international interventions in these places, but not others.

China's non-intervention policy is based on the principle of non-interference by military means, yet this does not preclude the fact that China still conducts soft-interventions in order to solve regional problems in the Myanmar region. Indeed, similar Chinese soft-interventions have also taken place in Darfur and North Korea. China has long been accused of supporting authoritarian regimes through its non-intervention policy; however, in the case of Myanmar, China has already developed contact with opposition groups not supporting the authoritarian government of Myanmar, mostly to ensure Chinese interest in case of the government's fall.⁵¹ Non-intervention policy neither means that there is no intervention nor that China supports the current regime. Rather, China has urged the Myanmar military government to develop its economy, solve ethnic conflicts and reestablish a democratic system. A stable Myanmar will be in the best interest of China. To be clear, however, China's non-intervention policy serves it various interests in and through Myanmar irrespective of the particular regime or leadership there.

⁵¹ Ming Pao Daily, 26/09/2007.

Regional Security Dynamics in the Middle East

The Problematic Search for a Regional Leader

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi

Introduction

The paper is based on an analytical exposition of “potential” regional leaders in the Middle Eastern region. The following seven countries compete for regional leadership in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. Before moving on to an exhaustive analysis of these countries, it is important to clarify the distinction between regional leaders and regional hegemons.

The concept of regional hegemony implies domination and coercion. It exemplifies a scenario where one or more than one state exercises its power over other states in the region. One should note that the crucial term here is domination. An inherently negative term, domination militates against the idea of regional peace and long term stability. Regional hegemons, by exercising their power over other states, destroy the basis of cooperation and stability giving way to an insecure regional order with the potential and risk of war as an imminent reality and fact of life.

On the other hand, a regional leader is not a regional hegemon and thus by extension does not dominate, uses force or coerces other states in the region. The essential quality of a regional leader is its acceptance as a leader by other states in the region. Such an acceptance is not pragmatically induced nor a function of band-wagoning. Rather it involves an intersubjective understanding of each other's identity and a consequent relocation of a common framework of action and policies. The European Union here is a classical example. The regional leader, whose stability and prosperity is essentially linked with the regional sub-system, strives to maintain a close working relationship with other countries that in turn recognize and accept the leader as legitimate.

With such a conceptual benchmark between the essential qualities of a regional leader and a regional hegemon clarified, it is possible to move towards an analysis of the Middle Eastern region. Any analysis of regional leaders in the Middle East region needs to invoke the argument that since regional leaders are benign entities, their potential as leaders requires an analysis of not only their respective military strength, which is indispensable for regional leaders, but also their internal strength as strong states with political stability and democratic governance.



Farhan Hanif Siddiqi

The normative framework of political stability and democratic governance in the post-Cold War era and specially the War on Terror has acquired immense importance as a criterion to judge the political development of nation-states. States which measure up to such a criterion are privileged compared to states which range from the quasi-democratic to outright tyrannical governments; the latter being a reality for most states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Israelis, for example, continue to emphasize that they are the only democracy in the Middle East, which bestows them an advantage over the monarchical kingdoms and dictatorships which litter the Middle Eastern socio-political landscape.

In addition, to the regional and domestic dynamics, the search for a regional leader in the Middle East is mediated by the variable of international security. International security impacts on the rise of regional leaders in the Middle East with respect to three issues: the War on Terror against Al-Qaeda, the alleged nuclear weapons program of Iran and the democratization of the Middle Eastern countries. The salience of the three issues is directly interwoven with the role of the United States as the foremost military superpower in the world and its propensity for agenda setting.

It will be argued, that the three variables combined—that is, domestic, regional and international security—makes it difficult for the rise of regional leaders in the Middle East. Unfortunately, in the Middle East, the contemporary security epitome is tainted with regional hegemons, including Israel and Iran, whose regional ambitions contradict rather than complement each other. The transformation in roles from regional hegemons to regional leaders is what is required in the contemporary Middle Eastern security structure to guarantee peace and development in the longer run. Such a transformation entails, amongst other things, an intersubjective acceptance of each other's identities and interests. The monstrosity of the said task, that is, the intersubjective domain of shared understanding attests to the problematic of searching for regional leaders in the Middle East. Though Egypt and Israel with different cultures and belief systems have come close to each other since the Camp David Accords (1979), and the current Syria-Israel talks on peace between the two countries stand as an additional good example, the prospects for a regional leader to emerge still look dim if one takes into account the rivalries and conflicts between the different states of the region.

In addition to the three levels of analysis, ethnic peculiarities play an equally important role in the Middle Eastern region. The Arab Middle East includes within its fold powerful non-Arab states, which have challenged and continue to challenge the Arab world for supremacy in the region. Iran, Israel and Turkey,

the three major contenders for regional supremacy are non-Arab, a factor that in myriad ways militates against their propensity to become the leading countries of the region. With such an analytical framework, the article is structured along the following lines: the framework of regional security will be analyzed in the first instance to introduce the reader to the security dynamics at play between different countries in the region. It is important in the first instance to understand how the Middle Eastern security system is structured and how different countries are placed in it. Secondly, international security imperatives will be detailed upon to assess the impact on the rise of regional leaders. The last section will look at domestic security determinants with reference to the establishment of democracy, fundamental freedoms and protection of minorities within the said Middle Eastern states.

Regional Security in the Middle East: Definition and Framework

In security terms, 'region' means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other.¹ Buzan further contends that regional security dynamics can be best understood with respect to the pattern of amity and enmity among states. Basing his argument on constructivist lines in which identities play an influential role in determining the security structure of a region, the pattern of amities and enmities in the Middle East in the postwar era were shaped by the presence of Israel, which was a cause of inter-Arab unity.

The virtual hostility of Arab countries to the existence of Israel dominated regional politics in which Egypt and Syria emerged as two leading countries of the region. Their defeat at the hands of Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967 heralded a new regional security complex whereby Egypt, in the post-Nasser era, abandoned hostility towards Israel in favor of a more amicable relationship with the Jewish State. The Egyptian U-turn in the 1970s along with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 paved the way for a newer hybrid mix of both amities and enmities.

A geographical delineation of amities and enmities in the Middle Eastern region can be constructed as follows: In the Persian Gulf region, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are the principal states with Saudi Arabia and Iraq acting in unison against revolutionary Iran since the 1980s. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was perceived as a threat by the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia and, on the other hand, it sent jitters into neighboring Iraq, home to a Shia majority. The result was an eight-year war

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO, 1991.

between Iran and Iraq, the longest in the post-war era, resulting in the deaths of a million people.

Iran and Saudi Arabia locked horns with each other as Wahhabi Islam contended with Shia Islam for predominance and influence in the region. Saudi Arabia became one of the principal suppliers of arms and armaments to the regime of Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988). Rivalry between the two states was also manifest in Afghanistan in the 1990s, where Saudi support to the Taliban regime was seen as detrimental to the interests of the Iranian State. This rivalry was also played out, unfortunately, in Pakistan, where sectarian parties emerged, boosted by their respective client states, that is, Iran and Saudi Arabia, leading to much sectarian violence and bloodshed especially in the 1990s.

Of these three states, it must be noted that Saudi Arabia stands in a weaker position compared to Iraq and Iran mainly due to its lack of military strength. The Saudi State remains dependent for its security on the United States and has not engaged in any major combat operations against another regional state. Iraq, on the other hand, is going through a transitional phase as it attempts to restructure its society and politics after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Its potential as a regional power, thus, is increasingly circumscribed. Iran retains great potential because of the sheer size of the state as well as its military strength, but its domestic politics along with its ethnic and sectarian identity tends to prevent its rise as a regional leader acceptable to other states of the region.

Iran's ethnic and sectarian identity (Persian and Shia), stands in contradistinction to the predominant Sunni and Arab states in the region. During the 1990s, the Taliban movement in Afghanistan of which Saudi Arabia was one of the major supporters—one of the three countries besides Pakistan and the UAE which had recognized the Taliban regime—was denounced by Ayatollah Khamenei in 1998 as *juhul*, a Quranic term meaning “ignorant”.² On other occasions, moreover, Khamenei has asserted that Persian, not Arabic is the “true” language of Islam.³ This dichotomy between Persian-Arab/Arab-Persian thus has been a constant irritant in Iran-Arab relations stymieing the growth of Iran as a regional leader.

The Persian Gulf can be contrasted with the Eastern Mediterranean consisting of Israel, Syria and Egypt as the principal states. Egypt has since the 1970s come closer to Israel while Syria finds itself locked in a strategic rivalry with the state

2 Fred Halliday, Iran and the Middle East: Foreign Policy and Domestic Change, in: Middle East Report, Autumn 2001, pp. 42–47.

3 Ibid.

of Israel, which has played out frequently in Lebanon. Israel is without doubt Middle East's foremost military power as has been demonstrated during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. Arab efforts in defeating Zionism have come to naught and the Israeli state has geographically expanded at the expense of its Arab neighbors. However, as in the case of Iran, the non-Arab facet of Israeli identity impacts negatively on its acceptance as a regional leader.

Israel's status as a regional power was most clearly demonstrated after the 1967 War when in a matter of six days, Israel was able to circumvent the supremacy of powerful regional states including Egypt and Syria. Though Egypt has moved closer to Israel since the 1973 War and a general trend towards rapprochement with Israel took shape in the 1990s amongst Arab countries,⁴ Israel and its status as a regional leader remain in doubt. This is due to its repression of the Palestinian populace, which makes any move towards better relations between Israel and other Arab states a chimera. The Arab-Israeli divide with its historical antecedents bordering on and including religious hostility as well as ethnic differentiation make Israel's position as a regional leader highly precarious.

Syria, on the other hand, retains a pariah status and although Syria under Hafez al-Asad supported the American-led invasion against Saddam Hussain in 1991 and was an integral part of the Arab-Israeli peace process, relations with Israel—es-

⁴ The process reversed after the initiation of the Second Intifada in September 2000.



The Middle East Panel

pecially vis-à-vis Lebanon—cast a negative shadow over its capability as a regional leader. Lastly, Turkey, another non-Arab country, has become a key player in contemporary regional dynamics, most specifically in terms of its interest in Iraq with respect to the Kurdish ethnic question. However, Turkish interest in the Middle East has remained largely peripheral and the Turkish ruling elite sees itself as part of a larger European entity in the future.⁵

This is most manifest in the Arab-Israeli dispute in which Turkey has consistently adopted a policy of effective neutrality, with periodic verbal support for the Palestinians. Turkey recognized the state of Israel in 1949 and has never withdrawn this recognition.⁶ Turkey's recent overtures to join the European Union are a good indicator of where the state sees itself in the future. However, the Turkish polity is a central part of the Western security structure in the Middle Eastern region and remains important in terms of the strategic bases that it provides to the United States. These bases were utilized effectively during the Second Gulf War in 1990–91 as well as in the late stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Turkey's non-interest in the Middle East remains despite the ascendancy of a new government with supposed Islamist tendencies. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has identified Europe as a top priority and introduced reforms which paved the way for the opening of membership talks in October 2005.

International Security Dynamics and the Middle East

International security dynamics relative to the Middle East impact in three ways: the fight against Al-Qaeda and its various cells, Iran's nuclear arsenal and the democratization of the undemocratic regimes in the Middle East.

The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 resonated with the Huntingtonian prediction of a 'clash of civilizations' between the West and Islam. Highly controversial in its formulation and with theoretical and methodological weaknesses, the thesis became a tool to vilify the Arab world as archaic in opposition to the civilized and progressive West.⁷ The clash of civilizations thesis fell flat on the face when Arab states allied themselves with the United States rather than Al-Qaeda and did not oppose the American invasion of Afghanistan, although Syria did object to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia came under some hefty criticism from conservative elements within the Pentagon,

5 The BBC website does not include Turkey as a Middle Eastern country rather news on Turkey can be found in the section on Europe.

6 William Hale, Turkey, in: Yezid Sayigh, Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East*, New York, NY, 1997, pp. 250–278.

7 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, NY, 1996.

as fifteen of the nineteen hijackers on 9/11 were Saudi citizens. However, on September 12, 2001 Crown Prince Abdullah discreetly shipped an extra nine million barrels of oil to the United States in order to foil the oil price hike in the wake of the attacks. Furthermore, a senior Saudi prince donated a gift of \$10 million to victims of the World Trade Center, which was later refused.⁸ The Saudi gesture was a strong reminder that it valued its relationship with the United States rather than the Islamists, which were seen as a threat to the Saudi monarchy.

The fight against Al-Qaeda, however, impacts negatively on the state of Iran, which is seen as a supporter of terrorism by the United States although no evidence of a nexus between the Iranian state and Al-Qaeda exists. On the same lines, Syrian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon is equated with the issue of terrorism, which once again does not bode well for the Syrian state and its regional status. However, other countries such as Egypt, Israel and Turkey stand to gain a dividend as the War on Terror provides fertile grounds for these states to condemn domestic opposition as part of a wider global agenda which calls for an end to extremism and politics of terrorism at the sub-state level.

Secondly, the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program has also attracted wide attention and the United States has been in the forefront of attempts to curb what it believes is Iran's propensity to develop nuclear weapons. Ironically and very surprisingly, an American national intelligence estimate in December 2007 absolved Iran of producing nuclear weapons stating that the program had been stopped in 2003. However, on a recent visit to the Middle East, President George W. Bush reminded the Arab world of the threat which emanates from Iran and its revolutionary regime. Iran insists that its nuclear energy is for peaceful purposes and that it does not intend to build nuclear weapons, a posture verified by its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The issue, it seems, is compounded to a large extent with the ascent in power of a hard-line President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who on more than one occasion has called for the destruction of Israel and the West. His regime is thus seen as a threat by the United States and Israel. The United Nations Security Council's unanimous vote and passing of Resolution 1803—with Indonesia abstaining—was a further blow to Iran's nuclear program. The sanctions call for the foreign assets of 13 Iranian companies to be frozen, and imposes travel bans on five Iranian officials.⁹

A third interwoven theme along with the threat of Al-Qaeda and Iran's nuclear program is that of the democratization of the Middle East. From Egypt to the

8 Peter Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East*, London 2003.

9 UN approves new sanctions in Iran, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7274902.stm> (10/03/2008).

Arabian Gulf, the Middle East is ruled by leaders, which may be characterized authoritarian and despotic. President Bush in his recent visit to the Middle East called for democratic reforms in countries like Egypt as well as the six Persian Gulf States.¹⁰ The call for democracy was punctuated with the assertion that the democratic system was the best guarantee in defeating extremism. Furthermore, in his meeting with Hosni Mubarak, President Bush expressed hope that Egypt would move towards greater democracy. Democracy and democratization have thus become important signposts, which countries in the Middle East cannot ignore. That some international pressure exists on states in the Middle East to democratize is most evident in the case of Saudi Arabia which has allowed municipal polls in the last three years notwithstanding the country's refusal to allow for national elections.

Domestic Security Environment and Regional Leaders

The search for a regional leader is complicated further by the domestic security environment of individual states. It is important to understand the internal character of states concerned, because weak states with unstable socio-political structures have more vulnerabilities and therefore face different and more complicated security problems, than strong states.¹¹ Powerful countries or leaders do not only possess military strength but also combine this with stable political structures, the latter alluding to both formal and substantive democracy including periodic elections, fundamental freedoms of citizens and protection of minorities.

Starting with Saudi Arabia, the state falls far short of both formal and substantive democracy. Fundamental freedoms remain the prerogative of the monarchy, which rules the country with an iron grip. The little democracy allowed in recent years, including holding of municipal elections, does not hide the simple fact that the Saudi State remains largely authoritarian with no participation for the masses in the political process. There is still a long way to go before democracy (entailing the presence of political parties and parliamentary politics) is established in the Saudi Kingdom.

In Iran, the recent elections and the manipulation of the electoral process in favor of candidates deemed compatible with President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and his conservative policies signifies that in Iranian polity clerical authorities dominate the political system. The conservative forces representing the religious establishment are well entrenched in sections of the security forces, the judiciary and the constitutional bodies.

¹⁰ Bush ends Mid-East tour in Egypt, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7190804.stm> (10/03/2008).

¹¹ Barry Buzan, op.cit. (note 1).

Iraq, a post-conflict society, is going through the travails of establishing a legitimate order, which is not only democratically stable but also ethnically diverse. The present political system dominated by the Kurds and Shia attests to the multiplicity of actors in Iraqi society, which need to be co-opted in any socio-political set-up. As things stand, it will take years before the Iraqi state acquires a stable set-up beset as it is by both Al-Qaeda violence against the United States and sectarian violence between Shia and Sunnis.

Israel comes closest to a democracy in the Middle East but its policy with respect to the Palestinians is a moot point. Without the resolution of this erstwhile problem, Israel's democracy is at best controversial. The fragility of Israel's domestic security is a direct consequence of its relations with the Palestinians. The younger generation of Palestinians under the guise of Hamas is radically opposed to Israel and its existence as a sovereign state.

Egypt remains in a state of emergency since 1981. This state of emergency—one of the longest in the contemporary world—comes at the expense of Egyptian citizens who are denied fundamental freedoms. Hosni Mubarak's regime has to contend with a large amount of social discontent and the rise of Islamists who pose a major challenge to the incumbent regime. Despite the opposition, Mubarak has continued to rule Egypt with an iron hand and restricted the role of opposition parties and politicians.

Syria under Hafez al-Assad remained a one-party state and though attempts at political liberalization have been made with Bashar al-Assad in power, Syria is not much different today than it was before. There has been an Islamic opposition to the regime in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, which stands outlawed, and a major disturbance in the Kurdish region was also witnessed in March 2004.¹² The Kurds remain politically and socially marginalized and real power in Syria rests with the Presidency.

Turkey's democracy remains precarious at best with the Army exercising a major influence over the political process; however, it is Turkey's treatment of its minority Kurdish population that has brought it increased international condemnation. The ethnocentricity of the Turks in the socio-political system has condemned the Kurds to the status of an inferior and lower-ranked group,¹³ which has found itself at the mercy of the Turkish Army not only within Turkey but also Iraq.

12 Anders Strindberg, Syria Under Pressure, in: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, No. 4/2004, pp. 53–69.

13 Joan Smith/Kocamahhul, In the Shadow of Kurdish: The Silence of Other Ethnolinguistic Minorities in Turkey, in: *Middle East Report Summer 2001*, pp. 45–47.

Conclusion

The paper has argued that the search for a regional leader in the Middle East is problematic. The domestic, regional and international imperatives of security in the Middle East make the quest for regional leaders difficult. All three dimensions, it must be stated, are not mutually exclusive and they tend to combine in myriad ways. For example, democratization in the region (a factor in assessing domestic security) is directly linked with the global role of the United States (an international security imperative). Similarly, the role of the United States (an international security imperative) elevates the stature of countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia at the same time that it denigrates others such as Iran and Syria (a factor in determining regional security). Moreover, the democratic imperative in the contemporary world makes it important for regional leaders to embrace democracy as the only legitimate political system within their socio-political domain. To be developed politically is to be democratic. Countries will have to measure up to this standard in order to be accepted as regional leaders. Lastly, and most importantly, for regional countries to emerge as regional leaders, hegemony in a Gramscian sense, that is, implying acceptance rather than outright domination, needs to play out. If such an acceptance is missing the region will be beset with rivalries and conflicts leading to increased long term regional instability.

Working out Gaza: Options for Regional Cooperation and the Role of Regional Leaders¹

Ksenia Svetlova

Introduction

During the last three years which passed since Hamas' victory in the Palestinian Authorities' parliamentary elections there has been hardly a day when Gaza has not been in the news. The territory has been referred to by the Israeli and international press as a "ticking bomb," "on the verge of explosion," "wasp's nest," "ghetto," and so forth. News from Gaza drew public attention due to latest developments in the overpopulated 60 kilometers long strip which has always been rich of conflicts and problems. The history of contemporary Gaza dates back to 1948, when Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini, tried to proclaim the first independent Palestinian state on this territory. Hajj Amin was deported and arrested, and eventually the state was never proclaimed. During the next 19 years Gaza was ruled by Egypt, being an imposition on Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime and posing a security threat to Israel as Palestinian fidayyun (militants) crossed easily into Israeli territory, carrying weapons and explosives. Underdeveloped and poor, crowded with refugees, Gaza was already on the verge of explosion as early as 1967. The situation aggravated after the Six-Day War when Gaza was occupied by the Israeli army and its residents received the peculiar status of non-citizens lacking any political rights whatsoever. During the last two and a half years that have passed since the disengagement by the Israelis in 2005, Gaza reached a state of almost impossible dead-lock. In the Middle Eastern context Gaza is not just a narrow strip of land situated between Egypt and Israel. The developments inside Gaza not only influence both countries inevitably but also Middle East as a whole since the Palestinian question continues to be one of highest importance. In a way, Gaza is the first domino in a regional game: when it falls, it drags the rest of the dominoes into a fall.

The goal of this paper is to display how Gaza did become a regional problem and regional responsibility during the second half of 20th century and how a possible solution for Gaza might look like. It is argued that only by regional efforts and the cooperation between regional leaders a right formula can be found which is, then, exemplified by highlighting a few possible directions for this kind of cooperation.



Ksenia Svetlova

¹ This paper has been written in summer 2008 and therefore does not include an analysis of the recent war in Gaza in early 2009.

The Gloomy Picture

According to a recent report by eight British-based human rights organizations, the situation in Gaza strip has reached its worst point since the Six-Day War in 1967. The report finds that more than 1.1 million people, about 80 percent of the population in Gaza, are now dependent on food aid while the overall unemployment is close to 40 percent. The hospitals are suffering from power cuts of up to twelve hours a day, and the water and sewage systems have been close to collapse, with 40–50 million liters of sewage pouring into the sea on a daily basis.² There are no food shortages yet, but some food brands are unavailable or scarce and the prices of food have increased dramatically. At the same time, there is no shortage of weapons and explosives that pour into the strip through underground tunnels that connect the Palestinian part of Rafah with the Egyptian part of the city. An average of 20–30 Qassam rockets per day had been falling on the Israeli town of Sderot until the truce in June 2008, seriously injuring dozens of its residents, among them small children.³

In the early months of 2008 more than 150 Palestinians died in air strikes (50 civilians, 84 combatants and 16 with unknown status⁴), while 2 others died from various diseases, unable to reach Israeli or Egyptian hospitals due to the closure of the border. Since June 2007 so far 103 Palestinian patients died due to the Israeli imposed siege on the Gaza strip.⁵ The situation in Gaza also affected the process of negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, as both parties declared they are not able to negotiate during military escalation.

Gaza: Whose Problem?

After the disengagement in the summer of 2005 the Israeli government has proclaimed that “Israel is through with Gaza”, yet it seems that Gaza is still very much connected to Israel by the umbilical cords of economic dependence (electricity, water, gas) as well as military presence and surveillance (air, water and land borders). Numerous solutions for Gaza have been discussed, tried and rejected until now—from military re-occupation of Gaza by the Israeli army to power cut-offs—yet none of them seem to have resulted in tangible or successful results. According to international law, Israel, as a controlling force on Gaza borders and an entity which ruled Gaza for 37 years, still has several obligations and duties

2 MenaReport, Humanitarian situation in Gaza Strip worst since 1967, <<http://www.menareport.com/en/business/223189>>.

3 Ynet, הנשה תליחתם בגנב ולפנ סימאסק 400 הכרעה, <<http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-3508650,00.html>>.

4 Interview with Sarit Michael, Betzelem. 03/15/2008.

5 IMEMC, Two Palestinian patients die due to the Israeli siege on Gaza, death toll due to the siege hits 103, <<http://www.imemc.org/article/52697>>.

towards the population of Gaza, although there is a legal dispute on the question whether Israel is still an occupying force or not.⁶ It thus seems that unless the situation in Gaza improves, Israel can neither enjoy the security it seeks nor make progress in negotiations with the Palestinians, thereby continuing to be attached to it by previous obligations.

Yet, Gaza cannot be perceived as merely an Israeli problem. Although Egypt does not have any legal duties concerning Gaza, as Israel does, it has much deeper historical and religious ties with Gaza population. The dramatic developments on the Rafah border in January 2008 proved that Egypt is not immune to developments in Gaza, too. The border was broken easily by Hamas activists who had prepared the breakout for months; nearly half a million Palestinians poured through the hole in the wall into the Egyptian part of Rafah and Al-Arish. The first attempt to stop the flow of “shoppers” from Gaza was met with angry demonstrations held by members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, following the declaration of the Egyptian president that he would not be able to give the order to shoot at hungry people.⁷

The border was closed only after a few days, during which a few Hamas militants carrying weapons infiltrated the Sinai Peninsula, while hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members expressed interest in traveling to Gaza and join the anti-Israeli resistance. A few Palestinians, all members of the Hamas, were arrested by the Egyptians, and the military wing of the organization threatened to carry out suicide attacks in the Sinai which would have hurt the Egyptian tourism industry immensely.

Like Israel, Egypt has been concerned by the growing influence of Iran in the strip. Today, Iranian money pays the salaries of Hamas leaders and activists, and allows for the acquisition of weapons and explosives. Egypt and Israel are also equally concerned by the appearance of Al-Qaeda cells in Gaza.⁸

Obviously, Israel and Egypt, Gaza’s immediate neighbors are expected to be the most interested parties when it comes to working out any solution for Gaza. Other countries in the Middle East are, however, also concerned since no regime can stop the flow of information and horrific pictures from Gaza which are broadcast into every living room by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Today Gaza is

6 Human Rights Watch, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, <<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/isrlpa9806.htm>>.

7 Ehud Yaari, Egypt working to contain Gaza, <<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2713>>.

8 Robert Zelnick, How Iran could help end the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, <<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.zelnick.iranisraelpalestine.html>>.

just as much the problem of Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan as it is a concern of Egypt and Israel. Moreover, the Gordian knot of Gaza is way too complex and tangled to be untied by one party alone. Therefore, only regional cooperation will allow for finding a right and feasible solution for Gaza that will eventually put an end to the spiral of violence and the suffering of the civilians. Also, it is important to understand that the complexity of problems requires the solution to be complex as well, as there are at least a number of different levels which need to be addressed. These need to be approached simultaneously in order to achieve some kind of progress. There is the security level, the political level, the humanitarian level and the legal level—a puzzle of interconnected and interdependent pieces which do not allow for an approach addressing one issue after the other.

Attitudes and Terminology

In January 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Territories the world was taken by surprise. For the first time in history of the contemporary Middle East an Islamic movement had come to power as a result of transparent and democratic elections. Soon after the US tried to topple the Hamas regime, unsuccessfully one has to say,⁹ the international community decided to boycott Hamas and forbade Abu Mazen and the Egyptians to negotiate with Hamas as well. This disregarded the fact that Hamas is the sovereign in Gaza and in charge of the lives of the 1.5 million Palestinians living there. However, during the time rumors were constantly spread by various sources that both Israel and the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah were holding separate talks with Hamas. Only recently the taboo on contacts with Hamas was removed by the Americans, although unofficially, which allowed the Egyptians to negotiate a possible cease-fire between Israel and Hamas. The Egyptians had already quite successfully negotiated about the re-establishment of the border in Rafah and the return of the Palestinians to Gaza with Hamas in January 2008. I believe that a new standard should be introduced and implemented by the regional powers as well as by the international community if the situation in Gaza remains as it is. This would mean that contacts with the Hamas government will be allowed in cases where humanitarian aid and the transfer of Palestinian patients to Israeli territory is needed or an exchange of prisoners is concerned. This measure will not only improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza but also prevent Hamas from using the rumors on “negotiations” or “contacts” as a bargaining chip. At the same time, it is important to stress that the standards of the international community towards Hamas should not be altered and no normal ties be established with the organization until its leaders will meet the three Mideast Quartet requirements: (i)

⁹ Yediot Ahronot (Israel), 3/14/2008

recognition of Israel's right to exist, (ii) adoption of previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and (iii) a renouncement of violence and terrorism.

Economics

Food supplies and electricity: Although there is a legal dispute in Israel on whether Gaza is still considered an occupied territory, there is no dispute on the question of basic responsibilities towards the population of the strip. Currently Gaza is dependent on Israeli electricity, gas and humanitarian aid which come through Israeli checkpoints, mainly Kerem Shalom. At the same time, Israel is a country which has engaged in military conflict with Hamas, the ruling party of Gaza, and has proclaimed the latter as a “hostile entity.” Each act of hostility by Hamas is almost immediately followed by a closure of checkpoints. Food supplies rot in trucks and patients do not receive necessary medical treatment. Many international humanitarian organizations suggested in the past that the situation will improve, if they were allowed to bring aid into Gaza via the Rafah border (controlled by Egyptians) instead of Karni (controlled by Israelis). The Israeli and the Egyptian sides have been reluctant in this respect, suggesting that terrorist organizations would use the shipments of aid in order to bring further weapons and explosives into Gaza. However, if an agreement of this sort were to be reached by Israel, Egypt and the UN—which would safeguard the aid shipments—the risk of starvation or deprivation of food in Gaza would be significantly reduced.



Neslihan Kaptanoglu from Turkey and Ksenia Svetlova from Israel

Electricity and fuel: Currently Gaza acquires the electricity from the Israeli energy company “Hevrat Hashmal” although it could equally use the cheaper electricity coming from Egypt following the Jericho example (Jericho has recently started using Jordanian instead of Israeli electricity¹⁰). In principal the Egyptians declared that they are in favor of connecting Gaza to the Rafah district power station and the Egyptian electricity grid. Yet, no progress has been made in this direction until now.

Freedom of movement: Although the international economical boycott on Gaza began following the Hamas takeover in the strip, most of its population has been denied freedom of movement for more than seven years now, unable to work in Israel, study in the West Bank and visit relatives in Egypt. This tactic of strangulation has not proven to be very effective, a fact which is now recognized by Israeli leaders as well as by the international community. In this context, questions of legality arise. The Syrian government does not recognize Israel and provides support to numerous militant organizations, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Has this fact in any way affected the freedom of movement by Syrian citizens? If the answer is “no,” then it is clear that some sort of agreement must be negotiated for the Palestinians which are currently denied a basic human right. Israelis fear a reopening of the Rafah crossing, even a temporary one intended to channel humanitarian relief to the strip. According to them, an international peace force will not be able to provide for effective surveillance and may eventually also fail to prohibit an Egyptian takeover of responsibility for Gaza. Regardless of the stepping down of the Hamas government in Gaza the freedom of movement between Gaza and the rest of the world must be negotiated immediately and not after another party has come to power. After the disengagement in 2005 the construction of an airport and the seaport were already discussed and planned. It is recommendable that the parties—Palestinians, Israelis and Egyptians—continue the work on these plans as soon as possible. Until that moment the mentioned parties as well as Jordan will have to agree on the most efficient procedure to allow the residents of Gaza to cross the borders for religious, medical and educational purposes.

Security

Security has always been a key issue for the Israeli side which claims that Gaza poses a real threat to southern Israeli cities and villages. During the years of the Intifada, al-Aqsa, dozens of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists committed suicide bombing inside Israeli cities and currently dozens of Qassam and Grad rockets fall on the Israeli cities of Sderot and Ashqelon every day. Each act of hostile-

10 Jordan: Electricity supplies to Jericho begin today, <<http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20080225034753>>.

ity causes an act of retaliation by the Israeli army, resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, pain and horror, which in turn causes angry reactions and a desire for retaliation. The Palestinian president Abu Mazen had many called times for calm, urging the military organizations in Gaza to stop “the useless rocket fire on Israeli cities.”¹¹ It is ironic that despite the harsh blockade the only abundant supply in Gaza consists of weapons of any kind, including artillery weapons and rockets. These weapons are acquired by Palestinian militants from Egyptian dealers under the blinking eye of Egyptian border patrols and are brought to Gaza by underground tunnels. What if the stream of weapons from Egypt were to stop? For this to happen all the tunnels had to be closed from the Egyptian side of the Filadelfi route, patrols in this area had to be multiplied and measures taken against weapon dealers further sharpened. The economic blockade did not have any effect on the continuation of fighting in Gaza so far and the ability of militants firing rockets. It is, however, most likely that the weapon blockade will have the desired effect. There is no doubt that Egypt bears the responsibility for stopping the flow of weapons. Not least, since these pass through its territory but also because Qassam rockets were fired on Egyptian territory during the riots at the Rafah border.

Diplomacy

It is common knowledge that the Hamas leadership consists of three levels. There is a level of local leadership, currently represented by Ismail Haniya, Mahmud Az-Zahar and Sayiid Siam in Gaza. The second level is the level of “foreign” leadership by Khaled Mashaal and Musa Abu-Marzouq—both Hamas leaders who reside in Damascus, Syria. The third level comprises Hamas leadership in Israeli jails, which is constantly informed by and consults with leaders in Gaza as well as those based in Syria and elsewhere. Different statements and attitudes among the leaders of the Hamas are the reflection of differences in options between these three levels of leaders. One party may proclaim a cease-fire, while the other may not agree to it. Neither Israel, nor Egypt or Jordan is able to hold negotiations with all three parties, due to a variety of reasons. Egypt and Jordan maintain a very complex relationship with Hamas leaders abroad since both countries repeatedly denied them entry visas while Israel’s official stance is a general refusal to talk to Hamas. However, there is at least one party which enjoys an equally good and stable relationship with all parties involved, that is, Qatar. The emirate of Qatar could hence serve as a regional negotiator for Hamas on a variety of issues ranging from daily necessities of life such as food delivery to more complex issues like the brokerage of a cease-fire deal. Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa as-Sani suggested that his country were to perform these negotiations, yet

11 Jihad Watch, Abu Mazen: Little Jihad is over, big Jihad starts, <<http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004598.php>>.

his suggestion was in vain as many other parties kept fighting for the prestigious role of negotiator. Yet, a neutral country such as Qatar which enjoys normal relationship with all parties in question could most probably achieve a greater success.

Conclusion

It is certain, that the key to success in finding the right solution for Gaza lays in enhancing regional cooperation, building up trust and strengthening transparency among the parties, all of whom share a joint interest. That is, the improvement of the grave situation in the Gaza strip. It is obvious that these developments will not take place without a great deal of international efforts, strong political will and concrete steps on the ground. A regional forum on Gaza must be created, in which Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East and beyond will participate. This forum must be formed of economists, security officials, diplomats and representatives of civil society of each country. A detailed and meticulous timetable has to be worked out after an agreement on key issues will be reached. Naturally, such a step might be considered a “normalization” step and, therefore, be renounced by more radical elements among the Palestinian Authorities, Saudi Arabia and even Egypt or Jordan. To avoid further complications, this forum must strictly focus on Gaza issues, without sliding into overall negotiations over other regional issues. This would be a first regional attempt to improve the situation on the ground in the Gaza strip.

It is important to remember that the proposed solution is designed for the particular situation in which Gaza is still ruled illegally by an Islamist organization which came to power as a result of a military coup. Should the situation change and Gaza will again be controlled again by the Palestinian Authorities, the original Road map plan—which was accepted by the international community as well as by Israelis and Palestinians—must be reactivated.

The African Peace and Security Architecture

Chrysantus Ayangafac

Introduction

It has become generally accepted—by scholars and laypeople alike—that Africa is a dark continent riddled with poverty, corruption and conflict. There is little doubt Africa has had its own fair share of problems, yet these problems are not unique to the continent. Rather, Africa's security and governance predicament is an unfortunate result of a development process upon which the Continent has embarked. Development is a conflict-stimulating process. Thus, rather than discard African conflicts as irrational ventures, the present political strife on the Continent should be viewed as inseparable from the developmental path the Continent has chosen. This assertion does not seek to validate conflicts on the Continent, nor is it a vindication of the developmentalist approach with which many scholars judge African conflicts. In short: analyses of peace and security in Africa have suffered from reductionism, oversimplification and banal analogies. Epithets, anecdotes and caricatures have replaced a sober analysis of peace and security challenges in Africa. Thus, conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies based on assumptions and generalizations are to be questioned.

In response to burgeoning demands by the Continent to address its own conflicts within the context of limited capacity, international indifferences and disengagement from African conflicts, the African Union (AU) was founded in 2002 in Durban, South Africa, as the prime African institution to address questions of peace and security on the continent. The inception of the AU in 2002 was greeted with much fanfare and optimism. Though there was skepticism, even ardent African pessimists conceded that the AU marked a significant paradigm shift in regard to conflict prevention and management, thus providing the continent with a plausible chance of solving its problems in the future.

However, while there is consensus that the AU has made some progress in enhancing human security on the continent, the persistence of conflicts in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia, as well as the recent political crisis in Zimbabwe and the repeated outbreak of violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), seems to suggest that the AU is still grappling with how to solve the Continent's crises. Within this context, one is tempted to ask what one can make of the AU seven years after its inception? Is there a need to re-organize and re-energize the AU given contemporary African and global political and eco-



Chrysantus Ayangafac

conomic realities? What explains the varied success of the AU, and how can the AU seek to preserve both stability and peace? In tackling these questions, the paper seeks to analyze the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It begins by interrogating what is APSA; then outlines its central argument and sketches out its theoretical framework. The paper then moves on to explore the nature and causes of conflict in Africa. Later it examines how the AU has responded to African conflicts, and highlights some of the challenges faced by the AU in preparation for an uncertain future.

Overview of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) refers to a well-ordered blueprint and neatly assembled structures, norms, capacities and procedures aimed at averting conflict and war, mediating for peace and maintaining human security on the Continent. The underlying rationale for APSA is to enable the continent to nip a conflict in the bud rather than reacting to conflict. As a result, conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution is the underlying principle of the APSA. The following institutions constitute the APSA:

- At the center of this architecture is the African Union's Peace and Security Council.
- Panel of the Wise: The Panel is an advisory, early-warning mechanism aimed at stemming conflict before it breaks out. The Panel is composed of five highly-respected African personalities selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned.
- Continental Early Warning System: the Continental Early Warning System is meant to collect and analyze country data on the basis of an appropriate 'early warning indicators module' so as to enable early response to a crisis.
- African Standby Force: The African Standby Force (ASF) is a preventive mechanism aimed at preventive deployment and humanitarian assistance as a means to avert overt conflict. The ASF shall be composed of a multi-disciplinary contingent with civilian and military components in the country of origin. It will be ready for deployment on short notice for the purpose of executing missions decided by the PSC and authorized by the assembly.¹
- Military Staff Committee: The Military Staff Committee is composed of the Chiefs of Defense Staff or their representatives (of the countries serving on the PSC). The Committee advises and assists the Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements.

1 Article 13 (1) of the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

- Peace Fund: The Peace Fund is supposed to be made up of financial appropriations taken from the regular budget of the Union, as well as voluntary contributions from member states and other sources within Africa, including the private sector (civil society and individuals) and appropriate fundraising activities.² At the heart of the APSA is the African Union Peace and Security Council.
- African Union Peace and Security Council: a perusal of articles 6 and 7 of the PSC Protocol will reveal that the PSC is the custodian of peace and security on the Continent. The PSC is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The PSC is a collective security and early-warning group that facilitates timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. According to article 5 of the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council is composed of 15 Members—elected in a non-discriminatory manner—of which ten serve for two years and five for three years. The Permanent Representatives of the Council meet at least twice a month, and the Ministers and Heads of State and Government meet on an annual basis.

Although the AU has succeeded in arresting conflict in some instances, despite this impressive institutional configuration, it is still grappling with how to cope with incidences of conflict on the Continent. Thus the question arises why the AU has succeeded in resolving some crises and failed in resolving others?

Deficiencies of the AU and Implausibility of Key Theorems Regarding African Conflicts

The central argument of my analysis is that although the African Union has designed a comprehensive peace and security architecture to address issues of peace and security on the Continent, the institution lacks the political will (and capacity) to deal with the structural causes of conflict on the continent. As a consequence, for most of its seven-year existence, the organization has been reduced to reacting to the symptoms of conflict, rather than focusing on eliminating the deeper, structural causes of conflict on the Continent.

Dealing with the structural causes of conflict is an issue that calls for interrogation of the institutional and political governance of African states, the rules of the political game, the political security of African politicians, and the distribution of resources (who gets what, when and how?). The central point here is that the weakness of the APSA should be considered a reflection of African domestic politics. In simple terms, if skewed institutional governance is the structural

² Article 21 (2) of the AU Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

causes of conflict on the continent, how do we expect members of the AU PSC with a poor governance record to pronounce on certain conflicts?

African domestic politics is a two-level game, and the AU is an extension of domestic African politics. The APSA is an institution whose member states make up the most critical part. Thus, the PSC must be seen as an institution to harmonize and coordinate the interests of the member states. As a consequence, the actions and omissions of the PSC are purely based on the prerogative or political calculations of its members. As such, one has to question the political incentives for member states to ensure the success of the APSA. Certainly, if the benefits of enforcing APSA provide political benefit and security to African leaders, these leaders will be more amenable to it. Hence adhering to and strengthening the APSA seems good insofar as it entails a commitment to overcome the problem of political uncertainty. It is nonetheless important to ask how AU members actually view APSA. The answer so far is that, to a large extent, APSA is perceived as an instrument/institution that provides opportunities to African leaders rather than one that imposes restrictions of any sort. The enforceability of its mandate is therefore contingent on the political rationalities of the AU's members and a consensus or majority among leaders. Against this backdrop, APSA is increasingly reacting to the symptoms of conflict rather than its structural causes, thus peace is increasingly being discounted for some sort of stability.

Nature and Causes of African Conflicts

Before addressing how the APSA has responded to some of the conflict on the continent the aim of this section is to debunk some of the myths surrounding the structural causes of conflicts in Africa. Many theses have been forwarded to explain conflict on the African continent. Among the most prominent and commonly-positing reasons we find ethnicity and greed.

Ethnicity and African Conflicts

The crisis in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Sudan are usually conceived as conflicts between various ethnic groups in those countries. The American journalist Robert D. Kaplan has argued that African conflicts are essentially a result of a Hobbesian State of nature that is brutish and primitive in its operations.³ Seen in this light, conflicts in Africa are short of any moral underpinnings, and must be understood in terms of untamed natural forces.

3 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, in: *The Atlantic Monthly*, No. 2/1994, pp. 44–76; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, NY, 1996.

A major limitation of ethnicity as a cause of conflict in Africa is that there is a lack of consensus and clarity as to what constitutes the exact ethnic or tribal make-up of the African population. This is because ethnicity and tribalism is not simply a question of objective data (as, on the other hand, languages, culture and religion are). Ethnic identity is merely a question of perception, rather than an absolute phenomenon. It is also janus-faced in the sense that identity entails a component of both, (voluntary) self-definition and attribution of specific traits by outsiders.⁴ While some African conflicts might be perceived as taking an ethnic character, ethnicity is not a cause of conflict but means to a (political) end. It is primarily instrumentalized or used as a mobilizing force for African elites to pursue their political agenda. Thus, personal interests of elites are framed in ethnic terms and the bells of ethnic solidarity are rung to rally support even at the risk of invoking the animosity of another group considered to be the enemy.⁵ Applying this primordial argument to the case of South Africa one has to wonder why the country has not descended into chaos, notwithstanding the fact of it being a patchwork of numerous races and ethnicities. Furthermore, ethnicity is a reality not only in Africa. Instead of shying away from these realities, it is imperative that the continent develops institutions to engender healthy competition and

4 Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis 1959–1994: History of a Genocide*, London 1995.

5 Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts. The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance*, London 1999, p. 9.



The Africa Panel

accommodation and at the same enhances and conserves its diversity and ethnic and cultural riches.

The Greed and Grievance Thesis

Increasingly conflicts in Africa are also perceived as a result of greed. Bannon and Collier argue that war occurs if the incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to its cost. Greed is the desire by parties of a conflict to steal, plunder or exploit for private gains. Rebels have an incentive to challenge government because engaging in conflict offers the opportunity for extortion, which can then finance and sustain a war.⁶ They argue that greed rather than grievance is the root cause of conflicts and the factor sustaining it. Supporting this analysis, Keen argues that, “War has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection.”⁷

Conflicts in Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Sudan seem to have validated this position. It is perceived that natural resources did not only ignite conflicts in these countries, it also fuelled and sustained them. While this thesis might seem plausible considering that natural resources have played an important role in sustaining the war-fighting capabilities in those countries, natural resource do not in themselves cause conflict.

The greed thesis is therefore conceptually and theoretically false. While natural resource abundance may increase the stakes in regard to state control in the absence of a viable alternative for accumulation; African politicians work within a more complicated social, economic and political context. Consequently, the origin and evolution of institutions and politically-influential strategies both provide political actors with opportunities and simultaneously constrain them. Consequently, no matter how damaging the struggle for natural resources might be or how this exacerbates political instability and conflict, natural resources are unlikely to stimulate civil war on their own in the absence of a correspondingly detrimental political and social context.⁸

6 Ian Bannon, Paul Collier (eds.), *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, DC, 2003; Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, New York, NY, 2003.

7 David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars* (Adelphi Paper 320—International Institute for Strategic Studies), London 1998, pp. 15–17; William Reno, *Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars*, in: Mats Berdal, David M. Malone (eds.), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Boulder, CO, 2000, pp. 43–68; Daniel Compagnon, *Somali Armed Movements*, in: Christopher Clapham (ed.), *African Guerrillas*, Oxford 1998, pp. 73–90; Stephen Ellis, *Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency*, in: Clapham (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 155–178; Ibrahim Abdullah, Patrick Muana, *The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpen proletariat*, in: Clapham (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 172–194.

8 Matthias Basedau, *Context Matters—Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Deutsches Übersetzungsinstitut, Global and Area Studies, Working Paper No. 1), Hamburg 2005.

Politics inherently involves activities associated with conflict, cooperation and negotiation, and always involves the use, production and distribution of resources at local, national and international levels.⁹ Therefore, the politics of resource distribution is at the heart of contemporary conflicts in Africa; as Harold D. Laswell already noted in the 1950s, politics is a question of who gets what, how and when.¹⁰ Consequently, conflict in Africa is a function of a governance crisis the continent is presently facing. In the absence of a viable private sector, the state in Africa has become the principal actor of accumulation. Consequently the absence of strong institutions to manage elite contestation has made violence an option for some politicians to accede to power.

Why has the APSA registered a Mixed Success in Averting and Resolving Conflicts?

From the onset it is important to state that it would be churlish to accuse the AU for its failure to halt some conflicts on the continent since the first instance of conflict prevention, management and resolution remain the member states. However, having cited resolving conflict on the continent as one of its principal objective and mandate, one needs to ask whether the AU is properly designed and equipped to carry out such an objective?

Since its creation, the AU (sometimes with the help of the international community) has achieved some spectacular successes in averting and resolving conflict. From the Togo to Comoros, Madagascar, Kenya and Burundi, the AU has managed to resolve or prevent conflict. However, in countries like Chad, Sudan Somalia and, recently, DRC the institution is still grappling with how to resolve conflicts in these countries. What does account for those mixed results?

Most importantly, the APSA is simply a set of institutions for coordination and cooperation, as a result African states have not entirely ceded their sovereignty to the APSA or cut back on their more narrowly defined national interests. Consequently member states still retain a large degree of autonomy as they engage with the APSA. Thus, adherence to the APSA by member states is determined by domestic political calculations balancing political benefits and political costs. Member states will thus adopt a certain course of action if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs. Policy prescription or matters of principle will merely figure as justification for such a course of action.

9 Rok Ajulu, African Security: Can Regional Organizations Play a Role?, in: Shannon Field (ed.), *Peace in Africa: Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*, Johannesburg 2004, pp. 267.

10 Ibid. [Hier erwartet man einen Verweis auf Laswell!!!! Der Sätzer]

In determining the potential cost and benefit, the political security of the leaders of member states is critical. For example, the government of Zimbabwe has time and again argued that some African countries cannot take a moral high ground in criticizing it's the country's governance record. The point here is that one cannot expect the leaders of Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Chad and Gabon to criticize the governance record of Zimbabwe because their own poor governance record—though less poor than Robert Mugabe's—, if they are to fear a backlash in their own backyard. This by no means concludes that the AU is simply made up of dictators who are willing to protect each other from criticism. As a matter of fact, the AU suspended the membership of a country like the Central African Republic because of an unconstitutional change of government. However commendable, why did the AU not adopt the same position in regards to the crisis in Kenya and Zimbabwe? There is little doubt Kenya and Zimbabwe provide a more difficult case because AU members take cognizance of the political ramifications these countries have on the overall political economy of the continent. One might therefore conclude that the AU always opts for a quick fix solution and a power-sharing agreement, hoping that the belligerents will sort out their differences once the stakes are high. Seen in that light, the problem in Kenya and Zimbabwe is not one of greedy elites who want to get their hands on power, far from that. The problems in these countries rather lie in the structural weaknesses of political institutions to manage elite contestation and from the absence of mechanisms which insulate political contestation by preventing the contestation flaring up into violence.

Within this context, one of the principal weaknesses of the APSA is the absence of minimum barriers to ensure policy coherence and consistency. The most important condition to qualify for AU membership is to be an African country. But what about the values espoused by African renaissance? It seems that article 5 (2) of the PSC protocol which lays out eligibility criteria for the PSC is then only worth the paper it is written on. The absence of minimum institutional and governance standards to gain entry to the PSC therefore means that the PSC faces the problem of information costs and time consistency.

Also one of the potential costs of dealing with the structural causes of conflict by the PSC is the nature of some African conflicts. Some African conflicts are regional in character involving more than one African state. As such, resolving the structural causes of these conflicts will have huge repercussion on the political survival of other leaders. For instance, it is widely perceived that the collapse of the regime in Chad will have a domino effect on the region as it might affect the regimes in the Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo

and Gabon. As a consequence, the regional character of the conflict in Chad has more often been over-emphasized over the skewed governance process which is at the heart of the conflict. The implication for this situation has been that peace is more often discounted in favor of stability. The EU forces in Eastern Chad are an example of how the regional character of the crisis in Chad is over-emphasized.

Another element that plays into the political calculus of leaders in regard to adhering to APSA is the potential economic costs vis-à-vis prospective benefits in carrying out peace support operations. Peace support operations demand enormous resources which some African states are unable or unwilling to commit if their perceived national interest is not at stake. For the time being, five countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa) account for some 75 percent of the AU budget. While financial constraints might have been lessened due to contribution from Africa's development partners like the EU through its African Peace Facility, much still needs to be done to ameliorate the AU's financial capacities.

To a large extent, AU's financial woes could be explained by the fact that many AU members are more interested in the regional economic groupings, cognizant of the fact that their national interests can be better articulated and preserved within a regional setting. This reasoning is grounded on the belief that security is increasingly taking a regional character on the continent and will, thus, eventually lead to the existence of a regional security complex. It is against this background that the AU has recognized regional economic communities as the building blocks of the APSA.

Conclusion

This paper set out to argue that despite some impressive successes, the AU is increasingly reacting to the symptoms rather than engaging with the structural causes of these conflicts. As a result, the AU is more involved in attempts to stabilizing a conflict situation than in trying to engender lasting peace. The paper further pointed out that the principal weakness of APSA should be seen in the weakness of African states. Weak states make weak institutions. As such, the skewed democratic processes in members states have provided little incentives for states to adhere to the principles of the APSA, especially with regards to addressing issues of good governance, the rule of law and the respect of human rights. Since the structural causes of conflict in Africa are to be seen in the absence of strong institution to manage elite contestation, issues of political and

institutional governance are becoming increasingly difficult for APSA to pronounce. Especially when considering the fact that APSA is barely more than a set of institutions whose most critical and important components are the member states. Since the APSA does not represent a separate body of political power and, therefore, does not possess a robust enforcement capacity, member states of the AU still retain a large space for maneuver in cheating on these institutions. Thus, until there is some policy coherence amongst member states and political and economic incentives to adhere to and enforce APSA, the continent will continue to experience mixed results when it comes to its potential in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Peace and Security in West Africa: Supporting Regional Organizations

Till Blume and Matthias Mayr

“The large countries should learn that strong leadership must induce followership [...]”

David Malone¹



Till Blume

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping in West Africa

West Africa has received far stronger international assistance for post-conflict recovery and statebuilding since the beginning of the 21st century as compared to the 1990s. Regional organizations have been relatively prominent in West Africa as well; globally, the number and extension of regional organizations has increased considerably. The division of labor within nation states, among regional leaders and international organizations is only in its early stages. It is clear, however, that regional organizations, together with international actors and organizations are likely to take over an increasingly important role—especially if international peacekeeping becomes more and more difficult.²

In West Africa, regional organizations represented the main actors behind regional peacekeeping interventions before 2003, but their record is not entirely positive in terms of promoting peace and stability. To analyze the contributions of such regional organizations, we shall revisit the regional interventions in Liberia in order to shed light on the weak organizational capacity and control of the operations throughout the 1990s. We intend to re-emphasize the main sources of success for regional organizations: finances, manpower, and political legitimacy. The necessity of these factors in carrying out successful interventions can be evidenced by looking at United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are deployed throughout the region with support from lead countries and other international organizations and have enjoyed considerable success.³

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which carried out most interventions in West Africa during the 1990s, is one of the largest sub-regional organizations on the continent. As mentioned, its record of peace-

1 David Malone, The African Union: Triumph of Hope over Experience, in: *Globe and Mail*, 07/06/2004.

2 A. Sarjoh Bah, Bruce Jones, Peace Operation Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements, in: CIC (ed.), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, New York, NY, 2008, pp. 21–30; Richard Gowan, The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08, in: *International Peacekeeping*, No. 4/2008, pp. 453–469.

3 The lead nations are: in Sierra Leone, the United Kingdom; in Côte d'Ivoire, France; in Liberia—after some hesitation and only in cooperation with many other partners—the United States.

keeping interventions is, at best, mixed. The main conclusion of this paper is that regional organizations must be supported—more than they currently are—by international and bilateral donors. The reason is that interventions in general and by regional organizations specifically, are more likely to be successful if sufficient financial, military, and political means are provided. And, furthermore, if they achieved legitimacy through the management and direction of the respective regional organization's headquarters—not those of its main member states. This has huge influence on the legitimacy and perception of interventions in the respective conflict area. Regional peacekeeping interventions need to be perceived as legitimate and impartial in order to be successful, both on the ground and in the region as a whole.

As stated, the three factors deemed crucial for a successful intervention are political legitimacy, military capacity, and financial funds. Regional organizations could easily provide the umbrella for providing security and peace, if they receive the backing they need—from member states or the international community—in order to develop their own political, military, and economic capacities. We advocate reinforcing the political legitimacy of regional organizations as they assist with conflict management, peacekeeping, and peace-building missions. Agreements between member states for funding and military support and with international organizations for hybrid arrangements should be encouraged. Furthermore, 'lead countries' should be encouraged to hand over the implementation of peacekeeping and peace-building missions to regional organizations.

The case study of ECOWAS interventions in Liberia within the framework of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) serves to illustrate the difficulties regional hegemonic powers, such as Nigeria, face when involved in implementing peace operations. Nigeria is the most powerful nation in West Africa, but has a shaky reputation among its neighboring states. Though ECOMOG interventions were partly successful in preventing more bloodshed, they also served to create more conflict (at least in Liberia). They ultimately failed to implement their mandate due to lack of diplomatic capacity, funding and equipment. The main problems can be clearly identified as a lack of finances, the lack of political legitimacy among ECOMOG deployments, which resulted in a politically-biased perception of the regional interventions in Liberia besides the lack of proper military equipment and manpower.

After a presentation of the argument and a short history of regional and international interventions in West Africa, a case study on the Liberian conflict and Nigerian involvement will reveal the pitfalls and dilemmas of regional leaders in

conflict prevention. Policy recommendations for the support of regional organizations are given at the end of the paper.

Mapping the Argument: Dimensions for Regional Interventions in Fragile States

Regional organizations in Africa—such as the AU in Darfur or ECOWAS in West Africa—are strongly supported by the international community. There are three ways in which regional organizations need to be supported in order to make the success of regional interventions more likely: Regional organizations need to be perceived as honest brokers (political dimension), they need to have the military means to prevent spoiling behaviour (military dimension), and they need to possess the management and funds to be able to finance interventions (financial dimension).

This, certainly, is never possible without contributions from member states, and it is essential that military and financial support come from these member states. However, regional organizations can improve legitimacy in the political dimension through their own actions. If regional hegemonic powers carry out interventions, they have, by definition, interests in the intervention area; they often do not contribute to a positive perception of regional leaders in the conflict area. If regional organizations use associated secretariats and organizational bodies (like the EU, African Union and ECOWAS) as political support systems, they can be more easily perceived as neutral than in their role as dominant member states.

ECOWAS since 1975

ECOWAS was founded by 15 member states (with Cape Verde joining in 1976 and Mauritania withdrawing in 2000) in 1975 as a result of initial organizational plans drawn by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1960.⁴ The founding document highlighted four main goals: to promote trade among member states, to improve physical infrastructure, to strengthen production structures, and to enhance monetary cooperation. ECOWAS is unique in that it transcends the linguistic and cultural divisions imposed by the former colonial powers, that is, the United Kingdom, France and Portugal.⁵ The region is considered one of the more ambitious economic groupings in Africa, as it boasts a per capita income that, in 2000 (\$ 332), was far higher than East Africa (\$ 234) or Central Africa (\$ 270).

4 Adebayo Adedeji, *ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey*, in: Adekeye Adebajo, Ismail Rashid (eds.), *West Africa's Security Challenges. Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, Boulder, CO, 2004, p. 22.

5 *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55.

The security pillar in ECOWAS gained momentum in the early 1990s, but despite a revised ECOWAS treaty and Nigerian efforts in 1993, functioning security mechanisms in ECOWAS were not developed. In fact, such mechanisms were not developed until the 1997 ECOWAS Summit, where the Nigerian proposal for a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security was drafted. Due to a clash between Nigeria and Senegal at the ECOWAS summit in 1998 (which occurred because of francophone concerns about Nigeria's dominating role), the resolution was not implemented until 2000. Nevertheless, ECOWAS has changed significantly since the early 1990s, when Nigeria promoted regional conflict resolution mechanisms to gain political influence in the region, seeing itself at the centre of West African politics.⁶ The ECOMOG forces deployed to Liberia in 1990, to Sierra Leone in 1993, and even to Guinea-Bissau in 1999, lacked both political and financial support, and were logistically ill-equipped to carry out their mandates properly.

The problems of ECOWAS interventions in West Africa in the 1990s were mainly in regard to financing, modes of deployment, the composition of the ECOMOG force, the command and control of operations, and the lack of involvement of the ECOWAS secretariat in managing the implementation of the mandate. As one consequence, the commanders on the ground, who had little diplomatic experience, had to manage the missions, and the bulk of staff and funds were largely provided by Nigeria.

The following section details the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and shows how the three dimensions identified above were not addressed properly. Furthermore, political steering from the ECOWAS secretariat was largely absent. Due to a partial cooperation with rebel groups, the perception of Nigerian troops in Liberia was relatively negative. What would have been necessary was a peacekeeping force that was equipped with sufficient funds and logistical capacity. Furthermore, leadership from a political organization independent of Nigeria would have increased legitimacy and political support in Liberia and among other ECOWAS member states.

ECOMOG in Liberia—ECOWAS, Nigeria, and a Failed State

Liberia is a special case in West Africa: the country has experienced 15 years of civil war, in which most neighboring countries were involved. The 1990

6 Gani J. Yoroms, ECOMOG and West African Regional Security: A Nigerian Perspective, in: *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, No. 1/1993, pp. 84–91.

ECOMOG intervention in Liberia was the first peacekeeping mission of a regional African organization.⁷

The Political Dimension

From the beginning, the Nigerian military contingent was the largest contribution to ECOMOG, especially after a Nigerian General replaced the first Ghanaian Force Commander. Over the years, Nigeria has provided 80 per cent of ECOWAS troops since the first regional peace operations started. Nigeria had a strong national interest in participating in the ECOMOG force in Liberia, but was not the only interested country in the region. Most other countries, such as Burkina Faso, were involved in the Liberian conflict behind the scenes.⁸ Due to Nigeria's perception as a regional leader and mounting concerns that the nation was acting only out of self-interest, Nigerian soldiers were never perceived as honest and neutral brokers, neither in Liberia nor in Sierra Leone. This perception worsened, when Nigeria started to support various factions in the Liberian civil war in order to gain control of certain areas. On the one hand, this was due to Nigeria's inability to defeat the rebels and the necessity of restoring some degree of order, which resulted in military stalemates and subsequent appeasement.⁹ On the other hand, however, ECOMOG forces were themselves seeking coalitions with rebel factions and were involved in looting the country, at least in Liberia.¹⁰

One contributing factor was the proliferation of ethnic factions in Liberia. However, ECOMOG was already hampered from the onset: poor diplomatic efforts on the part of ECOWAS member states during the crisis contributed to the failure of the mission.¹¹ Although the members argued for an immediate intervention to counter economic difficulties resulting from the flood of Liberian and other West African refugees into member countries,¹² the conflicting interests of such member states also complicated the negotiation of sound mandates and provision of sufficient equipment. Francophone countries in ECOWAS blocked reasonable and sustainable proposals for force levels within other nations.¹³

7 Heinrich Bergstresser, Denis M. Tull, *Nigeria als regionale Ordnungsmacht in Westafrika*, Berlin 2008.

8 Adekeje Adebajo, *Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms*, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 293.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 292.

10 The acronym ECOMOG was soon translated into "Every Car Or Moving Object Gone". Compare Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy. The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, New York, NY, 2006.

11 Clement E. Adibe, *The Liberian conflict and the ECOWAS-UN partnership*, in: *Third World Quarterly*, No. 3/1997, p. 474.

12 Interestingly, Nigeria and Ghana, the two major powers in West Africa are mentioned here explicitly by the former Ghanaian Foreign Minister Adibe, *ibid.*

13 Adebajo, *op. cit.* (note 8), p. 298. ECOMOG consisted of troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Mali, and Guinea.

The Military Dimension

Nevertheless, a military intervention seemed to be the primary choice of action. Due to the first Gulf War, international involvement in the early 1990s was low in West Africa. The international community deferred the responsibility for peacekeeping to regional organizations. For the first time, the international community demanded “African Solutions for African Problems,” a framework proposed to excuse the inability to assemble the necessary diplomatic backing and military means to intervene. Led by Nigeria, the original ECOWAS troops were provided by Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. Soon, Nigeria handled the intervention alone.¹⁴ While in the beginning of the mission the dispatched ECOMOG troops were by no means capable of ensuring stability and often had difficulties defending themselves properly, the contingents’ size was doubled within the first month of the mission from 3,500 to 7,000 troops, and further increased in 1992 to 11,256 soldiers.¹⁵ Nevertheless, troop morale, equipment, and logistics remained inadequate and had to be improved through the presence of UNOMIL, sponsored by American firms (see below).

The Financial Dimension

Nigeria contributed massively, both in military and financial terms, to ECOMOG and ECOWAS achievements. It spent more than \$ 3 billion on ECOMOG in Liberia between 1990 and 1996,¹⁶ but even scholars sympathetic to the overall mission argue that a large amount of money spent on ECOMOG went into the pockets of Nigerian generals.¹⁷ The ECOMOG interventions in the early 1990s were financed by the main troop contributors, mainly Nigeria and Ghana.

As a result, ECOMOG and Nigeria largely failed to create peace and stability in the country. The strong personal and economic interest of Nigerian force commanders on the ground, as well as the perception of the country as a regional hegemonic power, served to damage its reputation during peacekeeping efforts and further jeopardized ECOWAS efforts to act as a regional organization.

Nigeria and ECOMOG

The problem was not that Nigeria was contributing—without its support, nothing would have happened. The problem was how Nigeria steered and imple-

¹⁴ Adedeji, *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 45.

¹⁵ A military failure of ECOMOG already in the early stages would have reduced also the reputation of the two Force Commanders from Ghana, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings, and Nigeria, General Babangida. See Adibe, *op. cit.* (note 11), pp. 476–477.

¹⁶ Adibe, *op. cit.* (note 11). Both ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were funded by Nigeria alone, amounting to a total of about \$ 8 billion. See Adedeji, *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 45.

¹⁷ Adebajo, *op. cit.* (note 8), p. 312.

mented ECOWAS and ECOMOG operations. ECOMOG failed due to factors that constrained the fulfillment of the necessary military, financial, and political requirements for success.¹⁸

In 1993, the added value of impartial interventions became evident when one of the first hybrid operations, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL, 1993–1996), which was protected by ECOMOG, was launched. This was partly due to the fact that the conflict parties did not accept the disarmament of ECOMOG. The parties could only agree to disarm under supervision of UNOMIL's military observers, who would then be deployed to observe the process under ECOMOG protection.¹⁹ Following UNOMIL, international and bilateral support and financing of ECOMOG began to play a more important role in its operations; an example is the financial support provided by the U.S. Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), which improved ECOMOG logistics.²⁰ However, rebels also used some internationally-financed equipment that was henceforth provided—for instance, some rebel groups took over ECOMOG vehicles and used them for the transportation of their own material. The basic pattern of cooperation with local warring factions was thus not stopped. After the election of Charles Taylor as Liberian President in 1997, little was done in ECOWAS to promote further peacekeeping instruments. Charles Taylor himself announced that Liberia would no longer need any peacekeepers. Shortly after, ECOMOG began disbanding in November 1997 when the first troops left. The last ECOMOG monitors eventually exited the area in 1998.

The sudden end of ECOMOG was also due to the fact that Nigeria was more concerned with its domestic setup than with regional conflicts, which had calmed down, at least on the surface. The Abacha regime ended in 1998, after which Nigeria embarked onto a political process towards democratic structures. After the consolidation of democratic structures in 1999, the country continued to fulfill a leadership role in West Africa. However, this was not necessarily followed by a coherent concept of how to achieve conflict resolution and regional agendas—which were often watered down by conflicting interests and domestic politics.²¹

Today, Nigeria continues to play a major role and is a crucial partner in promoting security in the region. However, it should accept that leadership rhetoric is not always the best way to ensure support by followers. Others argue that the in-

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 296.

¹⁹ James O.C. Jonah, The United Nations, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), op.cit. (note 4), p. 327.

²⁰ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy. The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War*, New York, NY, 2006..

²¹ Bergstresser, Tull, op.cit. (note 7), pp. 11–14.

ternational community should develop a complex dialogue and partnership with Nigeria. And, indeed, these core themes should include regional integration.²² Nigeria will remain the main regional player in West Africa in terms of economic, military, and political power. Still, it seems to lack a coherent political agenda for the region. Its domestic prerequisites for a leadership role are—despite major improvements—still shaky, and the acceptance of a regional role in the region is far from a given fact.²³ As Adedeji, the former Secretary of UNECA puts it: “No country that is confronted with a long period of political instability, economic stagnation, and regression, and reputed to have one of the most corrupt societies in the world, has a basis to lead others. [...] Sadly, there is no other country that is as well placed as Nigeria to play this leadership role.”²⁴ Nigeria has a democratically-elected government only since 1999, and was a crisis state under military regimes before that time. However, the implementation of democratic rules is still questionable. Observers argue that elections are still rigged and results partly predetermined and negotiated among the parties, with the distribution of economic benefits.

International Interventions in Liberia after 2003

In 2003, international pressure opened the window of opportunity to push for a further peace agreement in Liberia. One of the reasons for the success of the peace agreement was the absence of Charles Taylor during the negotiations following his indictment by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.²⁵ Furthermore, both Nigeria and ECOWAS were strong supporters of the international solution to the Liberian crisis. In contrast to the regional interventions, the subsequent UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) did not suffer from insufficient funds, and the political dimension—both in terms of support from local populations and diplomatic leverage in the involved countries—was more developed and well-supported under the UN umbrella. The main need for military troops was initially fulfilled by troops from ECOWAS countries, who had served in the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) before the arrival of UNMIL and were re-hatted as blue helmets as soon as UNMIL was in place. The mere presence of U.S. marines offshore and on special patrols during the day in 2003, combined with the successful Nigeria-led ECOMIL force, which was under ECOWAS command, helped to ensure that hostilities were stopped and the Peace Agreement was negotiated—an agreement which included a clause promising a UN force that would take over for ECOWAS.

22 Ulf Engel, *Westafrikanischer Hegemon oder Scheinriese? Nigeria in der internationalen Politik*, Hamburg 2007.

23 Bergstresser, Tull, *op. cit.* (note 7), pp. 24–26.

24 Adedeji, *op. cit.* (note 8), p. 46.

25 Priscilla Hayner, *Negotiating Peace in Liberia: Preserving the Possibility for Justice*, Geneva 2007.

Today, Liberia provides a good example of the parallel importance and influence of international and regional players. Since 2003, the country has remained stable due to a hefty UN peace operation (UNMIL), strong international support and supervision in finance-related areas (most notably by the World Bank, especially the Governance and Economic Assessment Program, GEMAP), and a capable government since 2006. Despite this international influence, ECOWAS and Nigeria remain important players. After 2003, Nigerians and Ghanaians held senior posts in UNMIL; Nigeria remained one of the main troop contributors. Nigerian enterprises and banks re-opened in Liberia, and a large share of the petrol imports comes from Nigeria. The influence of Nigerian decisions on domestic politics in Liberia has also remained strong. One illustration of this fact has been the initial decision to grant asylum to former Liberian president Charles Taylor from 2003–2006 before extraditing him to Liberia in 2006.

ECOWAS since 1999

In 1999/2000 ECOWAS was reformed by its member states, with Nigeria supporting regional integration and conflict prevention efforts. These reforms were very important, as they added several institutions necessary for consultation and negotiations among member states and as they improved the capacity of the ECOWAS Secretariat—the Mediation and Security Council (political), the Defense and Security Commission (military), the Council of Elders (eminent persons, civil society)—which led to drastic improvements in political decision-making. In terms of capacity,²⁶ the Mission Planning and Management Cell was established within the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), one of seven commissioners within ECOWAS.²⁷ Furthermore, in 2007, there were efforts to set up a Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) designed to strengthen decision-making and intervention capacity.²⁸ In addition, the Executive Secretary was given the right to propose initiatives to the member states, and the post of a Deputy Secretary was created for operational matters and the coordination of special representatives deployed to the field. An ECOWAS observation centre, given the task of formulating policies and implementing all military peacekeeping and humanitarian observations, was created. Still, ECOWAS funding remains difficult. Member states in the past have often failed to provide both financial and human resources for the organization itself

26 Political Affairs Department - Organigramme, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/index.php?id=p_p1_commission&lang=en> (28/04/2008).

27 The ECOWAS Commission, ECOWAS Commission on a glance, <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/dept/index.php?id=p_p1_commission&lang=en> (28/04/2008).

28 Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, *The Emerging Role of the AU and ECOWAS in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, New York, NY, 2007, p. 22.

and for the missions of ECOMOG.²⁹ Almost all member states still owe large parts of their payments to ECOWAS.³⁰ In general, however, the capacities of African states for deploying military forces have considerably increased since 2001. ECOBRIG, an ECOWAS Standing Brigade, was deployed to Côte d'Ivoire for the first time in 2003.³¹

Today, Nigeria is incapable of taking unilateral decisions: the francophone bloc in ECOWAS has eight seats out of 15 members, and can therefore block decisions on interventions that require a two-third majority. The important feature of the current ECOWAS set-up is that no member state has obtained a veto power, which ensures that regional backing of the organization's decisions is always a necessity. The outlook for the role of ECOWAS seems good if "governments [...] subordinate immediate national political interests to long-term regional economic goals".³² Furthermore, ECOWAS could serve as an umbrella to streamline the various sub-regional institutions and organizations coexisting in West Africa, which might enable it to create focal areas for the region's development and stability³³—preferably, through coordination under the African security architecture as proposed by the African Union.³⁴

This can only be a starting point for increased capacity of regional organizations in general and ECOWAS in particular. Further work needs to be done, both by the organizations' member states in terms of their monetary contributions and political support, and by the international community in terms of continued and substantial support to regional and sub-regional organizations on the African continent.

The Show Must Go On: Supporting Regional Organizations

There are encouraging developments on the African continent. A new security architecture under the umbrella of the African Union was put forward in 2003,

29 Reliable data on the composition and sources of the budget of ECOWAS are difficult to retrieve.

30 Based on own rough calculations using data from the ECOWAS website, the member states owe about 21 million units of account [UA] (UA are equivalent to the IMF's special drawing rights [SDR], 1 SDR = \$ 1,625 on 29 April 2008, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx> (29/04/2008), and 13,912,983 for the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (created in 2001), about \$ 55 million in total).

31 There is little information on ECOBRIG. See Joachim Koops, Johannes Varwick, Ten Years of SHIRBRIG. Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany (GPPi Research Paper Series, No. 11), 2008, p. 18. For a general overview of African military capacities see Wolf Kinzel, Afrikanische Sicherheitsarchitektur – ein Überblick, in: GIGA Focus, No. 1, 2007. Important is being done at the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, which is also supported by German funds and capacity building (GTZ and ZIF).

32 Jeggan C. Senghor, Institutional Architecture for Managing Integration in the ECOWAS Region: An Empirical Investigation, in: Jeggan C. Senghor, Nana K. Poku (eds.), Towards Africa's Renewal, London 2007, p. 175.

33 CEAO, MRU, BCEAO, UEMOA, ANAD, CEAO, AAFC, just to name a few.

34 Chrysantus Ayangafac, An Analysis of the African Peace and Security Architecture, in this volume.

which also pushed for a strengthened ECOWAS Commission. ECOWAS is likely to play an important role in political and economic matters. Regional integration seems to be especially important, as most borders are too porous to control.³⁵ In order to counter this development and the movement of rebel forces, nations need to cooperate.

Despite improvements in the overall governance structure and mechanisms within the ECOWAS bodies, very few ECOWAS operations run without Nigerian funds and support. Since the domestic changes in 1999, the country is—next to South Africa—the leading nation in Africa in terms of diplomatic mediation and regional integration. Furthermore, it is Africa's largest troop and police contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, and has almost as many soldiers as all other ECOWAS member states combined.³⁶ However, its soft power remains limited throughout the region.³⁷ Nevertheless, its transformation from a military dictatorship to a democracy as well as several successful mediation efforts earned it the reputation of a soft power in the waiting and may promote democratization in the region. This might, then, ultimately justify a regional role for promoting peace and security. Together with Ghana, Nigeria could more actively promote the facets of its soft power in relation to diplomacy, mediation and interventions through the ECOWAS framework.

The critical issue remaining is funding. ECOWAS is largely dependent on Nigerian and international donations.³⁸ The argument at the outset was that regional organizations would be more successful in promoting and supporting security if they are perceived as organizations with own political, military, and financial capabilities, and are not directly influenced by their dominant members.

Regional and international organizations—including the EU and UN—will always be influenced by powerful member states. However, in relation to peacekeeping and peace-building, regional (and international) organizations can provide more legitimate and impartial support than hegemonic powers.³⁹ This is not to say that the backing and support of lead nations is not needed for these interventions. But the responsibility for the implementation of peace-building missions should be delegated to regional organizations and their military, financial, and political capacities. This article has tried to shed light on the fact that we

35 Samuel K. B. Asante, *The Travails of Integration*, in: Adebajo, Rashid (eds.), *op. cit.* (note 4), p. 53.

36 In 2003: 78,500 soldiers. Compare Bergstresser, Tull, *op. cit.* (note 7), p.15.

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

38 Several international and bilateral aid agencies are supporting capacity in ECOWAS, such as EU, GTZ and USAID.

39 For an organization-theoretic backing of the argument see Michael N. Barnett, Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics*, Ithaca, NY, 2004.

need to support regional organizations, especially as they seek to strengthen their capacity in terms of organizational and normative frameworks for regional action. In practical terms: member states should give money, soldiers, and political support to regional organizations, which in turn will then be able to engage in mediation, implement peace agreements and provide peacekeeping forces throughout the region—without the risk of being perceived as partial and hegemonic.

This is not to say that nothing has been done to bolster regional organizations: the EU, USAID, GTZ, and others are supporting ECOWAS. But there is more to be done: regional leaders should be encouraged to direct some of their efforts, especially those related to conflict management and security, towards regional organizations to ensure that other countries can ‘follow’ without being and feeling dominated. In turn, regional leaders will only take regional organizations seriously if the latter have the ability to manage funds and political processes adequately.

Nigeria will continue to provide the bulk of finances, diplomatic resources, and troops to support ECOWAS. Nevertheless, strengthening ECOWAS will be helpful in promoting the further political integration of West Africa, which will be crucial for the region’s future stability. The resolution of the Liberian conflict already added to the stability and capacity of ECOWAS by bridging the gap between anglophone and francophone (and lusophone) countries. It seems essential for international donors to continue to provide both technical and financial assistance in order to maintain existing capacity, and, even more importantly, to build, develop and strengthen the ability of ECOWAS in addressing regional challenges in West Africa—especially as the United Nations missions in the region downsize over the next few years. International efforts must focus on regional organizations, especially in regions where the immediate attention of donors and the international community is shrinking rapidly.

To prepare for future interventions, hybrid missions between international and regional organizations should be enhanced, especially until the capacities of regional organizations become fully developed.⁴⁰ Despite the recent steps taken by ECOWAS, Nigeria, and the international community, a great deal remains to be done—in terms of capacity-building within ECOWAS, cooperation amongst international and regional organizations, democratic consolidation in the region, and the cooperation and coordination between Nigeria and the international community.

40 A. Sahrjo Bah, Bruce Jones, *Peace Operation Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements*, in: *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* 2008, p. 10.

Policy Recommendations

A non-exhaustive list of issues that should be addressed in the near future will have to include efforts by the international community to further support regional organizations in terms of their organizational capacity and financial management. This will necessitate a change in behavior on the side of regional leaders. The latter should be encouraged to build up soft power through regional organizations in addition to their economic and military dominance. More specifically, regional leaders should be encouraged to increasingly hand security and conflict prevention tasks over to regional organizations. While this still sounds like wishful thinking, one incentive could be the increased deployment of hybrid forces of regional organizations and UN and EU troops. The experiences gained in such an endeavor and the financial burden-sharing might then be used as a clear indication that in regard to ECOWAS as well as the AU, regional leaders will be able to gain more by engaging in regional organizations' peacekeeping efforts than initially expected. A good starting point for such a paradigm shift could be joint training and logistics standards in ECOWAS (ECOBIRIG).

Running with the Hare, Hunting with the Hounds

South Africa's Dual Role as Regional Power and Global Player

Miriam Prys

'[South Africa's] refusal to renegotiate the skewed South African Customs Union Agreement, its ill-fated intervention in Lesotho, its 1990s trade battles and recent 'quiet diplomacy' with Zimbabwe, all raise questions about Pretoria's mishandling of regional affairs while taking on grandiose roles on the continental stage'.¹



Miriam Prys

Introduction

Warren Christopher, during a visit in South Africa in 1996, stated that 'when I look around the world, I see few countries with greater potential to shape the 21st century than the new South Africa.'² The international community, particularly Western donors, hoped that South Africa's economy could pull other countries in Southern Africa and throughout the continent along as a 'locomotive of growth.' Further hope was raised in that the country could bring stability, strengthen regional organizations, and take a leading role in solving African conflicts. On a global level these expectations have led to tangible results. For instance, South Africa, alongside Brazil, China, India and Mexico, has been invited to partnership talks with the G8. The EU has successfully pushed for a free trade agreement with South Africa and upgraded its bilateral relationship to a Strategic Partnership in 2006. In the US National Security Strategy outlined on September 17th, 2002, South Africa has been singled out as one of the four states in Africa that 'have a major impact on their neighborhood.' Both the donor and business communities have, too, developed a strong interest in using South Africa as a springboard for development and projects in Africa.³

These global expectations have been reciprocated by the new South African government. The projection of South Africa's achievements and its peaceful transition (to a power?) on regional and global levels has been seen as a 'natural progression,' and the new international climate of the post Cold-War era has 'inevitably reinforced the Mandela government's aspiration to play a liberating role in international relations.'⁴ South Africa established full diplomatic relations with most states by 1995 and was (re-)admitted to over 45 international organizations

1 The Limits of Power, in: Africa Confidential, No. 14/2004, pp. 2–3.

2 Warren Christopher, Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 10/12/1996.

3 Fredrik Söderbaum, The Reconfiguration of Southern Africa: Stabilizers, Globalizers, Exploiters, Peace-Makers, Revisionists, Transformists and Missionaries, unpublished paper, 2000.

4 Jack Spence, South Africa: An African Exception or Just Another State, in: Conflict, Security and Development, No. 2/2007, pp. 341–347.

by 1996.⁵ Beyond mere participation, it chaired and hosted international bodies and conferences such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). South Africa presented itself as a ‘good international citizen’ by promoting ‘good causes’ such as the prohibition of land mines and by assuming mediation positions in inter-state conflicts, for instance between Libya and the West over the 1988 Lockerbie bombing.⁶

In this paper, I will argue that we cannot understand the way South Africa is exercising its regional leadership in Southern Africa without considering the nation’s global ambitions. This is mainly because at times, its global and regional ambitions require different, if not contradictory, responses, and we can thus speak of a ‘dual role’ with which the South African government is attempting to comply.⁷ One common argument insists that this dual role and its consequences impact the key dimensions of effective (regional) leadership, both in negative and positive ways. The inclusion of this dual role in our understanding of regional leadership can therefore help us understand the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in South Africa’s foreign policy, particularly towards the region. This will be shown through the help of two key examples—South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy and South Africa’s role in the strategic reform of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). These two cases represent two matters that are traditionally considered to be crucial aspects of regional hegemonic leadership: the provision of regional stability and the facilitation of economic development.

Dual Role and Regional Leadership

The dual role of regional powers creates, potentially, contradictory behavioral incentives for the regional power. A clear regional leadership role would, for instance, require the elimination of significant external influence in the region, particularly if this influence is meant to balance or contain the regional leader. Engagement with the international system should happen on behalf of the entire region, taking into account collective regional goals rather than simply the regional leader’s own national interests. Activities of this type are described as gate-keeping. On the other hand, creating and maintaining a global role requires using

5 Robert Davies, *South African Foreign Policy Options in a Changing Global Context* (Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, Southern African Perspectives, No. 40), Bellville 1995.

6 Peter Kagwanja, *Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of Africa’s Multilateral Capacity for Peacemaking*, in: *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, No. 2/2006, pp. 159–184.

7 Domestic preferences and, hence, both regional and global ‘ambitions’ are largely taken as a given in this study, as a discussion of the generation of these preferences and values would go far beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I have used governmental documentation and other official primary resources to assess both ambitions and interests of South Africa. As South Africa is a democracy, it is, as a simplification, taken for granted that these positions adequately amalgamate and represent domestic interests.

the outstanding regional role as a stepping-stone to achieve global aims. This can be in the interest of the region; usually, however, we should expect that the global interests of a more developed state like South Africa differ from the interests of its lesser or least developed neighbors. In sum, while gate-keeping involves the exclusion of global actors from the region, stepping stone behavior requires close interaction with the same actors on issues of global governance; and while the first type of behavior generally requires the emphasis of regional identity and solidarity, the latter demands a global outlook and, arguably, compliance with international expectations.

Leadership here is understood to have two main sources.⁸ On the one hand, it can be attained through the provision of positive (and negative) material incentives, such as public goods or market access. On the other hand, we can find a more subtle component of leadership 'at the level of substantive beliefs'.⁹ Actors that are perceived to be legitimate and whose norms are accepted or internalized will find it easier to assume leadership. In both regards, the dual role of regional leaders can have an impact. With regard to material incentives, the global involvement of South Africa means that it is able to provide smaller neighboring states with the opportunity to voice their interests, as South Africa acts as a mouthpiece for African concerns. Yet, an involvement at the global level could also divert financial or administrative resources away from regional concerns, which is often a key complaint of South Africa's neighboring states. With regard to beliefs and perceptions, involvement at the global level can negatively impact acceptance and legitimacy. In the case of South Africa, we have found that it is often accused of acting as a puppet of the West, and its explicit assumption of an 'intermediary role' has been challenged in the neighborhood. The clearly-formulated expectations of external actors, however, seem to give credibility to South Africa's ability to solve some of Africa's problems more effectively than contenders such as Zimbabwe or Nigeria.

The Southern African Customs Union

The Southern African Customs Union Agreement (SACUA) establishes a common external tariff between the states of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland

⁸ This is certainly a very brief discussion of 'leadership' and summarizes briefly the key elements of leadership identified elsewhere. See for example John G. Ikenberry, Charles A. Kupchan, *The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power*, in: David Rapkin (ed.), *World Leadership and Hegemony*, London 1990, pp. 49–60; Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, Kim Nossal, *Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict*, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, No. 3/1991, pp. 391–410; Arild Underdal, *Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management*, in: William I. Zartman (ed.), *International Multilateral Negotiations*, San Francisco, CA, 1994, pp. 178–197; Dirk Nabers, *China, Japan and the Quest for Leadership in East Asia*, Hamburg 2008.

⁹ G. John Ikenberry, Charles A. Kupchan, *Socialization and Hegemonic Power*, in: *International Organization*, No. 3/1990, pp. 283–315.

(BLNS) and South Africa.¹⁰ Since the SACU's establishment in 1910, its member pool has received substantial income from excise and import duties, which members then share according to a complex, frequently-revised formula. After the end of apartheid in South Africa, the SACUA had to be renegotiated again as both sides—South Africa on the one hand, and BLNS on the other—had become increasingly dissatisfied with it. The key points of contestation were the decision-making processes; for instance, with regard to the level of external tariffs, which were almost exclusively controlled by South Africa and the revenue sharing formula which was considered to be unfair by both. While South Africa contributed over 90 percent of revenue, it received only a fraction of the redistributed finances. The BLNS felt, however, that even this rather skewed distribution did not adequately compensate them for the trade diversion caused by South Africa's much more considerable economic strength. Renegotiations started in 1994, yet the final agreement was only signed in October 2002 and effectively implemented in 2004.¹¹

Often, the difficulties that were faced during this torn-out reform process are linked with South Africa's inability or unwillingness to commit to its regional leadership role in providing both positive and material incentives for its smaller neighboring states.¹² The reform and cooperation in SACU thus can illustrate the tensions of regional leadership at the nexus of regional and global politics. South Africa, on the one hand, is the clear economic hub in the SACU region, its economic steam room, and also provider of employment and stability. On the global level, it is an emerging, yet nevertheless small actor that, through its reputation, the reverberations of its miracle transition, but also its regional power position, has over-proportional credence. South Africa clearly brings in its clout and human resources into negotiations with external actors. While, on the one hand, this might undermine the participatory rights of the BLNS, it has been assured by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) that strict coordination processes are followed and the South African negotiators have clear mandates that are geared towards the interests of all SACU members: 'With China, all the negotiations that are taking place are SACU negotiations. SA leads; and that was by agreement, because SA has the capacity to do this, which the other countries do not have.'¹³ South Africa often takes on a protective stance in favour of the BLNS against negative influences from outside the region and thus engages in a 'gate-keep-

10 More on SACU: Robert Kirk, Matthew Stern, *The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement*, Africa Region Working Paper No. 57. Washington, DC, 2003; Richard Gibb, *The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with Democracy*, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies*, No. 3/2006, pp. 583–603.

11 *New Agreement on SA Customs Union*, in: *Financial Times*, 05/12/1994.

12 Patrick J. McGowan, Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, *Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa*, in: *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, No. 2/1998, pp. 165–195.

13 Interview with government official, Pretoria, 08/08/2006.

ing' strategy. Several examples can be named, for instance when, allegedly, South Africa attempted to prevent China from impacting negatively on Lesotho's textile industry, but more clearly and officially, when it stopped negotiations of a SACU-USA free trade agreement over a dispute about the treatment and special privileges of Southern Africa's least developed countries (LDCs), mostly in agriculture.¹⁴ This happens despite that fact that it might jeopardize some of South Africa's opportunities of concluding agreements with external partners.

South Africa's dual role is, however, also problematic because of the vast differences in economic development and trading needs between South Africa and its SACU neighbors, particularly the LDCs among them. Its commitment to development in Africa often contradicts the more specific commercial benefits available to South Africa through multilateral trade negotiations, and 'South Africa faces a dilemma that reaches the core of its trade policy.'¹⁵ Taylor formulates the following criticism: 'Although South Africa has assiduously crafted an international image as "bridge-builder" between North and South at the WTO, in practice this has meant weakening African solidarity [...]. Pretoria's tactic of unilaterally cutting deals with the North while grandly preaching African solidarity is also proving problematic for Mbeki's credibility as a spokesperson for the whole of Africa rather than for narrow South African interests only.'¹⁶ In this respect, particularly the interactions of South Africa at the WTO and its free trade negotiations with the EU, the EU-SA Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), have been attacked. It remained unclear for its neighboring states where South Africa's 'loyalties' were and thus provoked a strong reaction. While the TDCA might have elevated South Africa's position internationally by creating a basis of equality between the two partners, to the BLNS it has signaled that South Africa considers itself to be a country that is closer to 'developed' than to 'developing' status' and that its trade interests lie outside the region. At the WTO, South Africa cooperated with a group of countries including Brazil, Argentina and Thailand, rather than siding with the then Organization of African Unity (OAU). In Seattle, the South African delegation did not take part in the OAU caucus but rather participated in closed-door 'Green Room' discussions that provoked deep anger among developing countries.¹⁷ South Africa was openly opposed when trying to negotiate common SADC and SACU position on agricul-

14 Interview with Dr. Garth le Pere, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 07/07/2006.

15 Lyal White, South Africa in the Post-Apartheid Era: Converging Foreign Policy and Trade Policy Priorities to Meet the Challenge of Economic Growth and Equity, in: Fabio Villares (ed.), *India, Brazil and South Africa: Perspectives and Alliances*, São Paulo 2006, pp. 135–196.

16 Margaret C. Lee, The European Union-South Africa Trade Agreement: In Whose Interest?, in: *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, No. 1/2002, pp. 81–106.

17 Ian Taylor, When Rhetoric isn't enough: Contradictions in South African Foreign Policy and NEPAD, in: Walter Carlsnaes (ed.), *In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid*, Midrand 2006, pp. 164–174.

ture for the new Doha round in 2001.¹⁸ South Africa's ability to be included at the decisive informal groups at the international level arguably enhanced its international weight, but also generated resentment and opposition at the regional level. Further, administrative capacities in South Africa were, for instance, stretched due to the simultaneity of various important trade negotiations at the WTO level, with the EU, SADC and SACU. This has been named as the key reason for the delay of the new SACU Agreement by officials of the Department of Trade and Industry.¹⁹

South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy

The Zimbabwean crisis has been the poster case for many scholars to show how little influence South Africa has in Southern Africa and how easily it was 'snubbed off' by a resilient President Robert Mugabe. While many factors need to be considered, from the notion of African solidarity, the status of President Mugabe as liberation hero to domestic dynamics in South Africa, again, South Africa's dual role on the regional and the global level arguably had an important effect on its regional leadership capacities and credentials. With regard to acceptance and legitimacy as elements of successful leadership, the extent of Western expectations on South Africa have played a particularly important role. Zimbabwe started to become a concern to the West with its decision to intervene in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 10 000 troops in 1998/99. Domestic developments in Zimbabwe that were increasingly framed as a violation of New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) aggravated the alienation between Western governments and Zimbabwe even further. This is decisive as NEPAD was considered to be a major achievement in bringing about positive change in the relationship between Africa and the developed world.²⁰ At the same time, the end of Cold War proxy confrontations in the region, for instance in Angola, have left a power vacuum in the region, and South Africa as a regional power is widely regarded to be the most desirable actor for the solution of arising problems, as expressed in US President George W. Bush's designation of President Mbeki as his 'point man' on Zimbabwe.²¹ The EU Commission has emphasized that 'South Africa [...] is a natural partner to Europe on the African continent and on a global level' and plays a crucial role in

18 South African officials complained about 'hostile sentiments' by both Namibia and Zimbabwe. Office of the President, Background Information with Respect to South Africa's Participation in the Fifth Southern African International Dialogue (SAID) on "Smart Partnership". Annex B: Status with Respect to the WTO Negotiations (unpublished document), Pretoria 2001.

19 Interview with government officials, Pretoria, 08/08/2006 and 14/08/2006.

20 Steffen Stübzig, *Wirkungsloser Druck: 'Pariastaat' Simbabwe zwischen westlichen Sanktionen und regionaler Solidarität*, Hamburg 2007.

21 US Department of State, Press Availability with President Bush and President Mbeki, Pretoria, 07/09/2003.

making continuous efforts to bring the Zimbabwean crisis closer to a solution.²² The Zimbabwe resolution of the European Parliament of 2002 is more explicit in expressing its expectations on, describing 'President Mbeki [...] in particular, as Zimbabwe's most powerful neighbor and economic partner, as chairman of the AU, and as a member of the Commonwealth 'Troika' to have 'the opportunity and responsibility to show leadership in helping bring about urgent change for the better in Zimbabwe.'²³ In practice, this means for example that South African government officials are consulted on Zimbabwe by most if not all international actors.²⁴

Thus, while expectations of South Africa to 'take care of its own backyard' are palpable, we need to discuss whether, and if so how, these expectations and pressures become relevant for South Africa's regional leadership. These global support and expectations enhance South Africa's capacities, by its ability, for example, to hold authoritative discussions with the World Bank and the IMF on the potential economic fall-out of the Zimbabwean crisis and to build a bridge between Zimbabwe and these two organizations.²⁵ This also extends to South Africa's special partnership with the G8. Interviews with government officials in

²² Ibid.

²³ European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution on Zimbabwe (P5_TA/(2002)0412), Point H, No. 9.

²⁴ Interviews with two government officials, Pretoria, 31/07/2006 and 03/08/2006.

²⁵ Zimbabwe Loan Freeze Sparks Regional Alert, in: All Africa, 08/10/2000.



Magdalena Łecka from Poland, Miriam Prys from Germany, Chsysantus Ayangafac from Cameroon

South Africa have shown that, while neighboring states will not like that South Africa does, for instance, have this access, they will have to live with it and make the best of it, particularly, as government officials insisted, as South Africa argues on behalf of the whole region or continent in these forums.²⁶ In the same vein, Zimbabwe does not appreciate the treatment of South Africa as an envoy for its own domestic problems by external actors. Yet, in its isolation, it seems to make the best out of the situation by using South Africa's voice to bring its own concerns to the fore at the international level.²⁷ Here, the ambivalence of these effects becomes particularly clear as, at the same time, South Africa feels the need to distance itself from US and European pressures and to take part in (African) multilateral negotiations.²⁸ Also, the issue of allegations of racism of the West is an important factor that impacts negatively on the possibility of South African agency, as it puts it in the uncomfortable position to be easily labeled as a 'black' puppet of the predominantly 'white' West.²⁹

Looking at the way South Africa deals with its potential dual role on both the regional and the global level, we can see that it has engaged with the global level on behalf or with respect to Zimbabwe at three important international entry points, the Commonwealth, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the EU and the United States. It has limited the capacity of these actors to engage with Zimbabwe directly. South Africa made clear that external actors should not interfere and, by its defensive posture, have effectively shielded Zimbabwe and the region from the interference of external actors. Thus, South Africa clearly shows characteristics of gate-keeping rather than stepping-stone behavior particularly as it has jeopardized its international reputation as a torch-bearer in human rights issues and a reliable state in Africa. This has potentially enhanced its legitimacy and leadership capacities on the regional level.

Conclusion

For both cases, SACU and Zimbabwe, South Africa is unmistakably faced with competing priorities and a conflict between its global and regional ambitions. This has had an impact, particularly, on how its leadership role is perceived by its neighboring states. The arising tensions have at times forced South Africa to take a stand either pursuing its global interests or abiding regional concern. Overall, it

26 Interview with government official, Pretoria, 08/02/2006 and with Dr. Chris Landsberg, Johannesburg, 07/18/2006.

27 Interview with Prof. Adam Habib, Pretoria, 07/29/2006.

28 Janis von der Westhuizen, South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power, in: *Third World Quarterly*, No. 3/1998, pp. 435–456.

29 Interviews with Dr. Chris Landsberg, Johannesburg, 18/07/2006 and Prof. Adam Habib, Pretoria, 29/07/2006. This has been in particular an issue in the Commonwealth discussions of the Zimbabwean issue and President Mbeki has been very outspoken about this. See Thabo Mbeki, Letter from the President, in: *ANC Today*, 12/12/2003.

seems that in both cases, it has tried to emphasize its regional credentials. In the case of SACU, South Africa gave up its privileges to negotiate independently on the global level with regard to its own economic self-interest only. The benefits it gained from this relinquishment are predominantly regional. It has strengthened its position in the region by making its overwhelming power more legitimate and more accessible to the BLNS by providing them with an arrangement securing a steady and much-needed flow of revenue.³⁰ Also in the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa has prioritized its regional ambitions and, thus, extended the acceptance of its regional leadership. We have to keep in mind that the interest in the end of the Mugabe regime is not necessarily shared in Southern Africa, where the majority of regimes have rather doubtful democratic and human rights credentials. On an international level, its reputation as a good international citizen, its NEPAD project and potentially a permanent seat in the UN Security Council have been put at risk through its Zimbabwe policy.³¹ Yet, its regional role prescriptions required it to act in the best interest of the region, which is, at least from a governmental perspective, best assured by quiet diplomacy and a restriction of the influence of external actors. This results in inconsistency, for example, when it comes to the strong support of NEPAD and its African Peer Review Mechanism while simultaneously Zimbabwe seems to break most of the rules embedded in both institutions.

South Africa's dual role thus shapes its approach to the region. This ambivalence is present in most of its interactions and it is caught in a desire to be both part of the global governance elite and to rely on its regional leadership credentials in order to support this ambition. While South Africa is therefore often criticized for not fulfilling its regional responsibilities, this paper has tried to show that we need to think more about the potential dual role of regional leaders in order to properly understand the difficulties these states face in balancing their interests on both the regional and the global level.

30 Rod Alence, SACU and the Political Economy of Regionalism: Towards a Deeper and Broader Integration?, Trade Policy Briefing, Vol. 12, 2006.

31 Jack E. Spence, Point Man on Zimbabwe: South Africa's Role in the Crisis, in: The Round Table, No. 384/2006, pp. 191–199.

Primus inter Pares: Britain's Contribution to the Development of a European Union 'Grand Strategy'

James Rogers

It goes without saying that the United Kingdom was a latecomer to the political project of European integration. While Sir Winston Churchill may have been the first major European statesman to advance continental unification, he was clear that Britain should not be part of it: 'We have our own dreams. We are with Europe but not of it. We are linked but not compromised.'¹ Even at the end of World War II, many Britons felt that they had a special global role—a view buttressed by William Fox, who coined the term 'superpower' in 1944, including Britain alongside the United States and Soviet Russia.² But in hindsight, as 'de-colonization' began with India's independence in 1947, Britain's reach began to falter. Economic difficulties and the Suez War in 1956 compounded this trajectory; superpower pretensions were shattered.³

Pruned of empire, and perhaps envious of German, Italian and French economic resurgence, it was not long before the British government sought to join the European Community. While this was achieved in 1973, Britain was soon branded as a 'reluctant European,' not least because of the importance it placed on relations with other parts of the world—particularly the United States.⁴ As Brendan Simms has recently shown, this global orientation hardened after the British victories during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), when the country's traditional Eurocentric grand strategy began to turn global.⁵ 'Europe' has competed for British attention ever since.⁶ And, according to Simms, this has been very much to the nation's detriment:

a forward policy in Europe best secured Britain's maritime predominance...the sea was not a bulwark at all. Rather it was a highway connecting Britain not only to the wider world, but more importantly to her immediate neighbours: a bridge, not a moat. "Rule Britannia" had it wrong: the "main" which mattered most to Britons was not the shimmering "Span-



James Rogers

1 For more on Sir Winston Churchill's thoughts on European integration, see: Wendell Mauter, Churchill and the Unification of Europe, in: *The Historian*, No. 1/1998, pp. 67–84.

2 William T. R. Fox, *Superpowers: the United States, the British Empire and the Soviet union—their responsibility for peace*, New York, NY, 1944, p. 21.

3 David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British policy and World Power in the 20th century*, Harlow 2000, pp. 191–194.

4 Andrew Gamble, *Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics*, Basingstoke 2003, pp. 108–131.

5 For a review of Simms' argument, see: James Rogers, Britain: The European power, in: *Global Power Europe*, 04/11/2007.

6 A good discussion on British-European identity can be found in: Timothy Garton Ash, Is Britain European?, in: *International Affairs*, No. 1/2001, pp. 1–13.

ish main” of unlimited colonial opportunity, but the European “mainland” to which they belonged politically, if not geographically. In short, Britain’s first and most important lines of defence lay not in her “wooden walls”, but in Europe itself.⁷

In what follows, we hope to show that British grand strategy is again undergoing a phase of ‘Europeanization’, while the global dimension of British foreign and security policy is simultaneously being projected onto the European level. And we hope to show how this double movement between Britain and the European Union has led to the reorganization of both as international actors—and particularly to the empowerment of the latter.

A Few Words on ‘Grand Strategy’

A ‘grand strategy’ can be likened to a framework through which a community seeks not only protection from specified threats and challenges—its ‘security culture’—but also the instruments required to address those concerns—its ‘strategic culture.’⁸ Grand strategy can be understood as a synthesis of the two. According to Barry Posen:

A grand strategy can be best conceived as a theory about how to achieve security. Security as a concept encompasses the safety, sovereignty, territorial integrity and power position of states. A grand strategy identifies and prioritises threats to a state’s security, and similarly identifies appropriate political and military remedies. These remedies consist of chains of interconnected political and military means and ends—including military forces, intelligence capabilities, alliances, defence industry, foreign aid programmes, etc.⁹

A grand strategy is thus a political framework that serves as the central point of identification within a given community. That is to say, as progressively more groups and people identify with the grand strategy, it shapes the community by defining its borders; providing it with a collective story about its past; organizing a framework for envisioning its potential future; and structuring how the community should interact and position itself vis-à-vis the outside world. In short, grand strategy is stitched into the fabric of the social, shaping its very identity.¹⁰

7 Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, London 2008, p. 3.

8 For a good introduction to the debates on both concepts, see: Jeffrey S. Lantis, Darryl Howlett, *Strategic Culture*, in: John Baylis et al. (eds.), *Strategy in the Modern World*, Oxford 2007, pp. 82–99. In a European context, the best discussion is provided by: Geoffrey Edwards, Paul Cornish, *Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture*, in: *International Affairs*, No. 3/2001, pp. 587–603.

9 Barry Posen, *The European Security Strategy: Practical Implications*, in: *Oxford Journal of Good Governance*, No. 1/2004, pp. 33–34.

10 Iver B. Neumann, Henrikki Heikka, *Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence*, in: *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic Studies Association*, No. 1/2007, p. 33.

Yet how does grand strategy change? The answer can surely be provided by two concepts: the first being 'dislocation' and the second being the political practice of 'securitization'. Dislocation accounts for the moment during which an existing framework is shattered by some negative and decidedly traumatic experience.¹¹ Usually, these experiences are very minor, but they can also be more radical, whence they penetrate right down to the depths of the social. But dislocation is not only a traumatic experience. As Ernesto Laclau says: 'If on the one hand ... [dislocations] threaten identities, on the other they are the foundation on which new identities are constituted.'¹² In other words, after dislocation, we should expect 'hegemonic agents' to emerge in order to stitch the dislocated parts of the strategic culture into a new framework—or to try and radically restructure the entire ensemble. We cannot, however, necessarily discern in advance which hegemonic agents will succeed in providing the 'answers' to the 'threats'; rather, what we are likely to witness is a political struggle by different groups, each aiming to universalize its own particular vision of grand strategy as the community's own.¹³

Securitization could be seen as a form of articulation applicable to the dislocation of grand strategy. In the event of the emergence of a perceived threat to a community's safety and cohesion, hegemonic agents might seek to provide a new vision in order to overcome the danger.¹⁴ This does not mean that the threat is necessarily fabricated, but rather that securitization 'takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.'¹⁵ This allows particular hegemonic agents, in this case, 'securitizing actors'—that is to say, officials, academics and politicians with the authority to issue statements on foreign policy and security—to press for extraordinary forms of action in order to overcome the said threats.¹⁶ But as Ole Wæver points out, the securitizing move can only succeed, if the community accepts the securitizing actors' arguments as credible and legitimate.¹⁷ As such, grand strategy is usually pieced together after a dislocation at which point 'securitizing actors' proliferate and struggle to re-articulate a new order.

11 For more on the theory of dislocation, see Yannis Stavrakakis, *On the emergence of Green Ideology*, in: David Howarth et al. (eds.), *Discourse theory and political analysis*, Manchester 2000, pp. 100–118.

12 Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*, London 1990, p. 39.

13 Neumann, Heikka, *op. cit.* (note 10), pp. 5–23.

14 For a good introduction on the concept of securitization, see: Ralf Emmers, *Securitisation*, in: Allan Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford 2007, pp. 109–125.

15 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO, 1998, p. 23.

16 Ole Wæver, *Securitisation and Desecuritisation*, in: Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security*, New York, NY, 1995, p. 54.

17 Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, *op. cit.* (note 15), p. 25.

New Geopolitics, New Labour, New Britain, New Europe?

Britain, like France, has a traditional grand strategy of its own, predicated on global activism and forward deployment, which puts it in a different league than supposedly neutral powers like Austria and Finland or the more cautious member states Germany, Italy and Spain.¹⁸ This global orientation may be far removed from the days of empire, but the residue still penetrates British imaginations. As Stephen Haseler puts it: 'This lingering imperial impulse...[is] a somewhat inchoate, but seriously held view that Britain was some kind of special country—a reduced but still exceptional, even superior power which can help guide less fortunate nations.'¹⁹ The British obsession with what might be called 'positional security' has always been a critical dimension of their foreign policy.²⁰ In William Walker's words: Britons have long needed to know 'where they stand in the world, who they stand with, and how to improve or regain their standing.'²¹ In this sense, Britain came to question its position again during the mid and late 1990s, when a number of events dislocated many of the alliances, frameworks and doctrines through which British grand strategy had been pursued during the Cold War era and its immediate aftermath.

First, the Wars of the Yugoslav Succession (1991–1999) revealed Britain's inability and unwillingness to put an end to a small crisis on Europe's periphery, particularly because of the 'Realist' foreign policies implemented by the Conservative government of John Major and his Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd.²² And because of the primacy of the Atlantic Alliance, British politicians and strategists were still reluctant to provide the European-level capabilities, doctrine and institutions needed to solve the crisis.²³ Second, the residue of Cold War strategy and the economic difficulties it produced contributed to British inactivity, and it was only after the Europeans—and particularly the British—gave way to the United States' policy of 'lift and strike' that some sort of a lid was put back on the Balkans cauldron, and many Europeans got very red faces.²⁴ Third, the handover of Hong Kong in 1997,²⁵ and a feeling of isolation in Brussels during the latter era

18 Robert Tombes, Isabelle Tombes, *That Sweet Enemy: The British and the French from the Sun King to the Present*, London 2007, p. 671.

19 Stephen Haseler, *Sidekick: British Global Strategy from Churchill to Blair*, London 2008, p. 5.

20 For more on this concept, see: William Walker, *Where Does Britain Stand in the World?*, in: John Gittings, Ian Davis (eds.), *Britain in the 21st Century: Rethinking Defence and Foreign Policy*, London 1997, pp. 7–8. Also: Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture*, Basingstoke 2006, p. 48.

21 Walker, *ibid.*

22 Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia*, London 2001. See especially pp. 6–9.

23 Richard Whitman, *Amsterdam's unfinished business? The Blair government's initiative and the future of the Western European Union*, Paris 1999, p. 9.

24 Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence in the European Union*, Basingstoke 2007, p. 55.

25 David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th century*, Harlow 2000, pp. 295–297.

of John Major's government, further reduced Britain's international and European roles. It is in this atmosphere that a number of British hegemonic agents seem to have realized that Britain could regain influence if they began to press for the European Union to be furnished with the means to become a more credible and capable global power.²⁶

The trouncing of the Tories in the British general election of May 1997 opened the door to a restructuring of British grand strategy. New Labour suffered neither the euroscepticism nor Realpolitik of the previous government.²⁷ The Americans were the first to realize this; New Labour's approach, as one American official claimed, was like 'a breath of fresh air.'²⁸ This was already apparent in April 1997, when Tony Blair gave his only lecture on foreign policy during the electoral campaign. As John Kampfner reports, this speech was robust and confident: Blair criticized the Conservatives' 'negative' foreign policy, their weakness, their indecision, and their burning of bridges with Washington and Brussels. Blair proclaimed: 'The Britain in my vision is not a Britain turning its back on the world—narrow, shy, uncertain. It is a Britain confident of its place in the world,

²⁶ This came to the fore during an interview with the former Director-General of External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Sir Brian Crowe, on 10th March 2008.

²⁷ This type of foreign policy has been aptly described as 'amoral quietism.' See Oliver Kamm, *Anti-Totalitarianism: The Left-wing Case for a Neoconservative Foreign Policy*, London 2005.

²⁸ Cited in Simms, *Unfinest Hour* (note 22), p. 344.



James Rogers from the United Kingdom, Charlotta Spolander from Finland, Kathrin Brockmann from Germany

sure of itself ... and [ready to] provide leadership in the world.’ His speech’s apex was: ‘Century upon century it has been the destiny of Britain to lead other nations. That should not be a destiny that is part of our history. It should be a part of our future.’²⁹ At the time, many suggested that this was just pre-election hot air, but in hindsight, it represents the re-emergence of Britain’s traditional globalism, albeit one set to be wrapped in new European clothes.

The New Labour government was keen to show that it was committed to the European enterprise in a way that previous Tory governments were not. According to Sir Stephen Wall, the British Ambassador to the Union from 1995 to 2000, and then Tony Blair’s foremost European Union advisor between 2000 and 2004, a new catch-all phrase was even created—by Colin Budd, an official at the Foreign Office—to christen the new approach: ‘Step Change.’³⁰ Quickly pushed in the ministries of Whitehall, ‘Step Change’ reached its crescendo during the Anglo-French St. Malo summit in 1998, when the Prime Minister unlocked the door to a greater level of European strategic autonomy. In part, British leaders were keen to push European security and defense because they needed an area in which they could demonstrate Britain’s willingness to be at the heart of Europe, especially in light of their decision in October 1997 not to join the Economic and Monetary Union.³¹ But they were also motivated by real concerns about the marginalization of European influence within the Atlantic Alliance, due to declining European military capabilities and political will. The new British government decided that something had to be done to bring other member states out of Cold War strategic mindsets and into line with the new British approach to foreign, security and defense policy—represented by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR).³²

As Richard Whitman has shown, Robert Cooper, who was at the time the Deputy Secretary for Defence and Overseas Affairs in the Cabinet Office, was also influential in this project, especially when he was asked to draft a confidential memorandum in May 1998 for the Prime Minister and relevant parties in the Foreign Office.³³ Charles Grant, who in 1998 assumed the directorship of the newly established Centre for European Reform, also saw Cooper’s memorandum.³⁴ This influenced his own pamphlet “Can Britain Lead in Europe?”, which included an influential chapter calling for Britain to support a European-level security and

29 John Kampfner, *Blair’s Wars*, London 2003, p. 3.

30 Stephen Wall, *A Stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair*, London 2008, p. 176.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 169.

32 Secretary of State for Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, July 1998, <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf> (01/07/2008).

33 Whitman, *op. cit.* (note 23), p. 6.

34 This was established during an interview with Charles Grant, 04/03/2008.

defense policy. Grant suggested that the old Western European Union, a largely defunct institution, should be dismembered; he argued that its political dimension should become a fourth pillar in the European Union, while its military dimension should be given to NATO.³⁵ He claimed that this would confirm a new British commitment to the rest of Europe, while simultaneously strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. In this way, Grant's pamphlet can be understood as an attempt to transmit political demands by sectors within the British government into the wider political community, especially towards those interested in the potential for European security and defense policy.

This new British approach was discussed at the informal summit of European leaders at Pörtschach on October 24th–25th, 1998, but it was not until the St. Malo summit between the British and French on December 4th, 1998 that it bore fruit. While France—which had pushed for European defense integration for many years—was initially cautious of the new British approach, the two powers agreed that the European Union should be able 'to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage,' including 'autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so,' while sustaining 'the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members.' Britain and France also agreed that, 'Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and technology.'³⁶ However, as Jolyon Howorth has noted, it remains unclear whether the two powers still had different understandings as to where the project they unleashed at St. Malo might lead—whether it was (and is) about a fully autonomous European power, or merely a means to improve European military capabilities within the Atlantic Alliance.³⁷ Yet, to date, it has not prevented several further steps from being taken, not the least of which is the ongoing creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force, numerous battlegroups, the institutions in Brussels, and the European Defence Agency. It has also not precluded seventeen different civil and military missions, as undertaken under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). And with France's full readmission to NATO likely, this question of the intentions of the St. Malo project may already be answered.

³⁵ Charles Grant, *Can Britain Lead in Europe?*, London 1998, pp. 44–50.

³⁶ Joint Declaration on European Defence, Saint-Malo 04/12/1998, <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&aid=1013618395073>> (06/03/2008).

³⁷ Jolyon Howorth, Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy, in: *West European Politics*, No. 2/2004, pp. 211–234.

Clearly, the sheer power and capabilities available to the British state buttressed the British government's position within Europe. While the French military also packs a formidable punch, the British military's level of global reach, technological firepower and organizational capacity is simply on a different plane than the militaries of other European Union member states. Problems do exist: Britain has been stretched considerably thin since undertaking expeditionary operations in Kosovo (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001–) and Iraq (2003–), and it would be succinctly difficult for Britain to fight a large war alone. But the British Armed Forces still remain unique amongst Europeans in their ability to project power over long distances, using some of the world's foremost technology.³⁸ They are financed not only by the largest military research budget in Europe,³⁹ but also by the second highest military funding in the world,⁴⁰ which supports a sizable defense complex. With this, Britain's four nuclear ballistic missile submarines provide it and its European allies with a nuclear umbrella, while the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers—which are to be significantly upgraded in 2014 and 2016, respectively—and new amphibious assault vessels (commissioned in 2004) are the backbone around which the world's second strongest fleet is organized.⁴¹ The Royal Air Force is Europe's second biggest and among the world's most advanced, while the British army, although small, is fully professionalized and able to fight at similar levels of intensity as the United States.⁴² Alongside France, Britain is also unique in possessing several overseas military installations, space-based arrays and satellite infrastructure.⁴³ These capacities have furnished Britain with the means to undertake worldwide military operations every year for the past decade.⁴⁴

This combination of a new strategic doctrine and material power has placed Britain in a unique position as the European Union's pre-eminent military power. As Daniel Korski of the British-based European Council on Foreign Relations has argued, these strategic attributes serve as a model for other Europeans to copy and follow. In his words: 'the pendulum has swung towards London and the re-

38 Robert Tombes, Isabelle Tombes, *op. cit.* (note 18), pp. 675–679.

39 European Defence Agency, National Defence Expenditure in 2006, Brussels 2007, <<http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Facts&id=309>> (10/03/2008).

40 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The 15 major spender countries in 2006, Stockholm 2007, <http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf> (10/03/2008).

41 Matthew Jamison, James Rogers, Britain and the world, in: John Bew (ed.), *The British Moment*, London 2006, p. 33; James Hope, James Rogers, *The Royal Navy: Britain's Trident for a Global Agenda*, 4th September 2006 <<http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=279>> (07/03/2008).

42 Venusburg Group, *A European Defence Strategy*, Gütersloh 2004, <http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf> (10/03/2008), p. 68.

43 Outside of the European Union, these can be found in Ascension Island, the Bahamas, Belize, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Diego Garcia, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Kenya, Nepal, Norway, Qatar, Singapore and the United States.

44 These conflicts include: bombing Iraq (1998), the Kosovo intervention (1999), the intervention in Sierra Leone (2000), the war against the Taliban (2001–), the war in Iraq (2003–) and assistance in European military operations under the ESDP.

configuration of Europe's security landscape is a reality.⁴⁵ For example, it seems more than mere coincidence that the German Defence Review of 2006 and the French Defence Review of 2008 reflected the evolving British trend solidified in the 1998 SDR. What is important here is not that the British government has directed this project, but rather that the dynamism of British strategic discourse has filtered across to other member states, as well as up to the European level, and perhaps even back down again. Britain's European influence has risen through the dispersion of its grand strategy.

The European Union's Grand Strategy

Those, such as Robert Cooper, who were involved from the start in rethinking British foreign policy, have also directed their attention to the European level (insofar as the two can be disentangled). In 1996, a Labour-leaning think tank called Demos published Cooper's first pamphlet,⁴⁶ which marked the start of a stream of subsequent articles, pamphlets and books on foreign policy, international politics and security studies.⁴⁷ All of these works have looked into the relationship between security threats after the Cold War and the way in which the European Union might respond to them. Running through all of them is Cooper's claim that the end of the Soviet Union meant the death of Realpolitik within the European system. According to Cooper, this collapsing order has been replaced with neither a 'new world order' nor a 'new world disorder'; instead, as he put it: 'there is a zone of safety in Europe, and outside it a zone of danger and a zone of chaos.'⁴⁸ In fact, most of the world is like a dangerous 'jungle'.⁴⁹ For Cooper, the Westphalian modern state, which made Realpolitik possible, has either collapsed into pockets of 'pre-modern' disorder—particularly in places such as the former Yugoslavia—or has condensed into a greater order, which he describes as the 'post-modern element'. Cooper claims that the European Union is the best

45 Daniel Korski, *London Calling: How Britain Now Runs European Security*, 03/03/2008, < http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_london_calling_how_britain_determines_euroepan_security/ > (01/07/2008).

46 Robert Cooper, *The post-modern state and the world order*, London 1996.

47 For example, 'The post-modern state' was updated in 2000, and formed the core of chapter in Mark Leonard's *Reordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11th*. It was also integrated into two articles entitled 'The new liberal imperialism' and 'Civilise or die', as well as Cooper's book, *The Breaking of Nations*. The second part of this was intended originally as an essay for the British Prime Minister to read over Christmas 2002. See: Robert Cooper, *The post-modern state and the world order*, London 2000; Robert Cooper, *The post-modern state*, in: Mark Leonard (ed.), *Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term implications of September 11th*, London 2002, pp. 11–20; Robert Cooper, *The new liberal imperialism*, in: *The Observer*, 7th April 2002; Robert Cooper, *Civilise or die*, in: *The Guardian*, 23rd October 2003; Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, London 2003; Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, London 2004.

48 Robert Cooper, *The post-modern state and the world order*, London 1996, p. 34.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 38.

representative of post-modernity.⁵⁰ As such, it is not too far off the mark to suggest that Cooper has attempted to securitize the entire non-European world.

Cooper fears that post-modern states, predicated on openness and transparency, are increasingly unwilling to exercise raw power, which in his eyes has led them to ‘neglect our defences, both physical and psychological.’⁵¹ In such circumstances, he warns that ‘when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era—force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself.’⁵² And in order to do this, he calls on Europeans to bolster their defences, develop an effective grand strategy and engage more proactively across the globe.⁵³ Indeed, similarly to (and before) Robert Kagan, Cooper warns Europeans that becoming too reliant on civilian power, multilateralism and international institutions will not only harm their own foreign policy but also their relationship with the United States:

*The ... issue is whether in the long run—and I would say personally, this is perhaps the point that worries me most—there isn’t a risk of a cultural separation taking place between Europe and the US—a culture of power on one side of the Atlantic and a culture of law on the other side. Or, if you like, Hobbes on one side and Grotius on the other. Actually, we need both law and power; we need both Hobbes and Grotius.*⁵⁴

Cooper’s primary concern is to combine the use of force with the importance of legitimacy.⁵⁵ His answer is to extend international law, supplemented with military power, to tame ‘jungle’—that is, ‘modern’ danger and ‘pre-modern’ chaos—through transformational imperialism.⁵⁶ For him, European power must be calibrated to meet these new circumstances.

50 Robert Cooper, The post-modern state, in: Mark Leonard (ed.), *Re-Ordering the World: The Long-term implications of September 11th*, London 2002, p. 16.

51 Ibid.

52 Cooper, op. cit. (note 48), p. 37.

53 Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, London 2003, p. 165.

54 This context of this argument is often attributed to the American scholar, Robert Kagan. See: Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness*, in: *Policy Review*, June/July 2002, <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3460246.html>> (04/03/2008). But it was actually Cooper who first advanced the problematic situation of Hobbesian Americans and Grotian Europeans, at the annual meeting at the Trilateral Commission, in 2000: <<http://www.trilateral.org/annmtgs/trialog/trlgtxts/t54/coo.htm>> (04/03/2008). For a longer article on the same issue, see: Robert Cooper, *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy*, in: David Held, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), *American Power in the 21st Century*, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 167–180.

55 Frank Foley, *Between Force and Legitimacy: The Worldview of Robert Cooper*, Florence 2007.

56 For example, he cites Machiavelli’s maxim of the need for ‘good laws and good armies’. See: Robert Cooper, *Civilise or die*, in: *The Guardian*, 23/10/2003. For a longer article, see: Robert Cooper, *Imperial Liberalism*, in: *The National Interest*, No. 79/2005, pp. 25–34.

Significantly, Cooper was given the opportunity to advance this British-influenced approach at the European level in autumn 2002. He was appointed Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. Not only has he since played an important role as one of Javier Solana's top advisors, but his pen was also behind much of the European Security Strategy of 2003.⁵⁷ Many of his ideas can be found in this document, from calls for the Union to become more active and establish a world order predicated on 'effective multilateralism', to the 'need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.'⁵⁸

The European Union's Emergence as a 'Global Power'

So where does this lead us? Clearly, the partial dislocation of British grand strategy in the 1990s allowed for the construction of a new and increasingly European equivalent. This saw the displacement of many facets of British globalism and their transference to the European level. Hegemonic agents influenced by British grand strategy—people like Cooper and Grant, but also others like Daniel Keohane, Steven Everts, Nick Witney and Mark Leonard, as well as think tanks like the Centre for European Reform, the Foreign Policy Centre and Demos—have pioneered the way in this new project, first within Britain during the latter 1990s, and now increasingly at the European level. They have produced, in turn, an environment in which new think tanks such as the European Council on Foreign Relations can develop, adding further weight to the project.⁵⁹ In part, this is surely because of the attraction of Britain's globally-oriented and activist tradition in international politics. While a similar approach has long been taken by France, it was only after the aforementioned changes in Britain that both powers joined forces to press the project forward at the European level, leading to what Michael Smith calls a 'wider', 'deeper' and 'harder' Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP.⁶⁰

As such, Britain has emerged as a regional leader within the European Union. The transferal of its dynamic global approach has influenced European security culture, which is increasingly less 'chronopolitical'—that is, less concerned with the return of Europe's warlike past—and progressively more 'geopolitical', in

⁵⁷ Jolyon Howorth, *From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP*, in: Christopher Hill, Michael Smith, *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford 2005, p. 195.

⁵⁸ European Council, *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels 2003, <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>> (06/03/2008).

⁵⁹ Notice, for example, the creation of the European Council on Foreign Relations in several European Union capitals, which is headed by Mark Leonard. Further, Charles Grant has also been noted for the Centre for European Reform 'punching above its weight.'

⁶⁰ Michael Smith, *The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions*, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No. 4/2007, p. 444.

other words, positioning the Union separately from the outside world. As Geoffrey Edwards and Paul Cornish have shown, this is leading towards a European strategic culture, which is more robust and credible.⁶¹ And when taken together, the two cultures, security and strategic, have contributed to a new European Union grand strategy which, in turn, has constituted a more amalgamated security community. This could have significant consequences for the British, European and global orders, particularly if the political cohesion and willpower can be found at the European level to project the Union's growing capacities and demands onto the world stage.⁶²

Given its position as a hub of strategic expertise and as Europe's pre-eminent military power, Britain's role in the future development of a European Union grand strategy appears likely to remain critical. As the CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, argued at the University of Oxford in March 2008: 'Europe needs Britain. A credible European foreign policy without the United Kingdom is simply not possible. Europe needs your ... ideas, resources and relationships. Your organisational capacity, your global mindset and your armed forces.'⁶³ Yet in an increasingly volatile and unpredictable world, Britain's leaders seem increasingly convinced that Britain needs the European Union.⁶⁴ Should this project continue to develop at the same speed over the next decade as it has over the previous ones, the paradox might be that Britain's grand strategy becomes indistinguishable from the 'European' grand strategy, perhaps reducing Britain's standing. But if we are facing the threats identified by British strategists, the cost might be worth the price. Should Gordon Brown's government choose to do so, it could put Britain further at the heart of Europe, particularly if London can find ways of reconciling any outstanding differences with Paris.

61 Paul Cornish, Geoffrey Edwards, The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report, in: *International Affairs*, No. 4/2005, pp. 801–820.

62 Karl Deutsch (ed.), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton 1957. For more on 'security communities', see: Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security Communities*, Cambridge 1998.

63 Javier Solana, *Europe in the World: The Next Steps*, Oxford 2008, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/99116.pdf> (10/03/2008).

64 The British government's policy dossier *Global Europe*, <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/global-europe>> (08/07/2008).

France's Renewed Atlanticism

*Luís Simón Navarro*¹

Introduction

This article seeks to conceptualize France's geopolitical repositioning within the transatlantic space. France's renewed atlanticism is here explained as an attempt to preserve grandeur in a context characterized by an ongoing erosion of the country's relative influence in Europe and leadership position in the European Union, best illustrated by the rise of Germany's relative power in the continent and, to a lesser extent, Britain's growing interest in the European Union.²

The ideal of grandeur,³ widely associated with that of autonomy, lies at the very centre of France's foreign and security policy. Whereas the notion of autonomy has clearly occupied a central role in French foreign and security policy literature, it has sometimes been presented in contradiction with that of influence, both in the realm of French foreign and security policy studies and Foreign Policy Analysis at large.⁴ It is, nonetheless, seemingly hard to separate the very notions of freedom (autonomy) and power (influence) from each other, and perhaps more obviously so in the realm of international politics; as Michael Heseltine argued, "a man alone in the desert is sovereign. He is also powerless."⁵ To be sure, France's quest for grandeur has rested upon her attempt to balance autonomy and influence, an enterprise which requests the adequate combination of the country's various foreign and security policy assets—mainly diplomatic and military. The concepts of autonomy and influence will therefore be here treated interdependently, at the service of grandeur.



Luís Simón Navarro

- 1 I would like to thank Jerome Bacquias, Rosa Balfour, Edward Mills, Alister Miskimmon, Antonio Missiroli, Henning Riecke, James Rogers, an anonymous reviewer, and all the participants in the 11th DGAP New Faces Conference for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Program—Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Compagnia di San Paolo and Volkswagen Stiftung—and the Department of Politics and International Relations of Royal Holloway (University of London) for financial support.
- 2 For a stimulating overview of Britain's growing European focus see James Rogers' contribution on this issue.
- 3 Grandeur (greatness) is often described as rank, status. On grandeur and French foreign policy see Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (1958–1969)*, Paris 1998; Frédéric Charillon, *Peut-il encore y avoir une politique étrangère française?*, in: *Politique étrangère*, No. 4/2002, pp. 915–929; Stanley Hoffmann, *La France dans le Monde 1979–2000*, in: *Politique étrangère*, No. 2/2000, pp. 307–317.
- 4 Etienne de Durand, *Quel format d'armée pour la France*, in: *Politique Etrangère*, No. 4/2007, pp. 729–742; Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, Wolfgang Wagner, *Neorealist foreign policy theory*, in: Volker Rittberger (ed.), *German foreign policy since unification*, Manchester 2001, pp. 37–69.
- 5 Quoted in Javier Solana, *Europe in the world: the next steps*, Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University, 28/02/2008, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/99116.pdf>. For a conceptual discussion on the different faces of power see Steven Lukes, *Power: a radical view*, Basingstoke 2005. For a dissenting view on Lukes' analysis see John Gray, *On the contestability of social and political concepts*, in: *Political Theory*, No. 3/1977, pp. 331–348.

France's Quest for Grandeur since Suez

America's request to the French, British and Israelis to cease their military activities in the Suez Canal in 1956 marked a symbolic turning point in France's post World War II foreign and security policy: never again would France allow a third party to hold a veto over her legitimate security interests. Since the birth of the 5th Republic in 1958 and for the remainder of the Cold War period, France's search for grandeur rested upon strategic autonomy—largely associated with the development of an independent nuclear deterrent capability—and a search for leadership (influence) over Western Europe, ideally through the nascent European Community (EC). Indeed, the very orientation of France's foreign and security policy during the Cold War is very telling of the extent to which the 'foreign' (diplomacy) and 'security' (capabilities) bits of foreign and security policy are coordinated at the service of a coherent strategy: France's instinct for strategic assets—chiefly the independent nuclear force de frappe, but also a vested interest in the field of satellite communications or in maintaining a national industry for defense procurement—was explicitly linked to the idea of autonomy and leadership over Western Europe.⁶

Soon after General de Gaulle's announcement of his country's inauguration into the nuclear club in 1960, and as World War II wounds began to heal thanks to a combination of American cash, the economic incentives arising from European integration and the domestic opportunities offered by the tasks of reconstruction,⁷ France would grasp the potential benefits of 'going alone.' In 1963 and, again, in 1967, President de Gaulle vetoed Britain's bid to join the EC; in 1965, he withdrew France's representative from the Community as a protest against the EC's supranational biases; and in 1966 he announced his decision to leave the Alliance's integrated military structure and asked NATO to remove its headquarters (formerly in Paris), all forces and other facilities from France by the 1st of April of 1967. Paris would assert its autonomy from NATO and the US while watching out against any elements—be these other States or the rise of supranationalism—that might pose a threat to its leadership (influence) over the EC. The American-imposed multilateral order in the continent provided an effective check on Western Germany, which gave France a degree of latitude in European af-

6 For an insightful discussion on the differences between a strategically oriented model of army and a more tactically oriented one see Durand, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 729–742; Christopher S. Chivvis, Durand, *Political and strategic consequences of the French White Paper*, (US-Europe Analysis Series, Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, Spring 2008. On France's strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe see Adrian Treacher, *Europe as a power multiplier for French security policy: strategic consistency, tactical adaptation*, in: *European Security*, No. 1/2001, pp. 22–44.

7 For an analysis of France's economic evolution after World War II see Bruno Palier, *Gouverner la sécurité sociale*, Paris 2005.

fairs that the unification of her larger German neighbour in the late 19th century seemed to have made unthinkable.

During most of the Cold War, France's accent on the multilateralism and third forcism represented by the EC was largely motivated by her perceived leadership over a Community, which rested upon the implicit bargain of German economic strength and France's politico-strategic direction. These (advantageous) conditions largely resulted from Germany's imposed weakness and over-dependence on her Western allies for security—mainly the US—, but also from France's crafty attempts to balance her perceived monopoly over 'Europe,' her emphasis on strategic autonomy from NATO and the US, and some occasional flirting with the Soviets, with her belonging to NATO and the Western camp.⁸ To sum up, France's Cold War diplomatic and capability assets were coordinated in a rather coherent manner: while the capability effort was directed to achieve and consolidate a strategic outlook, diplomacy was oriented to selling and buying the idea of French leadership over Western Europe; the cause-effect relationship between the 'foreign' and 'security' bits of foreign and security policy went both ways.⁹

Since the end of the Cold War, an important succession of tectonic shocks—i. e. disappearance of Soviet military threat to Western Europe, German and European reunification, the several crises in the Western Balkans, the irruption of international terrorism or the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq—has altered the very logic underpinning international and regional distributions of power, but also the way in which threats are perceived and conceptualized. Insofar as the power balance and the strategic environment (threat balance) are the key variables underpinning states' foreign and security policy, key changes in the balance of power and the strategic environment are pushing different countries to reshape their respective strategies to maximize their influence in international politics. It is in this context of tectonic movement, that France has, since the 1990's, proceeded to a gradual rethinking of the way in which she puts in play her different diplomatic-political and capability assets in order to deliver grandeur.

At a more political level, France responded to the end of the Cold War with a reassuring sign of commitment to deepen her strategic relationship with Germany in the framework of the EU, of which the 1993 Maastricht Treaty is a very good testimony.¹⁰ On the other hand, a parallel intensified diversification of France's

8 On the opportunities that structural conditions in Western Europe offered to French foreign policy see David P. Calleo, *Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. EU*, in: *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2003, pp. 17–24.

9 Author's interview at the French Ministry of Defence (Paris, April 2006).

10 For a geopolitical analysis of the Treaty of Maastricht see Michael J. Baun, *The Maastricht Treaty as high politics: Germany, France and European Integration*, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, No. 4/1995–96, pp. 605–624; Joseph

diplomatic activity can be appreciated since the early 1990's, namely the repeated efforts to improve relations with Britain and the US/NATO (see below); attempts to palliate an EU Eastern enlargement, which happened too soon and too fast for both France and Europe, by progressively raising her presence in Eastern Europe; an insistence in underscoring a national commitment to Africa or the Middle East; and, most recently, the will to exploit her nuclear leverage to strengthen her influence through bilateral ties in strategic neighborhoods—i. e. across Northern Africa or in the Gulf Region—or President Nicolas Sarkozy's visible pushes for a Union for the Mediterranean.¹¹

Most notably perhaps, the last fifteen years have witnessed a 'love me-love me not affair'¹² between France and the US/NATO. During the early to mid-1990s, France courted NATO and the US in the framework of a reconciling trend that reached its peak in 1995–97—during the so-called AFSOUTH crisis, when French demands to gain command over NATO's southern Mediterranean fleet led to a standoff in the negotiations over France's re-entry into the Alliance's integrated military structure. That positive climate, nonetheless, served to pave the way for a Franco-British momentum that stretched from effective cooperation 'on the mountains of Bosnia'¹³ in 1993 to the 1998 Franco-British Saint Malo Summit, eventually resulting in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Sooner rather than later Paris would, again, distance herself from Washington given the latter's response to the 9/11 attacks, a response which emphasized long term military solutions to terrorism and a manifest disdain for multilateralism. Franco-American tensions reached a historic high during the run-up to the 2003 Anglo-American military intervention in Iraq.¹⁴ Not long after the transatlantic storm over the 2003 Iraqi crisis, France would, however, progressively and cautiously seek to close the gap with Washington, a

M. Grieco, State interests and institutional rule trajectories: a neorealist interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European economic and monetary union, in: *Security Studies*, Spring 1996, pp. 261–306. For a rich and compelling overview of France's stakes in European Monetary Union see David Howarth, *The French Road to European Monetary Union*, Basingstoke 2001.

11 On France and NATO see Frédéric Bozo, *Alliance Atlantique: la Fin de l'Exception Française ?* (Document de Travail, Fondation pour l'innovation politique), Paris, February 2008, <<http://www.fondapol.org/v2/publication-details.php?id=261&lg=fr>>; Jolyon Howarth, Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, in: *Survival*, No. 2/2000, pp. 33–55. On France's perception of the EU enlargement to the East see Florence Deloche, *La France et les élargissements à l'Est de l'Union Européenne*, in: *Les Études du CERI*, No. 46/1998, pp. 1–41. For an analysis of France's leading role in Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo see Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, *Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?*, in: *International Peacekeeping*, No. 3/2004, pp. 508–525. On the French proposal for a Union of the Mediterranean see Rosa Balfour, *Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU?* (Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Policy Brief), Brussels, 13/02/2008; Michael Emerson, *Making sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean*, (CEPS, Policy Brief), Brussels, 03/07/2008.

12 Stephanie Hoffman, Ronja Kempin, *France and the Transatlantic relationship: love me, love me not...*, (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Working Paper), Berlin, 04/02/2007.

13 The expression is from David Howarth, *The French Road to European Monetary Union*, Basingstoke 2001.

14 Jolyon Howarth, *France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic crisis*, in: *Survival*, No. 4/2003, pp. 173–192.

rapprochement which has been most eloquently illustrated by President Sarkozy's recent camaraderie with President George W. Bush.¹⁵

France's choice to widen her diplomatic options and to get closer to her NATO allies cannot be isolated from a parallel diversification of capabilities away from an exclusive focus on strategic assets in order to pay more attention to attributes such as deployability, readiness or interoperability.¹⁶ In this sense, France's moves towards capability diversification in the military realm are part of a much wider movement of military transformation that reflects important changes in the definition and understanding of the concept of threat.¹⁷ Changes in our understanding and definition of threats result in changes in the way we conceive our responses to them: the shift from traditional (i.e. interstate) military threats to less traditional threats (i.e. regional crises, terrorism, rogue states) has given way to a progressive shift from deterrence to force projection; from conscription and mass armies to professionalization. Not only did changes in the strategic environment (i.e. end of Cold War bipolarity) largely result in capability or doctrinal adjustments across the board (i.e. professionalization of armed forces, emphasis on deployability, readiness or interoperability, etc). Furthermore, those adjustments in capabilities or doctrine generated their own path dependencies on the part of the agent that fed back into the structure and contributed to the consolidation of a new strategic environment. The logic ran both ways.¹⁸

Since the professionalization of the French army in 1996, two successive lois de programmation militaire (1997–2002 and 2003–2008) have been approved to translate the demands of the emerging strategic environment into specific capability requirements. After operation Desert Storm, France tried to restore the loss of weight that followed from the Soviet decline by upgrading force projection to the status of core strategic function, by identifying strategic communications, armed forces professionalization and command as the new vehicles towards international influence. The demand for readiness and tactical capabilities, however, would not be made at the expense of France's strengths at the strategic level: in

15 Sarkozy's holiday in US raises eyebrows, *Financial Times*, 11/08/2007. For a description of an improvement which was already under way before the arrival of Sarkozy to power see Frédéric Bozo, Guillaume Parmentier, France and the United States: waiting for regime change, in: *Survival*, No. 1/2007, pp. 181–197.

16 In this sense, the obstacles to allied interoperability that France evidenced during Operation Desert Storm were largely behind France's will to get closer to NATO during the early to mid-1990's. I thank Antonio Missiroli for alerting me on this point.

17 For an insightful appraisal of the patterns of military transformation in France, Britain and Germany see Thomas Dyson, *Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy: Convergence and Divergence in post-Cold War British, French and German military reforms*, UACES annual conference, Portsmouth 2007.

18 On the role of using discourse to set the terms of the strategic environment see David Campbell, *Writing security: United States Foreign Policy and the politics of identity*, Minneapolis, MN, 1998; David Grondin, (Re)writing the 'national security state': How and Why realists (re)built the(ir) Cold War (Center for the United States of the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Occasional Paper 4).

this sense, the obsession to develop the necessary means to achieve the status of ‘framework nation’ in the context of coalitions and alliances, notably the EU, remained visible.¹⁹ In an attempt to assess France’s capability needs at a time when the *Livre blanc sur la défense* (Defence Review) was still being drafted, Durand recently argued that ‘beyond the false debates that oppose classic vs. nuclear forces, the current strategic environment and the challenges of military planning demand to make choices and set orientations. If these are to have a chance of being perennial, and contrarily to certain dominating doxa today, it appears that the best move would be to reject black-or-white choices and aim for a composite format.’²⁰

Beyond the military realm, France has, since 9/11 and yet most vocally since the precarious evolution of the Afghan and Iraqi theaters, highlighted the need to resort to different means (diplomatic, economic and military) to address the complex challenges of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict stabilization. This includes an emphasis on non-military operational means to crisis management (i.e. policing), with France’s gendarmerie offering an opportunity to add a valuable strength in the framework of the European Gendarmerie Force. Whereas some authors have appealed to ‘social learning’ or ‘Europeanization’ in order to account for France’s open attitude towards a more ‘comprehensive’ approach to security,²¹ structural reasons should not be overlooked, namely the changing nature of the strategic environment itself, as reflected by the US weaknesses to bring about stability in Afghanistan and Iraq after military victory. These weaknesses on the American part offer the French an opportunity to assert the added value of the EU, an opportunity that shall not go unnoticed.²²

The Rationale behind France’s NATO Bid

The end of the Cold War not only resulted in important dynamics of transformation in the global strategic environment or the global power balance, it has also opened the door to a series of (ongoing) changes that substantially alter the balance of power that underpins European geopolitics. For one thing, a range

¹⁹ Durand, op.cit. (note 4), pp. 729–742. Durand emphasizes the symbolism of Operation Artemis in this regard.

²⁰ Durand, op.cit. (note 4), pp. 757–758 (author’s translation). Indeed, France’s 2008 *Livre Blanc* attempts to strike a balance between the need for tactical capabilities and the ongoing importance of strategic assets, including the role of the independent nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of France’s security (p. 69). The 2008 *Livre Blanc* pour la défense et la sécurité nationale can be found at: <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc/les_conclusions__1/le_livre_blanc_l_integrale/le_livre_blanc_l_integrale__1>.


²¹ See Pernille Riecker, *From Common Defence to Comprehensive Security: Towards the Europeanization of French foreign and security policy?*, in: *Security Dialogue*, No. 4/2006, pp. 509–528.

²² American participation in the EU’s new policing mission in Kosovo is a good illustration of this. For a rather skeptical view on the EU’s alleged strength in comprehensive tools to crisis management see Christopher S. Chivvis, *Birthing Althea: The uncertain future of the European Security and Defence Policy* (ifri, Focus Stratégique n° 5), Paris, March 2008.

of different factors—among which America's progressive disengagement from Europe stands out—would result in Britain's growing interest in European integration. Secondly, Germany's reunification first, and securitization later—most eminently symbolized by the EU and NATO enlargements to the East—, would call into question the very sacred balances underpinning the European integration process, resulting in a (progressive) rebalancing within the Franco-German engine in favor of the latter and a decline in the overall influence of the Franco-German engine over the whole European integration process.

On the one hand, Germany's improving position,²³ and, although to a lesser extent, Britain's growing interest in European integration call into question the idiosyncrasy of France's Euro-Atlantic positioning, rested on the comfort that absence from NATO's military structure was balanced (justified) by a leadership position over the European integration process, German weakness (dependence) and Britain's lack of interest in Europe. On the other hand, the French are well aware of the fact that British acquiescence to ESDP is necessary for both military—the UK has the best power projection capabilities in Europe—and political

23 The issue of Germany's rise has generated much literature in the past decade. Many authors have rightly pointed to the many financial, political or cultural factors as standing in the way of a more influential German foreign and security policy. On this see Alister Miskimmon, *A crisis of influence? German foreign policy in crisis since 1998*, in: Alister Miskimmon, William E. Paterson, James Sloam (eds.), *The German crisis*, Basingstoke forthcoming 2008. However, the idea here is to pinpoint wider structural trends. For an excellent account of Germany's changing position on the international stage see Stephen F. Szabo, *Parting Ways: the crisis in German-American relations*, Washington, DC, 2004.



Luis Simón Navarro from Spain and Oleg Kozlovsky from Russia discuss a future European security architecture

reasons—Britain's stamp gives the ESDP project the Pan-European legitimacy that a French-led initiative would lack. Finally, the French know well that the road from Paris to London goes through Washington, hence the extra motivation to work the US/NATO element.

France's chief mistake during the Cold War was her lack of empathy. Her constant claims for a strong Europe were always accompanied by an instinct for 'intergovernmentalism'²⁴ that did not help to dispel what has been a widespread perception among her European partners for too long a time: the French want a Europe à la française. Today Paris must avoid the same mistake. The current rapprochement to the US and NATO must be largely understood by an acknowledgement that recognizing the concerns of her partners in an enlarged Europe is key to credibility and leadership.²⁵ France's contemporary foreign and security policy dilemma evolves around finding the right balance between the need for asset diversification (i.e. improving force projection capabilities or approaching Washington and London) and the must of looking after a well-earned exceptionalism that rests upon her special position in the realm of strategic assets and her special partnership with Germany in the framework of the European Union. Insofar as these balances between change and continuity mirror not only systemic developments but also domestic tensions within France's various foreign and security policy communities, the mixed external and internal signals are most likely to produce hybrid solutions.²⁶

The way ahead

Henry Kissinger once said that 'the test of a Statesman is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve its ends.'²⁷ Today, President Sarkozy has a chance to mould the environment, to take advantage of the various external forces and turn it into an opportunity for France.

As of today, the signs that some sort of bargain aimed at closing the gap between Paris and Washington in the realm of security policy is on the way can hardly be

24 The history of European integration has been marked by the tension between intergovernmentalism (the power lies with national governments) and supranationalism (let the Community institutions decide), a tension well captured in the literature. As Bohlen argues, 'De Gaulle always acted unilaterally. In the five years I was ambassador in Paris, there was not a single important foreign-policy issue in which he sought to consult with his allies (...) discussion and attempts to work out a common point of view were alien to him'; Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to history 1929–1969*, New York 1973, p. 510.

25 Philip Gordon, *The Hyperpresident*, in: *The American Interest* (The Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, Holidays (Nov/Dec 2007), <<http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2007/11france/11france.pdf>>.

26 Durand, op. cit. (note 4), pp. 729–742. For a good account of the internal disputes among France's various foreign and security policy communities see the interview with Justin Vaisse, *Le revirement de Nicolas Sarkozy sur l'Europe* (Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, 2008 <http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2008/0319_europe_vaisse.aspx>.

27 Henry Kissinger, *A world restored: Europe after Napoleon*, Boston, MA; 1957.

missed.²⁸ It is the very nature of that bargain, whether 'grand' or 'patchy', that is still up for grabs. One important observation shall be pointed out: France's re-entry into NATO's military structure and (French) access to command positions in NATO are not the only items on the table.²⁹ During the last few months, policy analysts have found it particularly challenging to keep up with the pace of ongoing developments when explaining the nature and likely consequences of a supposed grand bargain encompassing the evolution of NATO, that of ESDP or the future of EU-NATO relations.³⁰ Philip Gordon has captured well the grandes lignes of the bargain: 'NATO US officials (...) realize that a grand bargain with France—France's full reintegration into NATO, US support for European Defense, and perhaps a new NATO strategic concept—may not be possible before Bush's term ends, but they want to try.'³¹

Both France and the US have been resisting each other's plans vis-à-vis ESDP and NATO respectively for quite some time. Leaving earlier Cold War riffs aside,³² France has systematically opposed America's occurrences for an ontological (from a military being to a more political one), geographical (from a Euro-Atlantic organization to a global partnership) or functional (from a collective defense organization to a security provider) redesign of NATO since the Cold War ended, and most vocally so since US failures to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan have given her the perfect excuse to do so.³³ The Americans have, on their part, opposed the idea of an autonomous ESDP since long before its birth.³⁴ However,

28 Philip Gordon, *Europe is still on the Agenda* (The Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, Nov/Dec 2007; Ronald Asmus, *Saying Yes to France*, in: *The Washington Post*, 29/10/2007.

29 EPC-UACES lecture by French Ambassador Gérard Errera at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 21/02/2008.

30 Stephanie Hoffman, *L'OTAN: vers un nouveau concept stratégique*, in: *Politique étrangère*, No. 1/2008, pp. 105–118; Jolyon Howorth, *The Future of the European Security Strategy: towards a white book on European defence*, Presentation to the workshop organised by the European Parliament's Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, 03/06/2008; Luis Simón Navarro, *Sarkozy's dilemmas, the forthcoming French EU Presidency and ESDP: what's in it for Europe?* (Real Instituto Elcano ARI 76), Madrid, July 2008; J. Vaisse, *Nicolas Sarkozy's foreign policy: Gaullist by any other name* (The Brookings Institution), Washington, DC, April 2008; Thomas Valasek, *The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations* (Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note), Brussels, December 2007; Thomas Valasek, *France, NATO and European Defence* (Centre for European Reform, Briefing Note), Brussels, March 2008.

31 Gordon, *op. cit.* (note 28).

32 On France and NATO see Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN. De la guerre froide au nouvel ordre européen*, Paris 1991; Giles Andréani, *La France et l'OTAN après la guerre froide*, in: *Politique étrangère*, No. 1/1998, pp. 77–92.

33 The latest notable examples have been France's opposition to give the Iraqi crisis a NATO stamp or the rather modest outcome of NATO's 2006 Riga summit, when the French opposed plans to improve the Alliance's access to civilian assets or the proclamation of a global NATO. In both occasions, the French teamed up with the Germans. On this see Sven Biscop, *NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: no transformation without re-equilibration* (Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Paper 11), Brussels 2005. For a more recent analysis on the existing approaches to NATO's transformation see Stephanie Hoffmann, *OTAN: vers un nouveau concept stratégique?*, in: *Politique étrangère*, No. 1/2008, pp. 105–118.

34 On Europe's attempts to create a European security dimension after the Cold War see Jolyon Howorth, John TS Keeler, *Defending Europe: the EU, NATO and the quest for European autonomy*, New York, NY, 2003. For a more detailed overview of the US opposition, and the cooling of that opposition, to the ESDP see Esther Brimmer, *Seeing Blue: American visions of the European Union* (European Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 105); Paris, September 2007.

the growing demand for allied operational support seems to have forced Washington to rethink its stance on this issue.³⁵

Beyond the fact that France's improvement of relations with the US/NATO in light of Germany's rise and Britain's growing interest in the EU, has become an end in itself, the French seek to make further concrete gains out of their renewed atlanticism. For one thing, US explicit support for ESDP is of capital importance as it would ease the process of marketing Paris' plans to re-launch ESDP in London (chiefly), Berlin or Warsaw.³⁶ On the other hand, the French aspire to a good deal in terms of command positions in NATO and, more generally, further signs of American openness to an eventual rearrangement of NATO's structures and practices, in the sense of more explicitly recognizing the existence of a European element.³⁷ For the Americans, beyond the fact that they welcome Paris' contribution to the imminent urgencies that the Alliance is facing on the ground (notably in Afghanistan), the French can help instigate a more positive mood in Europe vis-à-vis the idea of NATO transformation and, more specifically, the approval of a new strategic concept for the Alliance. Although US backing of ESDP would be an important step for France's ambitions of building up an autonomous ESDP, one shall be careful not to take such backing as a panacea. Ultimately, European autonomy in the realm of security policy or, for that matter, any form of potential rearrangement within NATO would depend upon the political and financial will of most European countries to advance in that direction. Whereas American support of ESDP might be a necessary cause for that, it is certainly not a sufficient one.

As Sven Biscop has well captured, the extent to which the French (or, for that matter, Europeans) are ready to sign in go a more apt NATO bears a direct relationship to the extent to which the US is ready to embrace an autonomous

35 Speaking before the members of the North Atlantic Council, President George W. Bush asserted, the 2nd of April 2008 in Bucharest, that 'building a strong NATO Alliance also requires a strong European defense capacity' <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080402-2.html>>. In two consecutive speeches in Paris (22-2-2008) and London (25-02-2008), US Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, recently spoke in similar terms: 'An ESDP with only soft power is not enough. As we look to the French Presidency of the EU this summer, we hope France will lead an effort to strengthen European defense spending, upgrade European military capabilities with badly needed investment in helicopters, UAVs, special forces, interoperable communications and counterinsurgency trained soldiers and civilians' <<http://nato.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=21A35613-E9D6-431D-9FD5-36FDD1389EB0>>. In this sense see also Ronald D. Asmus, Rethinking the EU: why Washington needs to support European integration, in: *Survival*, No. 3/2005, pp. 93–102.

36 Luis Simón Navarro, Sarkozy's dilemmas, the forthcoming French EU Presidency and ESDP: what's in it for Europe? (Real Instituto Elcano ARI 76), Madrid, July 2008.

37 This is an old debate, one which eventually resulted in the breakdown of the negotiations over France's re-entry into NATO's military structures in 1995–1997. See Gilles Andr  ani, *La France et l'OTAN apr  s la guerre froide*, in: *Politique   trang  re*, No. 1/1998, 77–92; for a comparison between the 1990's negotiations and today's process see Fr  d  ric Bozo, *Alliance Atlantique: la Fin de l'Exception Fran  aise ?* (Fondation pour l'Innovation Politique, Document de Travail), Paris, February 2008, <<http://www.fondapol.org/v2/publication-details.php?id=261&lg=fr>>.

ESDP and a more balanced Alliance.³⁸ Surely, this old transatlantic puzzle entails too many variables—not least the interests of other countries—as to be sorted out in the light of a one year Franco-American honeymoon. Yet, the changing circumstances seem to play in favor of some sort of Franco-American understanding. Notably, difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq have made evident that the ‘war on terror’ is fought not just with guns but also with butter or, for that matter, policemen, teachers, judges and other civil administrators. If there is anything Americans value from the EU, it is its capacity to mobilize a vast array of different resources for multinational crisis management. Furthermore, after the recent passive witnessing of the EU Eastern enlargement in France or the country’s impotence vis-à-vis what President Sarkozy has referred to as the ‘anti-growth’ methods of the European Central Bank, Paris strongly feels the need to score in Europe, and foreign and security policy makes a good case. Finally, the institutional agenda is promising: one week ahead of a key NATO summit in Bucharest (held this 4th of April 2008),³⁹ France and Britain had recently celebrated a productive summit in London,⁴⁰ where President Sarkozy announced France’s deployment of an extra 700 troops to the Eastern part of Afghanistan. In addition, the French have published their *Livre Blanc pour la Défense et la Sécurité* in June 2008 and taken over the Presidency of the EU Council in July 2008, the 2003 European Security Strategy was meant to be revised by the High Representative for CFSP later in 2008, and December 2008 marked the tenth anniversary of the Franco-British Saint Malo Summit.⁴¹ Last but not least, a new American administration is in place since January 2009 and, only three months later, NATO will celebrate its 60th anniversary in Strasbourg and Kehl.

38 Sven Biscop, NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: no transformation without re-equilibration, (RIIR, Egmont Paper 11), Brussels 2005.

39 The Bucharest Summit was originally intended to continue the job started at the 2006 Riga Summit, namely to make progress in the promised functional and geographical expansion of the Alliance. Bucharest was practically monopolized by the urgencies of Afghanistan (although heavily related to the questions of the geographical and functional scope of NATO, a very specific case), enlargement to the Western Balkans and the issue of relations with Georgia and Ukraine. See Philip Gordon, NATO: Enlargement and Afghanistan, testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13/03/2008.

40 The communiqué can be found at <<http://www.number10.gov.uk/files/pdf/UK-FR%20Communique%20270308.pdf>>.

41 On the revision of the ESS see Thomas Valasek, Europe’s defence and its new security strategy (Centre for European Reform, CER Bulletin 57), London, Dec 2007/Jan 2008; Antonio Missiroli, Revisiting the European Security Strategy—Beyond 2008 (European Policy Centre, Policy Brief EPC), Brussels, April 2008.

Russia's Foreign Policy: A Review Of Putin's Rule¹

Oleg Kozlovsky

Introduction


Vladimir Putin has been Russia's President for eight years from 2000–2008. His personal role in determining the country's foreign policy is difficult to overestimate: not only the Constitution gives a President such an exclusive right, but Putin's own style of rule also proved to be independent and autocratic. Even now, the former President as Prime Minister appears to keep playing a decisive role in the national foreign policy. In this article, we will review the evolution of Russia's international relations during Putin's rule and try to determine the instruments and true goals of his foreign policy.

Russia's foreign policy, particularly its perception of the West has changed dramatically several times during the last eight years. We can roughly divide it into three phases: (1.) Inertial conflict, (2.) Tactical cooperation, (3.) Ideological confrontation.

Phase I: Inertial Conflict

When Putin entered into office in January 2000, Russia was in the middle of another conflict with the West, started by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1999 after the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Yugoslavia and deepened with the beginning of a war in Chechnya. In a great part, this trend was caused by the domestic situation in Russia: strengthening of the Communists and other Leftists and an increasing demand for an anti-Western policy.

Initially, Putin kept up with this policy "by inertia." He opposed NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe and was harshly criticized in Europe for human rights abuses in Chechnya. A number of international scandals marked this phase, including a Kursk submarine disaster that killed 118 Russian seamen. Some of the Russian officials blamed a US submarine for crashing into Kursk. There were also a number of espionage cases like that of Edmond Pope, when an American citizen was sentenced to a long prison term for spying (he was later pardoned by Putin).



Oleg Kozlovsky

¹ This review was made shortly before the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 and the consequent recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow. As a result, some assumptions of the work may need a revision, although most of its points were only proven by these events.

However, this policy turned out counter-productive and inefficient quite soon. Russia's economy badly needed foreign investments and access to international markets to recover after the crisis of August 1998. The country didn't have enough resources to oppose both Europe and the USA. It became clear that Russia had no option but to try to restore (or establish) partnership relations with the West.

Phase II: Tactical Cooperation

Putin used the terrorist attacks of September 11th as an opportunity to start his new, co-operative policy. He expressed his support of the USA and even helped establish military bases in ex-USSR Central Asia that were needed for the operation in Afghanistan. Cooperation of counter-terrorist agencies played a significant role in this period.

The goals of Russian foreign policy during its second phase were supposedly the following:

- help Russian business gain access to foreign financial and goods markets;
- silence Western criticism towards Russian activities in Chechnya;
- improve Putin's own image in the West and help him become a recognized member of a community of the world's leaders.

The goals were therefore mostly of tactical nature. Unlike the pro-Western policy of early Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, the Kremlin did not pursue any ideological goals nor did it share the same values with the West during this phase of "tactical cooperation."

Russia conducted a "No Institutions" policy and avoided founding or joining any international institutions with Western countries, with rare exceptions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead, the cooperation was often seen in Russia as a matter of personal friendship between Mr. Putin and his counterparts in the West. This approach to foreign policy was a tradition inherited from Yeltsin and, moreover, even from Russian Emperors, particularly comfortable for autocratic leaders as it leaves them with a maximum level of freedom of scope (unlike international institutions that limit such freedom to some extent).

This personality-based approach made Moscow's activities in the international arena unstable and dependent on the inter-personal relations of the respective heads of states. After Gerhard Schroeder, Silvio Berlusconi, and Tony Blair left

their offices, Russia could not maintain the same level of international relations with Germany, Italy and the UK. The same is true for Russia's nearest neighbors, particularly, Georgia and Ukraine.

Western heads of states, however, accepted this mode of international relations, decreased their level of criticism towards Russian domestic policy, improved conditions for Russian business and recognized Putin as one of their kind.

Phase III: Ideological Confrontation

The gap between Putin's domestic and foreign policies was growing in 2001–2003. While attempting to build an image of modern and adequate leadership abroad, democratic institutions at home were successively being destroyed or oppressed. However, in 2003 Putin's cooperation policy began to fail. The first blow was the Yukos affair and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October of that year, one of the main sponsors of all opposition parties, including the Union of Right Forces, Yabloko, and the Communists. The oligarch's opponents claimed that he was going to compete with Putin for the presidential post in 2004. Russia's richest man and some of his colleagues were arrested and charged with a variety of crimes from tax evasion to homicide. This way of dealing with political opposition caused unrest, both among Russian elites and in the West.

Parliamentary elections took place just two months later and left Russian democratic parties out of the Duma. European observers called these elections “unfair,” but Western leaders still refused to admit that Putin's Russia was moving in a precarious direction.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was the turning point for Kremlin's entire foreign policy. Vladimir Putin invested his reputation and reportedly a large amount of Gazprom's money in Victor Yanukovich, President Leonid Kuchma's ally. Political strategists close to Kremlin (like Gleb Pavlovsky, Putin's informal political advisor) worked in Yanukovich's team and used a variety of instruments that had brought victory to Putin and United Russia, including a large-scale propaganda campaign, the threatening of political opponents, electoral fraud and possibly even the poisoning of opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko. At the same time, Putin openly supported Yanukovich during bilateral talks and visits to Kyiv.²

Many Ukrainians saw this as Moscow's attempt to restore its imperial status and to diminish independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. Mass protests on Maidan

² Eight Years under Putin. Foreign Policy, in: Kommersant Vlast, 28/01/2008.

Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kyiv and in other places that followed the fraudulent elections were unforeseen by Yanukovich's and Putin's experts.

The non-violent Orange Revolution that brought Yushchenko to power became the most shameful and painful international defeat for Putin. Moreover, it brought to life a number of democratic non-violent movements in the Commonwealth of Independent States—from Moldova to Kyrgyzstan, not excluding Russia. For the first time, Russian political elites saw how unstable the authoritarian system built by Putin actually was. "The Ghost of Maidan" became (and still remains) the Kremlin's worst nightmare.

Sovereign Democracy

Pavlovsky and his colleagues had to find both an excuse for their failure in Ukraine and a means to fight the Russian "orangists," as they called the new wave of democratic opposition. Unsurprisingly, xenophobia was the solution.

The concept of Kremlin's new ideology that was later named "sovereign democracy" was plain and simple: Russia has its own historical way, with western-style democracy not suiting Russian traditions. Moreover, any attempts of other governments or foreign/international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support any groups or institutions in Russia without explicit resolution by Putin's Administration or to criticize Kremlin were considered unfriendly activities. Supporters of "sovereign democracy" view Russia as a superpower and a leader in the multi-polar world again. They claim the USA and its allies want Russia weak and semi-colonized, the way it was in 1990s, their real interest being Russian natural resources, not modernization, democracy or human rights. Supporters of "Sovereign Democracy" suspect agents of this anti-Russian conspiracy to have organized pseudo-democratic "color revolutions" in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, effectively colonizing these countries in order to achieve their goals and to now plan the same kind of intervention into Russia's own domestic affairs in order to overthrow Vladimir Putin.

Such a theory is nothing completely new in Russian history. In fact, the roots of these views go back to the 1830s, when Emperor Nicholas the First presented his ideology of "Official Nationality." Most Russian Tsars and even Cold-War times Communists later used certain variations of this ideology. The greatest difference is that "sovereign democracy" does not necessarily suppose military expansion, it is more defensive and economy-oriented. The reason is most probably the state

of the Russian army, which is unsuitable to successfully wage a serious armed conflict with any foreign power.

The very term of “sovereign democracy” was contested in Kremlin. Even the elected President Dmitry Medvedev argued that democracy did not need any additional specifications. However, the ideology itself has been a central subject of mass propaganda in Russia since early 2005.

The idea of “sovereign democracy” influenced both Putin’s domestic and foreign policies. The former got increasingly authoritarian and oppressive. New laws on NGOs, elections and extremism were approved, opposition rallies were banned, their participants arrested. The latter became openly anti-Western and aggressive to those ex-USSR countries that refused to accept superiority of Moscow.

Kremlin’s Campaigning Tactics

Since 2005 Putin tried to oppose Western diplomacy on almost every issue. He cooperated with the Palestinian Hamas government and with Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, sold armaments and nuclear technologies to Iran and was one of the few to congratulate Alexander Lukashenko after the fraudulent presidential elections in Belarus in 2006. He backed North Korea and criticized independence of Kosovo. On numerous issues Moscow’s position was directly opposite to that of the European Union (EU) and the USA.

Paradoxically, in most cases such a strategy cannot be explained in terms of geopolitics or economics. Russia, for instance, should have been interested even more than Europe and the USA in stopping Iran’s nuclear and missile program. At the same time, Tehran obviously felt no gratitude for this support and has not coordinated its foreign policy activities with Moscow.

Aggressive xenophobic campaigns became the main tool of Russia’s foreign policy towards the West and its neighbors. In their books, some experts like Edward Lucas³ and Mark McKinnon⁴ even called this a new Cold War. A number of these campaigns were conducted against different countries, mostly former Soviet republics but also others, including Ukraine, Moldova and Poland in 2005, Georgia in 2006 as well as Estonia and the UK in 2007. All these campaigns followed similar scenarios:

3 Edward Lucas, *The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West*, London 2008.

4 Mark A. McKinnon, *The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former Soviet Union*, New York, NY, 2007.

1. The country was called an enemy and was accused of violation of international treaties or anti-Russian activity. There could be any cause for this or none at all.
2. Russian propaganda started to smear these countries intensively, with the ultimate aim of depicting them as eternal enemies of Russia and the Russian people.
3. Youth groups were manipulated by the Kremlin to increase the level of xenophobic hysteria against the respective countries.
4. Russian authorities exerted economic pressure on the target countries, usually denying its political motivation.
5. Soon after the campaign achieved its peak, the level of hysteria went down, strength of propaganda decreased but neither did it really end, nor was economic pressure lifted.

The active phase of every such campaign was usually several months long. The first country to fall prey to such a policy was, of course, Ukraine after its Orange Revolution. Russian official media presented Victor Yushchenko as a Western puppet and Hitler supporter. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were reportedly paid for participating in the revolution or fooled by Western propaganda. State television explained that Yushchenko planned to open NATO military bases in Ukraine, ban Russian language and honor Nazi war criminals. Pro-Kremlin youth organizations like the Eurasian Youth Union organized a number of anti-Ukrainian actions both in Russia and in Ukraine. Russian Gazprom claimed that it would raise gas prices for Ukraine and threatened to cut gas supplies if Ukraine refused to pay. These “gas war” tactics proved efficient and were later used against other countries like Georgia and Belarus.⁵ After about a year the active phase of this campaign ended. However, Ukraine is still being smeared by Russian official media and politicians today, with fewer and fewer Ukrainians respecting Russia as a result.⁶

Another well-known example is the latest anti-British campaign, which was started in 2006 by the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi (“Ours”). Harassing British Ambassador Tony Brenton for his visit to a conference of Russian democratic opposition coalition Other Russia, the “Nashis” disrupted his speeches, attacked his car and rallied near the embassy for weeks with silent support of the authorities. The Litvinenko-Lugovoy affair worsened the situation even more. Russian state television broadcasted documentaries telling that Britain has been following anti-Russian policies since the 19th century. The Russian taxation agency, Min-

5 Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov, Putin: The Bottom Line, Moscow 2008.

6 Eight Years under Putin. Foreign Policy, in: Kommersant Vlast, 28/01/2008.

istry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Security Service (FSB) forced the British Council to stop its activities in the country. Russian bombers appeared near Britain's territory, causing new waves of confrontation. At the same time, Russian officials accused Britain of being unwilling to cooperate in the field of counter-terrorism. The crisis has come to a stalemate and Russian-British relations are now nearly as bad as they were during the worst times of the Cold War.

In most cases, these campaigns were as little conducive to Russian international influence or financial gains as was cooperation with so-called "rogue states". What was the reason for such a paradoxical foreign policy?

Domestic Policy is the Key

The only suitable explanation is that Putin's foreign policy goals have to be viewed and understood through the domestic lens. In fact, anti-Western hysteria was an end in itself.

As a result, Putin succeeded in convincing both Russian people and elites that the country is once again surrounded by enemies, giving him an excuse for concentrating more power in his hands, for oppressing opposition at home and for driving international NGOs out of the country. Kremlin's main message to convey was the necessity to defend the country's sovereignty against adversary offenses. Smearing democratic countries was part of the attempt to convince people that the Western model of democracy was far from perfect and certainly unsuitable for Russia. Fighting an "external foe" was to distract people from domestic problems and rally them behind the Government. Finally, following such a policy would let loose on actions that might be unpopular in the West, e.g. the infamous "gas wars."

All of these goals were short-term and tactical. Inconsistency and lack of a general strategy became obvious in many aspects of Putin's policy, which is characterized by pragmatism if not opportunism. Putin has been building a system devoid of ideology and based on the sole value of power, with preserving the Putin's existing political power and helping state monopolies like Gazprom gain more economic power as the ultimate aim.

Will Russia's foreign policy change under Dmitry Medvedev? The new President positions himself as a more liberal figure compared to Putin and has even criticized the term "sovereign democracy." This has induced some experts to say that

Russia might adopt a softer policy towards its neighbors and the West.⁷ However, this optimism appears exaggerated, especially in light of the recent crisis in Georgia. There have been no visible signs of a pro-Western turn in national foreign policy. Putin still plays a key role in Russian diplomacy. Even if Medvedev becomes a more or less independent politician, we can hardly expect anything more than a few symbolic steps. After all, he is also one of the architects of the same system based on the one and only value—power.

7 Черноморский флот уйдет из Севастополя, <<http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2008/01/25/focus/316005>> (25/01/2008).

Participants and Organizers

Participants

Timothy Strabbing (USA), US Naval Academy, Annapolis, USA

Regional Leaders and Peacekeeping: A New Way Forward?

Nikola Hynek (Czech Republic), Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic

A Reassessment of the 'Regional Turn' in Security Studies in Light of the Czech Missile Defense Experience

Mischa Hansel (Germany), Department of International Relations and European Studies, Cologne, Germany

Challenging Regional Power and Security: Conflicts in Space and Cyberspace

Esra Pakin (Turkey), Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Discussant

Monika Barthwal (India), Department of Politics and International Relations, Royal Holloway College, University of London, UK

India's Look East Policy: Challenges and Opportunities

Hak Yin Li (Hong Kong, China), School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK

Understanding China's "Non-Intervention Policy": Studying the Case of Myanmar

Nikolas Win Myint (Germany), Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York, USA

Discussant

Raffaello Pantucci (Italy/UK), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK

Discussant

Farhan Hanif Siddiqi (Pakistan), Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan

Regional Security Dynamics in the Middle East: The Problematic Search for a Regional Leader

Ksenia Svetlova (Israel), Channel 9 News/Russian BBC/Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, Israel

Working out Gaza: Options for Regional Cooperation and the Role of Regional Leaders

Neslihan Kaptanoglu (Turkey), Economic Policies Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Ankara, Turkey

Discussant

Seda Gurkan (Turkey), Defence Policy Officer, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium

Discussant

Chrysantus Ayangafac (Cameroon), Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The African Peace and Security Architecture

Till Blume (Germany), Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Germany

Peace and Security in West Africa: Supporting Regional Organizations

Miriam Prys (Germany), German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany

Running with the hare, hunting with the hounds: South Africa's dual role as regional power and global player

James Matthew Rogers (UK), Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, UK

Primus inter Pares: Britain's Contribution to the Development of a European 'Grand Strategy'

Luís Simón Navarro (Spain), Royal Holloway College, University of London, UK and European Policy Centre, Brussels, Belgium

France's renewed Atlanticism

Oleg Kozlovsky (Russia), Oborona (Youth Movement), Moscow, Russia

Russia's Foreign Policy: A Review of Putin's Rule

Charlotta Spolander (Finland), Centre for European Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland

Discussant

Luís Pereira da Costa (Portugal), Crisis Platform and Policy Coordination, DG External Relations, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium

Discussant

Organizers

Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff Director of the Research Institute, DGAP

David Bosold, Head of Program of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP

Kathrin Brockmann, Program Officer of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP

Magdalena Łecka, Program Assistant of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP

Yulia Loeva, Program Assistant of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP

Impressum

April 2009
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V.
Rauchstraße 17/18
10787 Berlin
Deutschland

Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0
Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16

info@dgap.org
www.dgap.org

Fotos
Konferenzteilnehmer

Satz
Tilman Chladek

Belichtung und Druck
Messedruck Leipzig GmbH

ISBN: 978-39810553-8-2

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie. Detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

